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Abstract: This thesis examines how the agency of informal vendors in Kampala, Uganda, is shaped 
by the state. It argues that efforts by the President and the NRM to monopolize political power 
have dramatically restricted the agency of informal street and market vendors, forcing them to 
adapt to changing political circumstances in ways that have limited their ability to participate in 
urban development and economic life. This argument is presented through two examples of how 
expanding political control has led to a contraction of vendors’ agency. The first of these describes 
how the early decentralization and democratization reforms introduced by the NRM allowed street 
vendors to take advantage of competition between newly elected and empowered politicians to 
remain on the city’s streets, and how the central government’s subsequent recentralization and de-
democratization of political power in Kampala has led to the repression of street vending while 
closing the channels of influence that vendors previously enjoyed. The second explores how efforts 
by the central government to undermine the opposition-led local government allowed market 
vendors to successfully oppose an unpopular market privatization initiative, and how both the 
President and the new city government have since been able to take advantage of disputes within 
markets for their own purposes while vendors have been largely unable to realize their market 
management and development ambitions. Both examples detail the causes, forms and implications 
of the ruling party’s monopolization of political power and explore how vendors have responded 
to their changing political circumstances, highlighting how these efforts face significant obstacles 
due to the increasingly restrictive environment in which vendors are forced to act. This thesis 
shows that the agency of informal vendors—while always manifest in certain ways—is constantly 
and increasingly constrained as the President and the ruling party tighten their grip on power. As 
their political exclusion precipitates a broader exclusion from urban development and economic 
life, informal vendors are forced to contend with a situation of increasing marginalization and 
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Note on Currencies 
 
This thesis describes values in either Ugandan Shillings (UGX) or United States Dollars (USD). 
The currency that is referenced in any particular instance is the one involved in the valuation or 
transaction under discussion.   
The value of the Ugandan Shilling fluctuates considerably. Between February and August 2015, 
the period during which fieldwork for this thesis was undertaken, the Shilling fell from 
approximately 2855 per USD to 3663 per USD. Throughout 2016, it remained relatively stable at 
a value of between about 3305 per USD and 3478 per USD. All figures cited here are nominal 
rather than real values.   
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Chapter One: Introduction 
 
Part I: Research Problem 
Informal economic activity is a central feature of economic life in many developing states. 
Defined as any otherwise legal income-generating activity that exists outside of the regulatory and 
revenue framework of the state, an estimated 66% of all non-agricultural workers in Sub-Saharan 
Africa engage in the informal sphere, along with 82% in South Asia, 65% in East and Southeast 
Asia and 51% in Latin America.1 Street and market vendors, urban transport providers, waste 
pickers, domestic workers, small-scale manufacturers and service providers, construction workers 
and other casual labourers all commonly operate in the informal economy, representing a wide 
variety of livelihood strategies and employment relationships.   
Despite its prevalence, however, informal economic activity is commonly neglected in 
scholarly and policy literature. Economic analysis frequently treats informality as non-existent, 
and when it is acknowledged, it is often done so in a brief, cursory manner. Even more scholarly 
treatments commonly present the informal sphere as opaque and incomprehensible.2 When 
informal economic activity is addressed in a more direct and detailed way, a perspective that is 
notably absent from most discussions of informality is that of informal actors themselves.3 This is 
not merely an oversight. Informal actors are commonly assumed, whether implicitly or explicitly, 
to possess limited capacity for agency. Their economic marginalization is extended to a more 
general inability to alter their circumstances, with their informal status rendering them, by 
definition, disconnected from and outside of the scope of political life. Because informal actors 
are assumed to lack virtually any form of political voice, questions about their agency frequently 
remain unaddressed.4 
                                                          
1 Vanek, Joann et al., “Statistics on the Informal Economy: Definitions, Regional Estimates and Challenges,” Women 
in Informal Employment Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) Working Paper (Statistics) N.2, April 2014, 10. 
Figures are averages for 2004-2010.  
2 This phenomenon is described in Meagher, Kate, Identity Economics: Social Networks and the Informal Economy 
in Nigeria, Oxford: James Currey, 2010, 6-7. 
3 The term ‘informal actors’ is used here to refer to all individuals who engage in informal economic activity.  
4 The literature addressed in this introduction is reviewed in detail below. For prominent examples of early literature 
on informal economic activity, see: Hart, Keith, “Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana,” 
The Journal of Modern African Studies 11 (1) 1973: 61-89; and Portes, Alejandro, Manuel Castells and Lauren A. 
Benton eds., The Informal Economy: Studies in Advanced and Less Developed Countries, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1989. 
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Several authors have come to question the silence surrounding agency in the informal 
sphere by focusing on the ways in which informal actors are able to insert themselves into urban 
development processes. Neoliberal accounts of informal economic activity offer the most 
influential understanding of the agency of the urban poor, presenting informality as a form of 
liberation from the state and a form of resistance to a political and economic status quo that is 
viewed as unjust, overly burdensome or otherwise flawed.5 Other authors have instead examined 
the specific forms that the agency of informal actors can take, including using the political support 
that they can provide to state officials to further their interests,6 forming or participating in 
organizations7 and practices of evasion and mutual assistance.8 Both sets of scholars have begun 
to address new questions surrounding how informal actors seek to overcome their marginalization 
and the impact that these efforts can have. This work has allowed scholarship to move beyond 
traditional debates surrounding the causes of informality and the most appropriate means of 
encouraging formalization, and to instead focus on its political dimensions and the struggles that 
it entails.  
Despite the value of this literature, it is still underdeveloped and many important questions 
surrounding the political actions of informal actors remain. The extent to which agency is 
dependent on political structures, circumstances and particular alignments of power deserves 
further attention, as does how the agency of informal actors is facilitated and/or constrained by 
particular state actions and broader political changes. Given that the state is often a primary target, 
obstacle, facilitator or vehicle for political action and a central party to the issues that informal 
actors mobilize around, its impact on agency merits full examination. It is impossible to understand 
the agency of informal actors without recognizing the centrality of the state, but existing treatments 
often provide only partial accounts of specific instances of state power, fail to consider how the 
state evolves over time or largely ignore the state altogether.9 Such a shortcoming allows for 
valuable new research to be undertaken.  
                                                          
5 De Soto, Hernando, The Other Path: The Invisible Revolution in the Third World, trans. June Abbott, New York: 
Harper & Row, 1989; and Tripp, Aili Mari, Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal 
Economy in Tanzania, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. 
6 Cross, John C., Informal Politics: Street Vendors and the State in Mexico City, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
1998a. 
7 Lindell, Ilda ed., Africa’s Informal Workers: Collective Agency, Alliances and Transnational Organization in Urban 
Africa, London: Zed Books, 2010. 
8 Steel, Griet, “Whose Paradise? Itinerant Street Vendors’ Individual and Collective Practices of Political Agency in 
the Tourist Streets of Cusco, Peru,” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 36 (5) 2012: 1007-1021. 
9 The most significant treatment of the state in this regard can be found in ibid.  
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Using informal street and market vending in Kampala, Uganda as a case study, this thesis 
addresses these gaps in existing literature by analyzing how the state shapes the agency of a 
particularly prominent group of informal actors in a highly contested urban environment. It details 
how the desire of the President and the ruling party to capture control of the city from the popular 
opposition has further marginalized street and market vendors and narrowed their opportunities 
for exercising agency, and explores how street and market vendors have responded to these 
changing circumstances in their continued efforts to participate in urban development. In doing so, 
it presents a critique of neoliberal interpretations of the informal sphere as a space for agency and 
disengagement from the state, instead demonstrating how agency can be permanently constrained 
by the constant encroachment of state power. The insights that it offers have profound implications 
for understanding informality both in Uganda and beyond. 
  
Part II: Thesis Overview 
i. Research Question 
This thesis addresses the following question: How does the state shape the agency of 
informal vendors in Kampala? It does so by empirically examining what characteristics of the state 
most fundamentally impact the form and success of vendors’ efforts to participate in urban 
development and economic life in the city, and by analyzing how informal vendors are impacted 
by and respond to changing political circumstances as the nature of and their relationship with the 
state evolves over time.  
 
ii. Argument 
This thesis argues that efforts by the National Resistance Movement (NRM) and President 
Yoweri Museveni to monopolize their control over the state at both the local and national level 
have dramatically restricted the agency of informal street and market vendors in Kampala, forcing 
them to adapt to changing political circumstances in ways that have limited their ability to 
participate in urban development and economic life in the city. Shortly after coming to power, the 
NRM introduced extensive (if flawed) decentralization and democratization programs as a means 
of expanding its own legitimacy and popular support, briefly allowing informal vendors to take 
advantage of competition between the ruling party and the opposition to exercise influence over 
important policy matters. As a result, street vendors were able to remain on the streets of Kampala 
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and market vendors were (largely) able to resist the privatization of the city’s markets. Determined 
to regain control of the city from the opposition, however, the central government ultimately took 
direct control over Kampala, disempowering the opposition and marginalizing local politicians, 
while Museveni and the ruling party have further sought to entrench their political control by 
establishing extensive patronage networks, co-opting or repressing independent organizations and 
influencing electoral outcomes through populist appeals, manipulation and the use of state 
resources. These ongoing and intensifying attempts to (re)assert hegemony have caused a gradual 
erosion of the competitive political environment that temporarily facilitated vendors’ agency, 
ultimately de-democratizing and recentralizing political power in the city and creating an 
environment that is defined by a high degree of political, economic and social control. As the 
hegemony of the President and the NRM has expanded, the agency of informal vendors has 
contracted.  
Informal vendors have been forced to adapt to their changing political circumstances. As 
the conditions that facilitated political influence have disappeared and the new centrally controlled 
local government has sought to legitimize its existence by implementing ambitious urban 
development plans, street vendors have faced significant repression and struggled to maintain their 
place in the city’s physical and economic landscape. Street vendors have responded to their new 
circumstances by seeking to co-operate with relocation efforts, adopting small-scale strategies to 
continue their activities or attempting to organize to restore their political voice, but all of these 
strategies have significant limitations, and none have succeeded in reversing their increasing 
vulnerability. Market vendors have similarly (if less dramatically) struggled to control their 
economic fortunes and secure involvement in Kampala’s urban development processes, and have 
experienced major conflicts surrounding market ownership and development that have been 
brought about and manipulated by the President and the ruling party. While some vendors’ 
organizations have been able to advance their management and development claims by 
establishing ties with either the President or the new local government, this has allowed Museveni 
and the NRM, in turn, to pursue their interests in the city’s markets, while agency has otherwise 
been limited as groups of market vendors regularly face co-option, neglect or repression, and often 
reflect existing hierarchies within markets, fail to represent members’ interests and struggle to 
implement management and development plans. For both street and market vendors, elections 
provide important periods of political competition, but the gains that they allow informal vendors 
Young  5 
 
to make are either temporary or do not alter the fundamental marginalization that vendors 
experience. For informal vendors in Kampala, agency is still possible, but in the increasingly 
restricted political environment in which they are forced to operate, it is precarious and constantly 
constrained, and it rarely leads to any meaningful improvement in their political, social or 
economic conditions. The President’s and the NRM’s ongoing expansion of political power has 
significantly limited the ability of informal vendors to participate in urban development and 
economic life in the city.  
This argument is presented by detailing specific efforts by the President and the ruling 
party to strengthen their control over the state and to (re)design state structures, institutions and 
policies with the ultimate objective of solidifying their political dominance, and by exploring how 
informal vendors have responded to the changing political realities that these efforts have entailed 
in their ongoing attempt to participate in urban development. It is primarily laid out through two 
accounts that are at the core of this thesis. The first of these details how street vending was able to 
thrive in the city due to the NRM’s twin decentralization and democratization programs, and how 
the practice was subsequently outlawed following the central government’s takeover of the city. 
The second explores how conflicts between the central and local government allowed market 
vendors to oppose an unpopular market privatization initiative, and how state actors have since 
been able to take advantage of disputes within markets to pursue their own agendas while vendors 
have been largely unable to realize their market management and development ambitions. These 
two accounts are tied together by the common thread of expanding political control and 
diminishing—but never completely disappearing—vendors’ agency that results in further 
marginalization from urban development and economic life, a thread that, this thesis argues, is the 
defining feature of the politics of informality in Kampala..  
 
iii. Aims of this Study 
This thesis aims to provide a detailed analysis of how the state has shaped the agency of 
informal vendors in Kampala, Uganda. It offers both a ‘bottom-up’ view of the evolution of the 
Ugandan state under Museveni and the NRM as well as an analysis of how informal vendors have 
navigated and negotiated their changing political circumstances. In doing so, it uses the 
relationship between agency and the state as a lens through which to view the inadequacies and 
challenge the core assumptions of common neoliberal treatments of informal economic activity 
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more generally. While it explores these themes in the context of informal vending in Kampala, its 
argument has fundamental implications for understanding informality and the political economy 
of urban development that resonate beyond the confines of its particular case study.  
 
a) Neoliberal Perspectives on Informal Economic Activity  
The primary contribution that this thesis makes to current scholarship is the critique that it 
presents of the neoliberal approaches to informal economic activity that dominate academic and 
policy debates. Following the influential work of de Soto, neoliberal treatments of informality 
view the phenomenon as a form of grassroots market activity undertaken by small-scale 
entrepreneurs outside of the regulatory reach of the state.10 Informality, in this view, is the result 
of a rational choice by the poor to disengage from an unjust, unrepresentative political and 
economic system and a response to systemic exclusion and public mismanagement. It thus offers 
a form of popular empowerment for the urban poor at the expense of the state that reflects the 
creativity, resourcefulness and resilience of urban life.11 Indeed, some contend, informal economic 
activity can have a transformative impact on the state by forcing it to accommodate the livelihood 
strategies of the urban poor, providing an important impetus for economic liberalization.12 These 
perspectives on informality have had a profound and wide-ranging impact on the theory and praxis 
of international development, particularly due to their influence on the World Bank,13 and have 
created a consensus around a set of policy prescriptions that aim to reduce taxes, regulations and 
state bureaucracy while strengthening entrepreneurship as a solution to poverty through 
microfinance, formalization and private sector development campaigns.14 Such initiatives are in 
line with the broader neoliberal objective of minimizing the role of the state at the expense of 
private enterprise that has come to dominate international development.15 
This thesis contends that neoliberal perspectives on informal economic activity are far too 
sanguine. This misguided optimism is rooted in a fundamental misconceptualization of the 
                                                          
10 De Soto.  
11 This view is also reflected in depictions of the agency of the poor in literature on urban Africa. See, in particular, 
Simone, AbdouMaliq, For the City Yet to Come: Changing Life in Four African Cities, Durham: Duke University 
Press, 2004. 
12 Tripp (1997).  
13 See, for example, Perry, Guillermo E. et al., Informality: Exit and Exclusion, The World Bank, Washington D.C., 
2007.  
14 Examples of important work that adopts a neoliberal perspective on informality can be found in Chapter Two, Notes 
57-66.  
15 Uganda’s history of economic liberalization under the NRM is explored in Chapter Three, Part II, Section iii.  
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relationship between agency and the state in the informal sphere. By focusing on this relationship 
in the context of informal vending in Kampala, this thesis moves away from treatments of the state 
as relevant for the provision of an adequately liberalized regulatory and revenue environment and 
instead builds upon arguments about the importance of power and control, internal political 
calculations16 and the imposition of certain ‘modern’ forms of development.17 In doing so, it 
critiques the idea that informality embodies a form of liberation from the state, arguing instead that 
the informal sphere is a space that is fundamentally defined by the state in which economically 
vulnerable groups face further marginalization due to broader political changes over which they 
have little control.  
The informal sphere is defined not by the popular agency of the urban poor, but the constant 
and ubiquitous presence of state power that permanently entangles those who participate in it. Far 
from offering a space for popular empowerment by allowing the poor to disengage from state, it 
subjects the poor to extensive and varied forms of state interference, co-option, repression and 
clientelism driven by the interests of those in power, all of which heavily circumscribe their agency 
and have a detrimental impact their livelihoods. While neoliberal approaches correctly focus on 
agency in the context of the institutional environment that informal actors find themselves in, their 
depiction of small-scale entrepreneurs engaging in grassroots market activity outside of and in 
response to burdensome laws and regulations misses the significance of the state for agency in the 
informal sphere; the poor do not exercise agency by disengaging from the state due to a lack of 
economic liberalization, but seek to navigate a complex and unstable political and institutional 
environment that is defined by the state in their efforts to participate in urban development and 
economic life. Informality offers not liberation from the state but further vulnerability and 
marginalization in the face of state power with little prospect of ‘changing the rules’ according to 
popular understandings of justice.18 The agency of informal actors does not shape political change; 
political change shapes the agency of informal actors. An appropriate understanding of informality 
requires a detailed analysis of how this occurs.  
 
                                                          
16 Cross (1998b).  
17 Bromley, Ray, “Street Vending and Public Policy: A Global Review,” The International Journal of Sociology and 
Social Policy 20 (1/2) 2000: 1-28; and Setšabi, Setšabi and Resetselemang Clement Leduka, “The Politics of Street 
Trading in Maseru, Lesotho,” Urban Forum 19 (3) 2008: 221-241. 
18 The concept of ‘changing the rules’ is borrowed from Tripp (1997).  
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b) Agency and the State in the Informal Sphere 
In its critique of neoliberal approaches to informal economic activity, this thesis builds on 
treatments of agency in the informal sphere that explore the ability of informal actors to challenge 
their marginalization and participate in urban development. Rizzo, addressing similar themes, 
stresses the importance of identifying the structural impediments to agency by placing informal 
actors within their proper economic and social context, highlighting fundamental questions of 
ownership and power that lie at the heart of the dynamics of informal labour.19 This thesis adopts 
a comparable emphasis on the structural constraints to agency in the informal sphere by placing 
informal actors in their proper political context, inquiring into the role of the state in defining the 
environment in which vendors act and limiting their ability to participate in urban development 
and economic life.  
Placing the state at the centre of its analysis, this thesis engages with the growing body of 
literature that emphasizes the ability of informal actors to exercise agency through political 
influence, organization and small-scale resistance.20 While such work serves as a valuable 
corrective to neoliberal treatments of informality, it too often fails to situate agency in its full 
political context and consider the contingency of the actors and events that it describes. The state, 
of course, is not absent from these accounts, and some—most notably Cross—provide 
foundational insights into how agency can be dependent on existing state structures and prevailing 
forms of political power.21 What is needed, however, is a full account of the state and its relation 
to specific forms and manifestations of agency that is sensitive to the dynamics of power that mark 
the politics of informal economic activity. Key features of the state, including its political 
processes and institutions, its specific functions and operation, its internal and external networks, 
its co-option or repression of independent or oppositional groups, its forms of representation and 
electoral competition and its implementation urban development programs, deserve further 
attention for the profound impact they can have on agency, and questions of how and why these 
change are crucial for a complete understanding of the politics of informality. This thesis therefore 
offers a full analysis of the how the state evolves over time, how this evolution is tied to questions 
of political power and how the increasing monopolization of power impacts the agency of informal 
                                                          
19 Rizzo, Matteo, Taken for a Ride: Grounding Neoliberalism, Precarious Labour, and Public Transport in an African 
Metropolis, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.  
20 This literature is explored in Chapter Two, Part II, Section iv.  
21 See Cross (1998b).  
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actors in specific ways, with a particular emphasis on the central role that a powerful, self-
interested executive and political party can play in these processes. 
While it is important to challenge the common depiction of informal actors as either 
apolitical or passive victims of underdevelopment, it is equally crucial to recognize the significant 
structural impediments that the poor face as they seek to exercise agency in their efforts to 
participate in urban development. Placing the agency of informal vendors in its proper political 
context can balance the need to incorporate the diverse experiences, strategies and objectives of 
the urban poor into development narratives with the risk of romanticizing their ability to control 
their political and economic fortunes, and thus offer a more nuanced and complete account of the 
possibilities and limitations of urban life in the face of various forms of political, economic and 
social exclusion. The (re)politicization of the informal sphere and the contextualization of the 
agency of informal actors can have significant implications for both scholarship and policy. Such 
a task is precisely what this thesis seeks to accomplish.  
 
c) Other Contributions 
This thesis makes several secondary contributions to existing scholarship. In particular, it 
contributes to understandings of the specific forms of political action that it describes. The ability 
of marginalized groups to use protest,22 clientelism23 and everyday resistance24 to advance their 
interests is widely recognized, and outbreaks of popular political action in Sub-Saharan Africa are 
receiving renewed attention.25 Understanding how and why members of a particularly large 
segment of the urban poor engage in different forms of political action, and the role that the state 
plays in shaping the agency surrounding these actions, promises to add important insights to this 
work. 
This thesis similarly explores broader themes surrounding the nature of the state, both in 
Uganda and beyond. By focusing on the monopolization of power by the executive and ruling 
                                                          
22 Piven, Francis Fox and Richard A. Cloward, Poor People’s Movements: Why they Succeed, How they Fail, New 
York: Pantheon Books, 1977.  
23 Gay, Robert, Popular Organization and Democracy in Rio de Janeiro: A Tale of Two Favelas, Philadelphia: Temple 
University Press, 1994. 
24 Scott, James C., Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts, New Haven: Yale University Press, 
1990; and Scott, James C., Weapons of the Weak: Everyday forms of Peasant Resistance, New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1985. 
25 Branch, Adam and Zachariah Mampilly, Africa Uprising: Popular Protest and Political Change, London: Zed 
Books, 2015.  
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party, the politicization of state institutions and offices, constant social and economic 
encroachment, the extensive use of co-option and repression to minimize opposition and informal 
negotiation processes that tie the state to large segments of society, its portrayal of the Ugandan 
state can be viewed in the context of more general literature on the nature of the state in Sub-
Saharan Africa that centres on neopatrimonialism,26 corruption,27 personal rule,28 ‘informal’ 
politics29 and the ‘instrumentalization of disorder’.30 More broadly, it details how those who 
control the state can use repression31 or manipulate electoral politics32 for their own ends, and how 
the state can evolve over time due to their efforts to (re)assert hegemony in an environment of 
ostensible political liberalization. By focusing on the politics of informal vending, this thesis 
provides a valuable counterbalance to ‘top-down’ views of the state by highlighting how the 
evolution of the state over time is experienced and adapted to by a particularly marginalized 
segment of the urban poor.  
Finally, this thesis adds to existing understandings of the political economy of Uganda by 
addressing the political significance of informal vending and the complex and constantly changing 
relationship between informal vendors and the state. Very little has been written about informal 
economic activity in Uganda, representing a significant gap in the literature surrounding a country 
where the informal sphere accounts for such a considerable portion of employment and economic 
output.33 The nature of the Ugandan state has received more scholarly attention, but rarely in the 
context of its relationship to the country’s informal economy. The issue of how the state shapes 
the agency of informal vendors in Uganda has never been explicitly explored. This project 
                                                          
26 Bach, Daniel C. and Mamoudou Gazibo eds., Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond, London: Routledge, 2012; 
Bratton, Michael and Nicolas Van de Walle, “Neopatrimonial Regimes and Political Transitions in Africa,” World 
Politics 46 (4) 1994: 453-489; Le Vine, Victor T., “African Patrimonial Régimes in Comparative Perspective,” The 
Journal of Modern African Studies 18 (4) 1980: 657-673; and Médard, Jean-François, “The Underdeveloped State 
in Tropical Africa: Political Clientelism or Neopatrimonialism?” in Private Patronage and Public Power: Political 
Clientelism in the Modern State, by Clapham, Christopher ed., London: Frances Pinter, 1982, 162-192. 
27 De Sardan, J.P. Olivier, “A Moral Economy of Corruption in Africa?” The Journal of Modern African Studies 31 
(1) 1999: 25-52. 
28 Jackson, Robert H. and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant, 
Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982.  
29 Chazan, Naomi, “The New Politics of Participation in Tropical Africa,” Comparative Politics 14 (2) 1982: 169-
189. 
30 Chabal, Patrick and Jean-Pascal Daloz, Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument, Oxford: International 
African Institute and James Currey, 1999. 
31 Davenport, Christian, “State Repression and Political Order,” Annual Review of Political Science 10 (1) 2007: 1-
23. 
32 Schedler, Andreas, “Elections Without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation,” Journal of Democracy 13 (2) 
2002: 36-50.  
33 Relevant literature is discussed below, as are specific figures. 
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addresses the notable lack of attention that the politics of informal economic activity in Uganda 
receives, and, in doing so, uncovers what these politics reveal about the political economy of 
Uganda and the Ugandan state more generally.  
 
iv. Case Study Selection 
Kampala has been selected as an ideal place to study the politics of informal vending for a 
number of reasons. The first of these pertains to the politics of the city. Due to the decentralization 
and democratization programs introduced by the NRM after coming to power in 1986, by 1998, 
the Kampala City Council (KCC) had come under the control of newly empowered politicians 
who depended on popular support for their elected positions for effectively the first time in the 
city’s history. The introduction of electoral politics also allowed the popular opposition to 
dominate the KCC and, due to decentralization, have significant control over policy formation and 
implementation in the city. On March 1, 2011, however, the central government replaced the 
elected (and opposition-controlled) KCC with a new body, the Kampala Capital City Authority 
(KCCA), which is instead structured in a way that invests considerable powers in centrally 
appointed technocrats. The introduction of the KCCA marks a significant reversal of the NRM’s 
previous decentralization and democratization efforts, and signalled a major transformation of the 
politics of Kampala as the central government sought to regain control of the city from the 
opposition. This dramatic (re)assertion of power provides a fascinating environment in which to 
study the politics of informality.  
Informal vendors in Kampala also face frequent attempts by the state to regulate or 
eliminate their activities and to impose ‘development’ on the informal sphere. Immediately after 
its introduction, the KCCA imposed a strict ban on street vending in the city, a move that has led 
to a significant rise in the persecution of street vendors and a major decline in the occurrence of 
the activity. The KCCA later announced that it would begin to prosecute customers of informal 
street vendors as well as the vendors themselves.34 The KCC tried to privatize the city’s markets 
between 2002 and 2007, and while this was unsuccessful, struggles surrounding the ownership and 
development of markets are ongoing. Both the KCCA and the central government currently have 
major plans to redevelop markets throughout the city in order to transform them into ‘modern’ 
shopping centres. The state is also taking significant steps to promote formalization, including the 
                                                          
34 Mukisa, Farahani, “Kampala Street Buyers Face Arrest – KCCA Says,” Daily Monitor, 25 August 2013.  
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introduction of the Taxpayer Registration Expansion Program (TREP), a joint project of the 
KCCA, the Uganda Revenue Authority (URA), the Uganda Registration Services Bureau (URSB) 
and local governments;35 the requirement that all persons seeking a licence or official authorization 
from a government body produce a Tax Identification Number (TIN); and raising the presumptive 
tax threshold for small businesses.36 These efforts follow a longer trend of state attempts to reduce 
or regulate informal economic activity that, despite limited success, has resulted in several 
confrontations between the state and informal actors.37 How informal actors are able to take 
advantage of the opportunities available to them to further their interests while navigating the 
policies and actions of the state deserves further analysis.  
The national political environment that exists in Uganda is also particularly relevant. Much 
of the literature on contemporary Uganda emphasizes the prevalence of neopatrimonialism, 
corruption and informal processes, structures and systems of power in the country, along with the 
various ways that the NRM or Museveni manipulate both the public and the state for their own 
purposes.38 The extent to which the Ugandan state combines elements of authoritarianism and 
democracy to strategically consolidate power in an environment of liberalization has also been 
highlighted.39 It has been argued that extensive patron-client networks have been able to capture 
otherwise adversarial groups,40 including the country’s formal labour movement.41 State power, 
however, is not absolute. This results in occasional conflicts between the state and elements of 
Ugandan society, a reality perhaps most notably demonstrated by a string on contentious elections 
and the outbreak of the Walk to Work Protests in 2011. The state’s continued efforts to repress the 
                                                          
35 Onyango, Emma, “Uganda Tax Agency to Widen Net,” East African Business Week, 7 April 2014; and Ssempebwa, 
Allan Kyobe, “Tax Register Expansion Project to Tap into the Informal Sector,” The Observer, 9 February 2014.  
36 Busuulwa, Bernard, “Informal Sector Next Target in Uganda Tax Drive,” The East African, 20 June 2015.  
37 Gombay, Christie, “Eating Cities: Urban Management and Markets in Kampala,” Cities 11 (2) 1994: 86-94; and 
Goodfellow, Tom and Kristof Titeca, “Presidential Intervention and the Changing ‘Politics of Survival’ in Kampala’s 
Informal Economy,” Cities 29 (4) 2012: 264-270. 
38 Tripp, Aili Mari, Museveni’s Uganda: Paradoxes of Power in a Hybrid Regime, Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 
2010; Asiimwe, Godfrey B., “Of Extensive and Elusive Corruption in Uganda: Neo-Patronage, Power, and Narrow 
Interests,” African Studies Review 56 (2) 2013: 129-144; Khisa, Moses, “The Making of the ‘Informal State’ in 
Uganda,” Africa Development 30 (1/2) 2013: 191-226; Muhumuza, William, “From Fundamental Change to No 
Change: The NRM and Democratization in Uganda,” Les Cahiers d’Afrique de l’Est 41 (1) 2009: 21-42; Mwenda, 
Andrew M., “Personalizing Power in Uganda,” Journal of Democracy 18 (3) 2007: 23-37; and Mwenda, Andrew M. 
and Roger Tangri, “Patronage Politics, Donor Reforms, and Regime Consolidation in Uganda,” African Affairs 104 
(416) 2005: 449-467. 
39 Tripp (2010).  
40 Mwenda. 
41 Barya, John-Jean, “Trade Unions, Liberalisation and Politics in Uganda,” in Trade Unions & Party Politics: Labour 
Movements in Africa, by Beckman, Björn, Sakhela Buhlungu and Lloyd Sachikonye eds., Cape Town: Human 
Sciences Research Council Press, 2010, 85-107. 
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opposition also resulted in the passage of the Public Order Management Act, which bans 
unauthorized public political discussions involving more than three people, in August 2013.42 The 
Ugandan state’s employment of various forms of co-option and repression in different contexts 
creates a fascinating environment in which to study the politics of informal vending.     
Second, Uganda has pursued large-scale economic liberalization under the leadership of 
the NRM, and is widely regarded as a successful example of the virtues of market-based 
development in Sub-Saharan Africa.43 The impact of economic liberalization on informal 
economic activity is a widely debated topic, with many believing that market reforms are essential 
for encouraging formalization and others arguing that liberalization compounds the unequal 
market integration that characterizes informality.44 Paired with the country’s economic 
liberalization are ambitious plans for the development of Kampala under the KCCA,45 which too 
deserve further attention given that similar notions of urban modernity elsewhere frequently 
exclude or involve the repression of informal vendors.46 Kampala provides an excellent 
environment in which to explore issues surrounding liberalization, development and informality, 
many of which this project will touch upon in its examination of the state and vendor agency.  
Finally, Kampala presents an ideal setting in which to study informal economic activity 
due to the prevalence of informality in the city. The Uganda Bureau of Statistics (UBOS) estimated 
that 52.2% of non-agricultural employment in the city in 2009/2010 was in the informal sphere, 
meaning that the majority of people who work in Kampala do so in the informal rather than formal 
economy.47 Some informal activities are so widespread and visible that they are defining features 
of the city’s economic, social, political and physical landscape, including boda-boda (motorcycle 
taxi) driving, work in the matatu (minibus) industry and, as this thesis examines, street and market 
vending. Before the KCCA introduced its ban on street vending, approximately 8,500 street 
                                                          
42 “The Public Order Management Act,” 2013.  
43 For an overview of economic liberalization in Uganda, see: Kuteesa, Florence, Emmanuel Tumusiime-Mutebile, 
Alan Whitworth and Tim Williamson eds., Uganda’s Economic Reforms: Insider Accounts, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2010; and Reinikka, Ritva and Paul Collier eds., Uganda’s Recovery: The Role of Farms, Firms and 
Government, Washington D.C.: The World Bank, 2001.  
44 The first position is perhaps best presented in De Soto. The second view is advanced in Portes, Castells and Benton 
eds. 
45 “Strategic Plan 2014/15-2018/19: Laying the Foundation for Kampala City Transformation,” Kampala Capital City 
Authority, 2014. 
46 Bromley (2000); and Setšabi and Leduka.  
47 “Uganda National Household Survey 2009/2010: Abridged Report,” Uganda Bureau of Statistics, November 2010, 
41.  
14  Young 
 
vendors operated in Kampala;48 despite the KCCA’s ban, hundreds or even thousands remain.49 
Market vending is even more ubiquitous, and likely involves around 150,000 people.50 In a city 
with a population of 1,936,000 people in 2015,51 the significance of markets as centres of economic 
activity is obvious.  
Similarly, as in other developing states, informal economic activity is widespread in 
Uganda, constituting a large portion of the country’s economy. Uganda’s informal sphere accounts 
for over 48% of the country’s gross domestic product (GDP)52 and, according to the UBOS’s 
2009/2010 report, 58% of all of its non-agricultural employment.53 These figures are likely 
increasing as well, as the UBOS claims that Uganda’s informal sphere is currently growing more 
quickly than its formal counterpart.54 The combination of widespread informality and extensive 
economic liberalization that exists in Uganda has significant implications; perhaps most notably, 
the Ugandan government only takes in 11.9% of the country’s GDP as annual revenue,55 the lowest 
share in Sub-Saharan Africa and far below the regional average of 17%.56  
Despite its size, Uganda’s informal economy has received limited attention from scholars 
and policymakers. The UBOS included a section on informal economic activity in the 2009/2010 
edition of its National Household Survey, but this was mainly for the purpose of statistical 
measurement and reveals little about how Uganda’s informal sphere actually operates or the 
                                                          
48 Lambright, Gina M. S., “Opposition Politics and Urban Service Delivery in Kampala, Uganda,” UNU-WIDER, 
Working Paper No. 2012/51, May 2012, 22.  
49 It is extremely difficult to provide an accurate estimate of the number of street vendors in Kampala. One of the main 
reasons for this is the fact that, as this thesis details, the total figure fluctuates considerably over time as vendors 
occupy and vacate the city’s streets due to changing political circumstances. An estimated 1,900 street vendors were 
operating in the city centre before the most recent evictions began in October 2016, but this figure was likely high 
given the increase in street vending that occurred around the 2016 elections. See “Vendors Must Leave Kampala 
Streets- Museveni,” Daily Monitor, 4 November 2016. 
50 This figure is estimate based on the research undertaken for this thesis. Also see Figure 3 below.  
51 “World Urbanization Prospects: The 2014 Revision,” United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 
New York, 2015, 345.  
52 Calculated from “2015 Statistical Abstract,” Uganda Bureau of Statistics, October 2015, 232-233. For different 
estimates, see: Kibelebele, Winnie Tabitha, “Informal Sector Now Growing Faster, Says Ubos,” Saturday Monitor, 
14 February 2014; Nantaba, Agnes E., “Informal Business Taxes Start to Bite,” The Independent, 24 August 2015; 
Schneider, Friedrich, “The Shadow Economy and Work in the Shadow: What Do We (Not) Know?” The Institute for 
the Study of Labour, Discussion Paper No. 6423, March 2012, 64; and Schneider, Friedrich, Andreas Buehn and 
Claudio E. Montenegro, “Shadow Economies All over the World: New Estimates for 162 Countries from 1999 to 
2007,” The World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper 5356, July 2010, 20, 22, 27, 29 and 47.  
53 “Uganda National Household Survey 2009/2010”, 41. 
54 Kibelebele. 
55 “The Growth Challenge: Can Ugandan Cities Get to Work?” Uganda Economic Update, Fifth Edition, The World 
Bank Group, Report No. 94622, February 2015, 14. Figure for 2014/15 fiscal year.  
56 Kibelebele. It is claimed here that the government takes in 12.7% of GDP as revenue. The lower figure of 11.9% is 
cited in this study because the source is more recent.  
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realities that informal actors experience.57 A similar chapter was notably absent from the following 
National Household Survey for 2012/2013.58 Work by the World Bank has also addressed the topic 
of informality in Uganda, but not in the context of the themes explored in this thesis.59 A small 
number of academics have studied Uganda’s informal sphere, and some have specifically focused 
on informality in Kampala, but this work, while valuable, remains conceptually and thematically 
distinct from this thesis.60  




It is necessary to define some key terms for conceptual clarity and analytical utility. Since 
this thesis examines how the state shapes the agency of informal vendors, three central terms are 
defined here: informal economic activity, the state and agency. 
 
a) Informal Economic Activity 
This study defines informal economic activity as any otherwise legal income generation 
outside of the official regulatory and revenue apparatus of the state. Three aspects of this definition 
are particularly important: that some form of monetary payment is involved, thereby excluding 
barter systems and subsistence agriculture; that the goods and services being traded are themselves 
legal, meaning their ‘informal status’ surrounds the conditions under which they are sold; and that 
what renders them ‘informal’ is the failure or refusal to adhere to at least some, but by no means 
all, of the legal requirements for official registration, regulation and taxation set by the state. The 
political dimensions of informality are thus implicit in the concept itself, which by its very nature 
                                                          
57 “Uganda National Household Survey 2009/2010”. 
58 “Uganda National Household Survey 2012/13,” Uganda Bureau of Statistics, 2014.  
59 See, for example: Bakeine, Amos, “Uganda Country Study Report: Raising Productivity and Reducing the Risk of 
Household Enterprises,” The World Bank, Kampala, December 2009; Fox, Louise and Obert Pimhidzai, “Is 
Informality Welfare-Enhancing Structural Transformation? Evidence from Uganda,” The World Bank, Policy 
Research Working Paper 5866, October 2011; and Ingram, Michael, Vijaya Ramachandran and Vyjayanti Desai, 
“Why do Firms Choose to be Informal? Evidence from Enterprise Surveys in Uganda,” The World Bank, September 
2007. 
60 See, for example: Lindell, Ilda and Jenny Appelblad, “Disabling Governance: Privatisation of City Markets and 
Implications for Vendors’ Associations in Kampala, Uganda,” Habitat International 33 (1) 2009: 397-404; Lince, 
Sarah, “The Informal Sector in Jinja, Uganda: Implications of Formalization and Regulation,” African Studies Review 
54 (2) 2011: 73-93; Gombay; and Goodfellow and Titeca. This work, and how it differs from this thesis, is explored 
in Chapter Two.  
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presupposes a certain degree of power and holds the state as its ultimate reference point in 
distinguishing between ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ activities. While some contend that the concept of 
the informal economy—sometimes referred to as the ‘informal sector’ or the ‘grey’, ‘shadow’ or 
‘underground’ economy61—is poorly defined, or even that broad definitions fail to capture 
significant variations that can exist both within and between countries,62 the definition that is 
employed here is standard across existing literature.  
This thesis focuses on informal vending, a subset of informal economic activity that 
involves the commercial sale of goods and services for monetary profit. Two types of informal 
vendors are specifically studied here. The first is market vendors, who operate within permanent 
built-up market areas throughout the city. Market vendors must pay various fees for access to the 
land and/or structures that they use. Markets in Kampala are either ‘gazetted’, meaning they are 
officially recognized by the state and the land on which they sit is designated for market use, or 
‘ungazetted’, meaning that they lack official recognition and do not occupy designated market 
space. Ungazetted markets are usually smaller and found outside of the centre of the city, while, 
with the exception of Park Yard Market, the major markets in the city centre are all gazetted (the 
implications of Park Yard’s status are addressed in this thesis).  
Street vendors constitute the second category of informal vendors studied in this thesis. In 
contrast to market vendors, street vendors operate outside of established market areas and instead 
sell in open public spaces, commonly the busy streets in the centre of the city. As a result, street 
vendors, unlike market vendors, are not confined to designated areas and pay for no rights of 
access. Much of the relevant literature does a poor job of distinguishing between market and street 
vendors, but separating the two is particularly necessary in Kampala as street vending is now 
illegal. Street vendors are sometimes further divided into three different categories: (1) mobile 
‘hawkers’ who move around the city; (2) vendors who remain stationary when selling their goods; 
and (3) vendors who establish small kiosks on city streets. All of these categories are included 
when referring to street vendors in this study (although street vendors who remain in the city centre 
rarely erect kiosks). The KCCA’s ban applies to all forms of street vending.  
                                                          
61 This study favours the terms ‘informality’, ‘informal economy’, ‘informal economic activity’ and ‘informal sphere’ 
as ‘informal sector’ can be taken to imply that informality and formality are separate and distinct when, in reality, 
there is a significant amount of overlap between the two. It also avoids the terms ‘grey’, ‘shadow’ and ‘underground’ 
as they are often used to mystify the concept rather in a way that is unhelpful for analysis.  
62 Mead, Donald C., “The Informal Sector Elephant,” World Development 24 (10) 1996: 1611-1619. 
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Rather than a simple ‘formal/informal’ binary, it is more appropriate to understand the 
relationship between different types of vending by placing them on a continuum that recognizes 
relative levels of adherence to relevant forms of regulation and taxation. Figure 1 classifies 
different types of vending according to location and places them on a scale that ranges from ‘less’ 
to ‘more’ formal:  
 
Figure 1: Formal/Informal Vending Continuum 
 





           City Streets                      Ungazetted Markets                     Gazetted Markets                     City Shops 
 
Street vending is classified as the ‘least’ formal form of vending since street vendors, by definition, 
do not adhere to official regulations on where and how goods can be sold. The introduction of the 
KCCA’s ban on street vending has deepened the informality of the activity even further. Because 
street vending is an illegal activity, vendors are also unlikely to register their businesses or pay 
taxes on their incomes. Vending in ungazetted markets is more formal than street vending because 
it is not illegal, but less formal than vending in gazetted markets because it does not adhere to state 
regulations on where market activity can take place. The fact that gazetted markets are recognized 
by the state means that they are, in important ways, not themselves informal, but are rather sites 
where informal economic activity is particularly concentrated given that market vendors often do 
not abide by business regulations—particularly those concerning registration and licensing—or 
pay business taxes. Finally, some vendors in city shops operate informally by, like many market 
vendors, failing to follow official regulations and pay necessary taxes. While doing so may be less 
common in city shops than it is in markets, the distinction between the two vending locations is 
less concrete than often assumed. 
The fact that the state holds the ultimate authority to signify whether an activity is 
‘informal’ or ‘formal’ means that common classifications reflect state developmental ambitions 
and understandings of modernity. As this thesis explores, both street and market vending are 
treated as informal because they are seen by the state as ‘out of place’ in a supposedly modern 
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urban landscape and economy.63 Thus even gazetted markets, despite their official recognition, are 
widely viewed as informal due to their failure to meet standards of construction, organization, 
cleanliness and aesthetics. For the state, informality is a problem to be solved through such 
measures as banning street vendors, transforming markets into ‘modern’ shopping centres and 
ensuring that all vendors are subject to business regulations and taxes. This thesis examines these 
aspirations and the implications of other forms of state power.   
 
b) The State 
The term ‘the state’ is used in this thesis to refer to the collection of government 
institutions, offices, legal arrangements and political processes that exist in Uganda from the local 
to the national level. The significance of the state is particularly emphasized in relation to the 
extent to which the President and the NRM have sought to entrench their political power by 
strengthening their grip on its offices, processes and institutions, blurring the lines between, on the 
one hand, the Ugandan state as in independent political entity, and on the other, the executive and 
political party that lead the government. This expansion of power has taken many forms: the design 
of non-inclusive institutions that are subject to a high degree of centralized control; the 
undermining and takeover of government bodies that are independent or controlled by the 
opposition; the marginalization of elected officials (particularly those who do not belong to the 
ruling party) in decision-making processes; the creation and proliferation of extensive personal 
networks and channels of influence outside of official state structures; the restriction of space for 
the opposition and independent civil society groups through repression and/or co-option; and 
attempts to influence electoral outcomes through overtly populist appeals, manipulation and the 
use of state resources for patronage purposes. In Kampala, this expansion of power has often been 
underpinned by the logic of urban management and development, with the ability to oversee 
development serving as a central component of Museveni’s legitimacy and that of the ruling party.  
 
c) Agency 
The concept of agency is used in this thesis to refer to the ability of informal vendors to act 
in accordance with their self-defined interests. Specifically, this thesis focuses on vendors’ agency 
                                                          
63 Inspired by Yamto, Yandi Andri, “Street Vendors as ‘Out of Place’ Urban Elements,” Journal of Urban Design 13 
(3) 2008: 387-402.  
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in terms of their ability to act in ways that allow them to participate in the city’s otherwise 
exclusionary urban economy and development processes.  
This thesis focuses on three ways in which the agency of informal vendors becomes 
manifest: through exercising political influence; through forming and/or participating in 
organizations that are designed (at least officially) to advance their interests; and through acts of 
small-scale resistance to repression and/or co-option efforts by the state.64 These can be defined as 
follows: 
 
1. Influence: the ability to impact the creation and implementation of policy or, more 
generally, the actions of politicians and state officials.  
2. Organization: the ability to establish and/or join vendors’ groups that focus on self-
governance, advocacy, legal and human rights protections, mutual assistance and/or, in 
the case of market associations, the management and development of the spaces in 
which vendors operate. 
3. Small-Scale Resistance: the ability to contest repression and/or co-option efforts 
through everyday activities or in daily interactions with politicians and state officials. 
 
Part III: Methodological Approach 
This study employs a qualitative approach that is primarily centred on the use of semi-
structured interviews, but also employs surveys, some participant observation and documentary 
analysis in order to strengthen or expand on information and themes raised by interview 
respondents. It is methodologically organized as follows.  
 
i. Research Design 
Data for this project was primarily collected during two phases of fieldwork in 2015, the 
first in February and March, and the second in July and August.  
 
a) Interviews 
In total, I conducted individual or group interviews with 134 different people, some of 
whom were interviewed more than once. Respondents can be divided into five categories:  
                                                          
64 Each of these is can be identified in the literature on agency in the informal sphere explored in Chapter Two. 
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1. State officials, including local and national politicians and members of bureaucratic 
institutions (nine people). 
2. Representatives of organizations formed by informal vendors, including market 
associations and street vending groups (37 people). 
3. Informal market and street vendors, whether members of vendors’ organizations or not 
(66 people).  
4. Leaders and/or members of civil society organizations that address issues of importance 
to this thesis, particularly informal economic activity, formal business interests and 
governance (eight people).  
5. Other individuals who were able to provide valuable insights for this thesis, including 
lawyers, moneylenders, journalists, customers of informal vendors, informal actors 
other than vendors and vendors in shops outside of the city’s markets (14 people).  
 
A large majority of respondents (103) were, for obvious reasons, informal street or market 
vendors. A full list of interviews is provided in Appendix A of this thesis.   
The questions that interview subjects were asked varied between, and even within, these 
five categories, and were largely tailored to individual respondents. Questions were designed to 
explore the central themes and topics of this thesis, surrounding, in general terms, the nature of 
informal economic activity and issues that surround it; the state and its relation to informal 
vending; and specific details about the history and politics of street vending and particular markets 
under study. Because interviews were semi-structured, new lines of questioning and topics of 
conversation frequently emerged while interviews were being conducted, allowing for points of 
particular interest to be expanded upon or pursued.  
Interview subjects were selected through convenience sampling. Convenience sampling 
remains the best alternative when random sampling is impossible, and although this entails a 
certain degree of bias in the fact that the probability of being selected may be influenced by such 
factors as visibility and personal connections, where possible, every effort was taken to maximize 
the diversity, and thus representativeness, of respondents.  
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b) Surveys 
Surveys were also distributed to a total of 128 vendors throughout the three main markets 
that this thesis focuses on (see below). Unlike the interviews undertaken during fieldwork, these 
surveys posed a standard and unchanging set of questions. This allowed for large amounts of 
information to be collected in key settings to complement insights gathered from interviews, 
making it possible to develop a broader picture of informal markets and to explore variations 
within and between them. The survey was designed to capture some of the main characteristics of 
market vending and to provide further insight into the internal divisions that exist within markets 
that are explored in Chapter Five. It was a single page, and divided into two sections. The first 
asked for basic information about the respondent and his or her socioeconomic position. The 
second section provided space for short answers to questions about a respondent’s entry into a 
market, the challenges he or she faces as an informal vendor and his or her involvement, if any, in 
market politics. This survey is reproduced in full in Appendix B at the end of this thesis, and macro 
data for survey respondents can be found in Appendix C.  
The distribution and collection of surveys was aided by two research assistants whom I met 
during fieldwork. One of these research assistants also helped to translate survey questions from 
English to Luganda before distribution, and this assistant, along with a third person, helped to 
translate answers from Luganda to English following collection. Since written responses were 
usually limited to only a few words, a respondent could easily complete the survey in less than 
five minutes. When respondents were unable to read or write, and therefore required assistance to 
complete the survey, survey questions were read aloud and answers filled in according to the 
responses provided. Like interview respondents, survey respondents were selected through 
convenience sampling.  
These surveys are not intended to capture a representative picture of market vendors in 
Kampala, but rather to provide a more detailed glimpse into some of the divisions that exist within 
markets that were originally identified during interviews. They revealed the internal heterogeneity 
and complexity of markets, and to shed light on the axes of difference that fuel market politics and 
entrench conflicts. Representative sampling is not necessary to achieve such a goal. 
 
22  Young 
 
c) Participant Observation 
Although fieldwork for this thesis was primarily based on semi-structured interviews and, 
to a lesser extent, surveys, limited participant observation was also employed. This took the form 
of spending extended periods of time with street and market vendors—particularly the former—
in order to more fully understand the nature of informal vending and the experiences of those 
involved in it. Participant observation was principally used as a means of witnessing some of the 
strategies that street vendors employ to remain on the city’s streets, which are detailed in Chapter 
Four of this thesis. These strategies were also outlined in interviews, but viewing them firsthand 
presented an opportunity to further understand when and how they are used, what they specifically 
entail and what effects they have. More generally, participant observation allowed for significant 
insights into the daily lives of informal vendors, including how and how often vendors interact 
with their customers, the general public and each other, and, crucially for street vendors, how they 
are treated by KCCA officials. Such work only constituted a small part of the fieldwork undertaken 
for this thesis, but nevertheless enriched some of the core empirical findings offered by interviews 
and surveys.   
 
d) Documentary Analysis 
Documentary analysis played an important role in the research undertaken for this thesis. 
It was primarily employed in two ways. First, major pieces of legislation and government 
documents were analyzed as a means of tracking how the nature and constitution of the state, as 
well as key internal state structures and policies, have evolved over time. This analysis plays an 
essential role in the descriptions of the evolution of the Ugandan state presented in this thesis, and 
in considerations of how, specifically, political changes at both the national and local level have 
shaped the agency of informal vendors. Second, a comprehensive search through the archives of 
the country’s two largest daily newspapers, New Vision and The Daily Monitor, was conducted in 
order to clarify, expand on and fill in certain gaps of information collected during the fieldwork 
for this thesis. By complementing my fieldwork findings, this archival material played an essential 
role in allowing me to reconstruct a history of informal vending in Kampala and to tie together the 
narratives that are at the core of this thesis.  
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ii. Fieldwork Sites 
Fieldwork sites for researching informal vendors in Kampala were chosen according to two 
obvious criteria: (1) where the activities under study are most concentrated; and (2) where the 
political issues surrounding them are particularly prominent. Interviews with state officials, 
members of civil society groups and other key individuals were undertaken throughout the city.  
 
a) Street Vendor Research Sites 
The city of Kampala is organized into five divisions: Kampala Central Division (the city 
centre), Kawempe Division (north), Lubaga Division (west), Makindye Division (south) and 
Nakawa Division (east). These divisions are made up of smaller areas that are commonly referred 
to in local geography. The street vendors that I study are all located in Nakasero, which makes up 
a considerable portion of Kampala Central Division and is, with major government buildings and 
the city’s Central Business District, the city’s political and economic centre, and Kisenyi, an 
adjacent built-up area to the southwest of Nakasero. Both are prime areas for street vendors in 
Kampala and, particularly Nakasero, places targeted by authorities in their efforts to remove 
vendors from the city’s streets. Specifically, the general area in which street vendors were studied 
can be defined as follows: 
 
• At its northern limit, a series of lines that connect Kyagwe Road, Lumumba Avenue, Speke 
Road, Kimathi Avenue, Parliamentary Avenue and De winton Street; 
• At its eastern limit, the section of Yusuf Lule Road that connects De winton Street to Jinja 
Road; 
• At its southern limit, a series of lines that run along Jinja Road, Nasser Road and Entebbe 
Road to the traffic junction where Entebbe Road meets Nakivubo Place Road, and then 
continues to a point immediately to the west of the northern end of Owino Market; and  
• At its western limit, a line that connects the point to the west of Owino Market to the 
beginning of Kyagwe Road.  
 
The other primary research site for street vendors is Usafi Market in Katwe, an area that is 
immediately south of the eastern portion of Kisenyi. Although Usafi is a market, it is considered 
here because it was established by street vendors and the KCCA as a site for street vendors to 
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relocate to in order to comply with the KCCA’s ban on street vending. It is the only market in 
Kampala that was set up for this purpose.  
These research sites are illustrated in Figure 2 below: 
 
Figure 2: Street Vending Research Sites65 
 
 
b) Market Vendor Research Sites 
Unlike street vendors, market vendors are, obviously, located in a finite number of easily 
identifiable markets of varying sizes throughout the city, making the selection of research sites 




                                                          
65 Figure created by the author based on a satellite image generated by Google Maps.  
66 Email interview, KCCA spokesperson, 12 February 2016. 
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67 Most of the figures below, unless otherwise stated, are taken from “Kampala District,” Development Initiatives 
International, accessed 6 July 2015, http://www.dii.co.ug/index.php/where-we-work/kampala-district. Exactly how 
this organization arrived at these figures is unknown, so they are almost certainly estimates, especially because markets 
are very rarely systematically studied. Still, similar figures are often cited elsewhere. Figures in brackets represent the 
number of vendors before displacement.  
68 Lindell and Appelblad, 401. Development Initiatives International (DII), the Ugandan civil society group that these 
figures are taken from, lists 5,000 vendors in Nakawa Market. Lindell and Appelblad’s figure is used here due to their 
detailed study of the market.  
69 Mukisa, Farahani, “Kisekka Market Demolished,” Daily Monitor, 24 December 2014. DII does not list Kisekka 
Market, likely because, as the article cited here details, the market has recently been demolished for a development 
process that this thesis explores.  
70 Mulondo, Lawrence and Juliet Waiswa, “KCCA Demolishes Usafi Market Stalls,” New Vision, 11 June 2015. 
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This study focuses on three of these markets: Owino Market, located in Kisenyi, Kampala 
Central Division; Kisekka Market in Nakasero, Kampala Central Division; and Nakawa Market in 
Nakawa Division.  
 
Market 1: Owino 
 With over 50,000 vendors, Owino Market is the largest informal market in Kampala, the 
largest in Uganda and one of the largest in East Africa.71 Owino was founded in 1971 when 300 
vendors left Nakasero Market due to overcrowding, and now covers approximately eight acres 
between Nakivubo Place Road and Kafumbe Mukasa Road in an area immediately south of 
Nakivubo Stadium. Owino itself has since become overcrowded, causing some vendors to leave 
and establish the adjacent Park Yard Market in the previously unoccupied space that surrounds 
Nakivubo Stadium. In 2009, an article in New Vision, the country’s leading daily newspaper, 
claimed that an estimated 200,000 people visit Owino and/or Park Yard every day, highlighting 
the central role that Owino plays in the city’s economy.72 
Owino Market was officially renamed St. Balikuddembe Market in October 2001.73 It is 
still commonly referred to by its original name, however, so the former is used in this thesis. 
 
Market 2: Kisekka 
 Kisekka Market lies less than one kilometre north of Owino on a plot of land off of Kyagwe 
Road between the Nakivubo Channel and Nakivubo Road. The market was founded in 1994 when 
vendors relocated to the site after being displaced by the construction of the city’s New Taxi Park, 
and named after the nearby Kisekka Hospital, which was itself named after Samson Kisekka, the 
Vice President at the time who had formerly served as Prime Minister. Kisekka is particularly 
known for selling vehicle parts and offering repairs, a specialty that distinguishes it from other 
major markets in the city. As this thesis details, Kisekka Market was demolished in December 
2014 to begin a major redevelopment process, displacing the market’s vendors as reconstruction 
takes place. The redevelopment process, however, has faced major delays, and at the time of 
                                                          
71 The descriptions of Owino, Kisekka and Nakawa presented here are based on fieldwork.  
72 Mugisa, Anne, Florence Nakaayi and Juliet Waiswa, “The History of Park Yard Market,” New Vision, 25 February 
2009. 
73 Namutebi, Joyce, “Owino Market Now St Balikuddembe,” New Vision, 29 October 2001.  
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research and the time of writing, the 3.7 acre plot of land on which the market sat remains a fenced-
off construction site where little work has taken place. 
 
Market 3: Nakawa 
Nakawa Market is the largest market in Kampala outside of the city centre, and is located 
2.65 kilometres to the east of Nakasero on Jinja Road. Founded in 1975, the market now has more 
than 10,000 vendors and covers an area of over eight acres. Nakawa Market is perhaps most 
notable for selling fresh fruit and vegetables, linking it, like many of the informal markets in the 
city, to the country’s significant agricultural sector.   
 
These three markets, along with other important markets in the city centre, are illustrated 
in Figure 4 below: 
 
Figure 4: Market Vendor Research Sites74 
 
 
                                                          
74 Figure created by the author based on a satellite image generated by Google Maps. 
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In regard to the first criteria for selection stated above, Owino, Kisekka and Nakawa are 
three of the five largest markets in the city, together containing over 70,000 market vendors.75 As 
for the second, each of these markets had a different experience during the city government’s 
market privatization program, and each is now involved in major disputes over ownership and 
development: in Owino Market, one group with close ties to the State House is leading a 
development project that is opposed by another group; in Kisekka Market, a disputed development 
project has progressed to the point where the market has been demolished for reconstruction; and 
in Nakawa Market, disputes between groups of vendors has led to a takeover by the KCCA.  
The selection of these three markets is not to suggest that other markets are not worthy of 
similar attention. Park Yard and Nakasero are obvious other candidates given their size and the 
fact that they too are experiencing ongoing conflicts surrounding ownership and development, but 
most of the features of these conflicts are similar to what can be observed at Owino, Kisekka and 
Nakawa, meaning their analysis is not necessary to further the arguments of this thesis. Other 
markets that are particularly important for understanding the themes addressed in this thesis are 
briefly discussed where necessary. The three markets under study, with all of their differences, 
have been chosen as representatives of all the city’s markets, with the conflicts that define them 
playing out in different ways to different degrees throughout Kampala. The political issues that 
can be observed at Owino, Kieskka and Nakawa may be particularly prominent and instructive, 
but they are nevertheless ubiquitous.  
 
iii. Practical Issues 
All non-Ugandan citizens wishing to undertake research in Uganda are required to obtain 
approval from the Uganda National Council for Science and Technology (UNCST). A successful 
application must be endorsed by an organization in Uganda. Based on contacts established through 
the Cambridge-Africa Partnership for Research Excellence (CAPREx) initiative, I was able to 
obtain support for my application from Makerere University. This connection not only aided in 
the approval of my research permit, which was done with minimal delay, but also facilitated certain 
introductions during the course of my fieldwork with those who were familiar with the institution 
and seemingly believed that my ties to it gave my project a greater degree of local legitimacy.  
                                                          
75 Before the displacement caused by Kisekka’s demolition.  
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Still, in general, there are significant difficulties involved in the study of informal economic 
activity. Issues of access were of particular concern. When I began this project, the only obvious 
entry point I had into Uganda’s informal economy was through a handful of larger civil society 
groups that I was able to identify from extensive internet searches, and even some of these proved 
difficult to get in touch with due to, in some cases, inadequate or out of date contact information, 
or, in others, a lack of response to repeated research requests. Fortunately, the relatively few 
contacts I was able to establish before beginning my fieldwork proved to be extremely helpful 
once I actually arrived in the country, and not only took part in interviews and invited me to 
organization meetings, but also showed me potential research sites, provided me with contacts and 
facilitated introductions. My familiarity with Uganda’s informal sphere, and my contacts within 
it, rapidly expanded as a result.  
The introductions that my first contacts supplied me with were essential for persuading 
informal actors to participate in my project. Many were initially somewhat reluctant, a stance that 
is understandable given, for street vendors, the legal status of their economic activities and, for all 
informal vendors, their common political, social and economic marginalization. My position as a 
researcher with whom they were not familiar and who occupied the role of an ‘outsider’ in both 
the informal sphere and the country as a whole likely did little to assuage such sentiments. Two 
concerns were commonly voiced. Some were sceptical of the true intentions of my work, fearing 
that I was only seeking financial gain for myself at their expense or that I was actually a political 
agent who wished to ‘spy’ on their activities in the interests of some distrusted power. Others 
wanted to know how I intended to ‘help’ them. In all cases, however, I was able to overcome these 
initial concerns, frequently with the help of the person facilitating the introduction (although the 
brief disappointment of those who hoped that my work would be of more assistance to them was 
evident). This allowed me to begin building relationships and establishing trust, and while this 
often took time, it always led to fruitful results.  
Once these relationships were established, I encountered few unexpected obstacles. Indeed, 
some difficulties that I anticipated never really materialized. Perhaps most notably, language 
ultimately did not prove to be a significant barrier to interacting with informal vendors. The 
majority of people I spoke to, either in interviews or while undertaking participant observation, 
had an adequate command of English, and many spoke it fluently. In instances where English was 
not sufficient and conversations were held in a different language—primarily Luganda—I was 
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always accompanied by the person who facilitated the introduction and who was able to serve as 
an ad hoc translator. My initial concern that respondents might be unwilling to discuss potentially 
sensitive political issues also proved to be unfounded, as many brought up politics with little or no 
provocation. I quickly learned, in fact, that politics are inseparable from seemingly all aspects of 
informal economic activity in Uganda, and are central to the ways that informal actors articulate 
their experiences. This reality exposed me to new and unexpected dimensions of my research topic, 
significantly benefiting my project as a whole.  
After obtaining entry into chosen research sites, the major practical issue that I faced when 
conducting my research concerned the illegality of street vending. I spent a considerable amount 
of time conversing with and observing street vendors, often staying with them for extended periods 
throughout the day as they worked. Although I was not engaging in illegal activity myself, and 
had a permit to conduct my research, I remained conscious of the fact that I was inserting myself 
into an environment in which state repression is common. While I witnessed some arrests and 
goods being confiscated, vendors that I was talking to were never harassed by authorities in my 
presence, even if they did, at times, conceal their goods and walk away as authorities approached. 
I was never questioned by any authorities about my research.  
 
iv. Ethical Concerns 
The study of informality also raises important ethical issues. The legal status of informal 
economic activities places them in a relationship with state power that is essential for the researcher 
to respect in the collection and analysis of empirical data. All research subjects were informed of 
the nature of this study and given the option to remain anonymous. In instances where the activity 
is fully criminalized by the state—namely, street vending—I have intentionally kept certain details 
about research subjects, sites and schedules vague to protect the identities of those involved. Doing 
so has not, I believe, in any way compromised the integrity or clarity of the contents of this thesis.  
Significant ethical considerations also surround the representation of the responses of 
informal actors. Researchers are in a power relationship with their subjects of study, particularly, 
as in the case of this study, when those subjects are otherwise marginalized. The researcher must 
reproduce all responses as accurately as possible to avoid reinforcing existing patterns of silencing 
and exclusion. Compounding this problem, of course, is the fact that interviews are not inherently 
neutral and are subject to the biases of the researcher when they are designed, undertaken and used 
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for analysis. The nature of the questions being asked can influence the responses given, and these 
responses, in turn, can be distorted by being interpreted within the context of the author’s 
arguments. To deal with these problems, the questions that were asked were constructed in a way 
that seeks to balance open-endedness with a focus on the issues and concepts that are central to 
this project. Leading questions were avoided. Every effort has been made to be faithful to the 
respondent’s intentions in his or her answer. While it is perhaps not possible to eliminate all of the 
biases that affect scholarly research, these can nevertheless be minimized. Due care is taken to 
ensure that this is done here.  
 
Part IV: Thesis Outline 
This thesis is organized as follows. After this introductory chapter, Chapter Two explores 
the existing scholarly literature that is relevant to the themes addressed in this thesis. It begins by 
examining the separate bodies of work that exist surrounding the Ugandan state and informal 
economic activity in Uganda. It then explores the broader literature on informal economic activity, 
including the relationship between informal vending and the state, early approaches to informal 
economic activity, neoliberal perspectives on informality and other treatments of the agency of 
informal actors. Three ways in which informal actors commonly exercise agency are identified: 
by taking advantage of state structures and/or specific political conditions to exert political 
influence; by forming and/or participating in organizations that aim to advance collective interests; 
and by employing small-scale resistance strategies. The chapter concludes by situating this thesis 
within the literature discussed and considering its contributions to current scholarly trends and 
debates. 
Chapter Three provides an overview of Uganda’s informal economy and its relationship 
with the state in order to properly contextualize the arguments presented in this thesis. It 
particularly focuses on informal vending in Kampala. General details about informal street and 
market vending are provided, including their key characteristics, issues surrounding entry, the 
livelihoods that they support and their linkages with the formal economy. It then provides a 
historical and contemporary overview of the role that the state has played and continues to play in 
creating, sustaining or otherwise shaping informality in both Kampala and Uganda more generally. 
Six topics are specifically addressed: the history of colonial planning in Kampala; Uganda’s post-
independence history of poor governance, instability and conflict; the country’s extensive 
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economic liberalization; internal geographic trends of development that have fuelled urban growth 
in Kampala; the country’s tax system; and the self-interest of state officials who gain political 
and/or economic benefits from the existence of the informal sphere.  
Chapter Four details the rise of street vending in Kampala and the subsequent introduction 
of a ban on street vending in the city. It begins by analyzing the decentralization and 
democratization programs introduced by the NRM after coming to power in 1986, and outlines 
how these were implemented in a way that benefited the ruling party and Museveni and were halted 
or reversed when they did not. It demonstrates how these reforms nevertheless created intense 
political competition between the NRM and the opposition in the newly empowered and elected 
KCC, and argues that street vendors were able to take advantage of this competition by leveraging 
the support that they could provide to politicians who were more concerned about electoral politics 
than enforcing laws that regulated street vending. The chapter then turns to the central 
government’s attempt to regain control of the city from the opposition by replacing the KCC with 
the KCCA, a body that in its design and operation aimed to disempower elected politicians at the 
expense of centrally appointed technocrats, and argues that the KCCA has since sought legitimacy 
through the implementation of an ambitious developmental agenda, a key component of which is 
the elimination of street vending in the city. Lacking the means of influence that they enjoyed 
under the KCC, street vendors have faced significant repression under the KCCA. The chapter 
then examines how street vendors have responded to repression and their changed political 
circumstances in three different ways: through compliance and co-operation, most notably by 
relocating to Usafi Market; through small-scale forms of resistance that allow them to remain on 
the streets; and through further attempts at organization. The significant obstacles that street 
vendors face in all of these efforts are highlighted. Finally, the chapter considers how the 2016 
elections provided a brief period of political competition that allowed street vendors to make small 
gains, but asserts that these gains were temporary and reversed almost immediately after the 
elections were over.  
Chapter Five explores attempts to privatize Kampala’s markets and the struggles over 
ownership and development that followed the failure of these efforts. It begins by describing how 
the KCC’s market privatization program was the result of financial struggles that were caused by 
the central government’s efforts to undermine the opposition-controlled local government, and 
details how market vendors were able to block privatization by appealing to the President, who 
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intervened on their behalf due to his desire to increase his own popularity in the city and undermine 
the opposition even further. The different ways in which these events unfolded in Owino, Kisekka 
and Nakawa are explored. It then describes how the central government’s policy—introduced by 
Museveni to overturn the KCC’s market privatization program—that vendors should be able to 
manage and develop their own markets has led to major conflicts within markets surrounding who 
has the right to represent vendors and what form(s) development should take. These conflicts are 
again explored in Owino, Kisekka and Nakawa. It is argued that both the President and the KCCA 
have been able to take advantage of internal conflicts to advance their own interests in markets—
which are, for the former, to increase his personal popularity amongst market vendors, and, for the 
latter, to gain the control of the city’s markets to meet its own development and revenue goals—
while some vendors have also been able to take advantage of this external support to advance their 
management and development claims. The significant problems that plague market associations, 
most notably the forms co-option, neglect or repression they face, their ties to ingrained market 
hierarchies, their failure to represent members’ interests and the difficulties they face in 
implementing their management and development plans, are emphasized. The chapter concludes 
by demonstrating how the 2011 elections provided an opening of political space for vendors to 
exercise agency while failing to give Museveni the electoral support that he had long sought, even 
if their gains were minimal and did not fundamentally alter the marginalization that vendors 
experience.  
Conclusions are presented in Chapter Six, along with the broader implications of this study 
and directions that it points to for valuable future research. Insights that it provides into the 
relationship between agency and the state and its implications for understanding informal 
economic activity more generally are discussed. A potential research agenda that builds on its 
findings is also outlined. The future of informal vending in Kampala is then briefly considered.  
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Chapter Two: Literature Review  
 
The question of how the Ugandan state shapes the agency of informal vendors invokes a 
number of debates and issues spanning the fields of political science, economics and sociology. 
Literature on informality in Uganda and the Ugandan state must be considered in reference to work 
on informal economic activity more generally in order to provide a full account of the topic under 
consideration, a task that is rendered even more important by the fact that these bodies of work 
largely exist in isolation from each other. This chapter therefore has two purposes: to review the 
bodies of literature that are relevant for this thesis, identifying significant trends, issues of 
contention and gaps in analysis; and to consider how this thesis is able to make original scholarly 
contributions by studying how the state shapes the agency of informal vendors in Kampala. 
This chapter is divided into three sections. The first explores existing treatments of 
Uganda’s informal economy and the Ugandan state. These two topics have not been adequately 
explored together—a gap that this thesis will fill—but treatments of each individually will be 
addressed. The second section addresses informal economic activity more generally. It begins by 
considering the relationship between informal vending and the state, highlighting how and why 
vendors commonly experience various forms of repression, neglect, tolerance and assistance. It 
then explores different treatments of agency in the informal sphere, first by describing early 
approaches that neglected the agency of informal actors and subsequently by outlining the 
neoliberal view of informality as an expression of the agency of the urban poor that has come to 
dominate both scholarship and policy. Three alternative ways in which informal actors are 
commonly seen to exercise agency are then identified: by taking advantage of favourable political 
conditions to exercise influence, by forming or participating in organizations and by engaging in 
small-scale resistance strategies. The final section situates this thesis within the literature discussed 
in this review. 
  
Part I: Informality and the State in Uganda 
 Despite its size, Uganda’s informal economy has received limited attention from both 
scholars and policymakers. Only rarely have its political dimensions been explored. The nature of 
the Ugandan state has attracted more scholarly attention, but this work, too, remains somewhat 
limited. Both bodies of literature are explored here.  
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i. The State in Uganda  
Aili Mari Tripp provides a particularly detailed account of the nature of political power 
and the state in contemporary Uganda. Describing the Ugandan state as ‘semi-authoritarian’ with 
a ‘hybrid regime’, Tripp claims that it is defined by such key characteristics as: a strong executive 
that seeks to expand its control at the expense of the legislature, the judiciary and civil society; the 
use of state institutions for patronage purposes; strong and extensive vertical relationships between 
the state and society, compared to weaker and less common horizontal linkages within society; 
regular elections that are manipulated by and used to legitimize those in power; and the suppression 
of civil liberties that can sometimes be challenged by the existing legal system. Such a system, she 
claims, has resulted in several contradictions in the exercise of power in Uganda: the 
transformation of the NRM from a broad-based movement into one that serves a more narrow set 
of interests; the role that internal dissent within the unresponsive NRM played in the introduction 
of multipartyism; political decentralization as a means of creating centre-periphery patronage 
networks; the involvement of security forces in patronage systems in a way that ultimately 
undermines security, both by suppressing opposition and participating in internal and external 
conflicts; the maintenance of undemocratic governance based on corruption and patronage through 
economic growth and foreign support; and, most significantly for this thesis, the opening up of 
political space accompanied by, and often serving as a pretext for, the expansion of executive 
power. Clientelism and repression, Tripp asserts, are both central features of state power in 
Uganda, allowing the NRM, and particularly Museveni, to maintain and exercise power in a 
political environment that is neither democratic nor authoritarian.1 
Much of the literature on Ugandan politics presents a similar characterization of the state. 
Importantly, authors commonly employ the concepts of semi-authoritarianism and 
neopatrimonialism, suggesting that governance and political power operate in both formal and 
informal ways, and that the country’s liberalized political and economic system and its supposedly 
independent legal, bureaucratic and departmental structures coexist with and are undermined by 
systemic forms of personal rule, patronage, clientelist networks, corruption, nepotism and 
cronyism, along with a general lack of distinction between public and private spheres of authority. 
                                                          
1 Tripp, Aili Mari, “The Changing Face of Authoritarianism in Africa: The Case of Uganda,” Africa Today 50 (3) 
2004: 3-26; and Tripp (2010). 
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William Muhumuza, for example, argues that pervasive neopatrimonialism has subverted the 
superficial and self-interested political reforms that the NRM implemented after coming to power, 
accusing the government or Museveni himself of undermining parliamentary authority, providing 
supporters with jobs and government contracts, manipulating electoral laws and processes, using 
the army for personal political purposes, intimidating and attempting to influence the judiciary, 
impairing the government organization responsible for combating corruption and capturing the 
support of local politicians and interest groups through the distribution of material rewards.2 
Godfrey Asiimwe claims that politics in Uganda is characterized by a form of neopatrimonialism 
with Museveni as its head in which state officials practice forms of accumulation for the benefit 
of themselves and those who provide the basis of their power.3 Policy reports on the politics of 
Uganda emphasize similar themes. Extensive corruption, high-level political manipulation, flawed 
democratic processes, poor service delivery and the repressive tendencies of the state are all 
commonly mentioned as major concerns by both domestic and international organizations.4 Such 
work provides important empirical insights. 
An interesting account of how state power in Uganda has evolved over time is offered by 
Joshua Rubongoya, who focuses on how the forms of political legitimacy employed by the NRM 
have developed throughout the party’s time in power. Usefully, Rubongoya describes how the 
NRM took early steps towards the construction of an inclusive, decentralized, democratic political 
system as a means of legitimizing its rule, but depicts how such movement, particularly since the 
1996 elections, has been slowly reversed as the party has sought to consolidate its power, 
effectively reproducing a form of neopatrimonial rule with the President at its centre. As a result, 
Rubongoya argues, the NRM has failed to produce the ‘fundamental change’ that it originally 
promised, and has reverted to the (semi-)authoritarian tendencies that defined its predecessors.5 
                                                          
2 Muhumuza (2009).  
3 Asiimwe.  
4 See, for example: “BTI 2012: Uganda Country Report,” Bertelsmann Stiftung, Gütersloh, 2012; “Corruption and the 
Service Delivery Tragedy in Uganda: Stories from the Eastern Leg of the Anti-Corruption Trail,” ActionAid Uganda, 
September 2014; ““Letting the Big Fish Swim”: Failures to Prosecute High-Level Corruption in Uganda,” Human 
Rights Watch, 2013; “Report of Money in Politics: Pervasive Vote Buying in Uganda Elections,” Democracy 
Monitoring Group, January 2011; “The 4th Annual National Anti-Corruption Convention: Theme ‘Fighting Corruption 
and Promoting Integrity: Summary of the Proceedings,” Uganda National NGO Forum, 3 December 2014; “The 
Growing Gap Between Citizens’ Expectations of Democracy and Human Rights and Realities in Uganda,” 
Afrobarometer, 17 April 2012; and “World Report 2015: Events of 2014,” Human Rights Watch, 2015, 561-567.  
5 Rubongoya, Joshua B., Regime Hegemony in Museveni’s Uganda: Pax Musevenica, New York: Palgrave 
MacMillan, 2007.  
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Other authors have similarly sought to explain how the power of the ruling party and the President 
has become so entrenched. Andrew Mwenda charts the rise of authoritarianism in Uganda under 
Museveni, and suggests that the government employs a combination of intimidation and patronage 
to prevent the mobilization of potential oppositional groups.6 He also describes, with Roger Tangri, 
how Museveni has sought to stay in power due to his belief that his leadership is essential for the 
security and prosperity of the country and fear that he will be prosecuted upon leaving office, and 
how both the military and international donors play a key role in preserving his position.7 
Elsewhere, they also argue that elite corruption is a defining feature of Ugandan politics and has 
been crucial for securing the support of both high-level officials and the general population for the 
NRM, providing few incentives to address it.8  
The idea that state power in Uganda is characterized by both formal and informal 
structures, systems and modes of operation is particularly relevant for this thesis, and has been 
outlined in detail by Moses Khisa. Claiming that the failures of the neopatrimonial model for 
African states can be addressed by replacing its reliance on structuralist binaries with, following 
Achille Mbembe’s concepts of ‘commandment’ and ‘entanglement’,9 an emphasis on the 
fluctuating and unstable post-colonial reproduction of colonial rationalities that are used to rule 
through resource distribution, scarcity and insecurity, Khisa describes Uganda as an ‘informal 
state’ that simultaneously centralizes and fragments state power while establishing modes of 
operation that run parallel to legal channels. This ‘informal state’, he argues, is defined by the 
proliferation of security and intelligence organizations and political mobilization groups, the 
outsized influence of the State House and the dominance of the NRM caucus at the expense of 
Parliament. Formal state structures exist to provide the illusions of modernity and legitimize the 
‘informal state’, but do not impede its function and are undermined whenever expedient. This leads 
to clashes with formal local state structures over mobilization, service provision and intelligence 
gathering. Khisa traces its emergence to the country’s extended experience of insecurity and 
political instability after gaining independence, as well as the NRM’s militaristic ideology and 
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desire to remain in power, and asserts that international donors aid its survival while limiting 
accountability.10   
These political realities significantly undermine the ability of the state to fulfill key 
functions. Richard Grabowski claims that patron-client relationships limit investment in 
agriculture, resulting in low productivity and high labour costs,11 Mbabazi Godfrey and Pyeong 
Jun Yu assert that pervasive corruption hinders anti-poverty efforts12 and a study by Ritva Reinikka 
and Jakob Svensson reveals that corruption significantly impacts the disbursement of education 
grants.13 This greatly impacts public perceptions, as Kristof Titeca claims that dominant forms of 
distribution fundamentally shape how Ugandans view the state, with many believing that the 
availability of state services is based on membership in a personalized network rather than 
universal.14 Perhaps more significantly, these realities can be seen to provide a logic for ineffective 
governance. In a study that is particularly relevant for this thesis, Gina Lambright demonstrates 
how partisan political struggles negatively affect municipal service delivery. Focusing on 
Kampala, she demonstrates how the central government was able to undermine the KCC by 
manipulating its financing, disrupting its tax policies and interfering in its political decision-
making. The KCC’s resulting poor performance, she suggests, allowed the central government to 
claim that the opposition was mismanaging the city and gave it a justification to replace the KCC 
with the KCCA.15  
Some authors have explored such features of the state in the context of reforms. Michael 
Keating claims that the introduction of multiparty democracy in 2005 threatened to transform a 
system in which Parliament was able to balance executive power, particularly in conflicts over 
financial sector reform, central bank independence and electricity sector reform, into one in which 
the executive was able to control Parliament.16 Mark Robinson states that the initial success of 
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civil service reform, the URA and anti-corruption efforts was stalled or reversed in order to 
preserve the functioning of the country’s neopatrimonial system.17 Elliott Green argues that 
patronage provides the underlying logic for the proliferation of political districts,18 and Janet Lewis 
makes a similar claim, also stating that such decentralization reforms decrease the bargaining 
power and administrative capacity of individual units, while also increasing the central 
government’s ability to monitor peripheral areas.19 Paul Francis and Robert James also state that 
the country’s decentralization program is based on ‘technocratic’ and ‘patronage’ modes of rural 
local governance that are designed to allow for a balance between central control and popular 
participation, but that the current system does not adequately empower local decision-making.20 
Not all authors believe that such characteristics of the state have entirely negative effects, however. 
Carol Dauda, for example, asserts that decentralization can allow for marginalized groups to gain 
some legitimacy and push for local accountability.21 Conversely, Anne Mette Kjaer asserts that 
Uganda illustrates how neopatrimonialism does not necessarily preclude public sector reform, 
although she does acknowledge that the pace of such reforms slowed considerably as Museveni’s 
own clientelist networks became entrenched.22 
The depiction of the Ugandan state that emerges from existing literature is similar to that 
which is presented in this thesis: one that is characterized by continuing attempts by the President 
and the ruling party to expand their power in an ostensibly liberalizing political system; constant 
encroachment on virtually all aspects of society and the economy; the repression or co-option of 
the opposition; and the existence of both formal and informal channels of negotiation that connect 
broad segments of society directly to the state, particularly the NRM and/or the President 
personally. This thesis builds on such work by using the politics of informal vending in Kampala 
as a lens through which to view issues of power and the Ugandan state more generally. It 
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particularly focuses on how the expansion of power by the President and the NRM becomes 
manifest in the highly contested urban space of Kampala and what the effects of this power have 
been for a particularly vulnerable segment of the urban poor. This focus on the relationship 
between informality and the state means that it is also necessary to consider existing studies on 
informal economic activity in Uganda, a task to which this chapter now turns. 
 
ii. Informal Economic Activity in Uganda  
The most relevant analysis of informal economic activity in Uganda for the purposes of 
this thesis is most likely a study by Tom Goodfellow and Kristof Titeca that examines how 
Museveni intervened on behalf of informal market vendors and boda-boda drivers in their dealings 
with the KCC to gain electoral support.23 The argument that the President blocked the KCC’s 
attempts to privatize the city’s markets for personal political gain is also presented in the first part 
of Chapter Five of this thesis. The empirical analysis contained in Goodfellow and Titeca’s study, 
however, is extremely brief and its scope is considerably different from that of this thesis. It fails 
to address the role that the President and the central government played in provoking market 
privatization by financially undermining the KCC, and also quite problematically ignores divisions 
within markets, meaning the authors fail to capture the complexities and nuances that define the 
politics of markets in the city. Most significantly, since their work only addresses the KCC’s 
market privatization program, it does not include an analysis of how markets have since become 
embroiled in major internal conflicts over issues of management and development and the political 
dimensions that these conflicts have assumed. Goodfellow and Titeca’s study is therefore relevant 
to this thesis, but its scope is far too narrow and its limitations are significant.  
Titeca presents a similar argument in a more recent and in-depth book chapter, providing 
further analysis of how Museveni and the NRM used specific policy actions, social programs and 
distributive practices to secure the electoral support of informal market vendors and boda-boda 
drivers in 2011. He particularly emphasizes the importance of Savings and Cooperative Credit 
Organizations (SACCOs), microfinance organizations that are set up by the government to provide 
loans at low interest rates, as vehicles that the NRM can use for resource distribution.24 Again, his 
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arguments are relevant for the part of Chapter Five of this thesis that addresses the role of markets 
in the 2011 elections, but the same shortcomings are still present, particularly the failure to address 
the importance of political divisions (although he briefly describes how these affect boda-boda 
drivers and claims similar trends can be found in informal markets) and adopt a broader view of 
changing political circumstances and how vendors react to these.  
Goodfellow also makes a similar argument in an earlier and more general study of how 
urban governance in Kampala under the KCC was undermined by competing interests and 
informal bargaining systems between elites and various interest groups. In doing so, he 
demonstrates how politicians were able to mobilize these urban groups in their political conflicts 
with their rivals, allowing these groups, including market vendors, to exercise a degree of political 
influence that was disproportionate to their socioeconomic status. While Goodfellow’s focus on 
urban dysfunction usefully situates informal actors within a broader matrix of power in which 
different political and economic interest groups undermine formal governance through unofficial 
channels, the fact that he only partially focuses on informality and examines a political context 
that, with the introduction of the KCCA, differs considerably from the one that presently exists 
renders his work significant for, but ultimately fundamentally different from, this project.25  
Other authors have similarly addressed the politics of markets in Kampala. In an important 
early article, Christie Gombay examines how conflicts surrounding market fees, upgrades and 
access in Kampala undermine the KCC’s bureaucratic attempts at urban management. Gombay 
argues that the ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’ that are seen to characterize the city by urban planners 
are misframed in terms of creating an ‘enabling’ environment, improving land management or 
enhancing revenue collection, and that policies based on such misconceptions fail in their 
application as they run into existing ‘politics of survival’ and forms of management by the urban 
poor. Such an argument still has a significant amount of resonance, but unfortunately her work is 
now more than twenty years old, so at this point it is more informative about historical conditions 
than present circumstances.26 A more recent analysis of attempts to privatize informal markets in 
Kampala by Ilda Lindell and Jenny Appelblad is also relevant. Lindell and Appelblad argue that 
privatization often involved the takeover of markets by external entities that collected fees and 
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provided few services in return, significantly undermining the organizational capacity and 
influence of, or even banning, existing market associations, causing some to disappear altogether. 
In Park Yard Market, which the authors examine to illustrate these trends, vendors responded to a 
takeover by an external private company with non-co-operation and ultimately unsuccessful 
appeals to government authorities. Lindell and Appelblad contrast Park Yard with Nakawa Market, 
in which a credit co-operative emerged and replaced the existing association, ultimately gaining 
the right to manage the market. This co-operative, they argue, has proven to be preferable to the 
city’s control of the market, but as it is controlled by and run in the interests of shareholders in the 
market, it is not as inclusive as the previous association, and many vendors complain that its fees 
are too high.27 Lindell and Appelblad’s study provides interesting insights into market privatization 
and how vendors have responded to this process, and their work importantly recognizes the deep 
divisions that exist within markets and the politics that characterize these. Still, its scope is narrow 
and, as this thesis shows, it is now slightly dated as many important developments have occurred 
in Nakawa Market since its publication.  
Other scholarly work on Uganda’s informal economy has less in common with this thesis. 
Nelson Kasfir’s early work on the growth of informal economic activity during the rule of Idi 
Amin, and how the relationship between the informal sphere and the state evolved and contributed 
to class formation during this period, is relevant for the issues discussed in Chapter Three, but it 
does not address political agency.28 Sheldon Weeks’ work also represents an early analysis of 
informality in Uganda, but is more of a descriptive account.29 More recently, Lilian Keene-
Mugerwa has examined both how adapting and expanding existing legislation in Uganda can 
benefit those who participate in the informal sphere and how civil society organizations can help 
informal actors overcome impediments to organization, but she does not discuss broader political 
themes.30 Sarah Lince’s study of how formalization efforts in Jinja have caused informal actors to 
lose control over their livelihoods, their bargaining and earning power and their strategies of 
maintaining financial security and stability provides a useful look into how the Ugandan state tries 
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to formalize its informal sector and the effects that this has, but it is thematically different from 
this thesis.31 Finally, studies by Robert Ikoja-Odongo and Dennis Ocholla on the information 
seeking behaviour of people who operate informal businesses and by Charles Muyanja et al. on 
the practices of informal street food vendors provide some useful background information on 
informality in the country, even if neither is directly relevant to this project.32  
Policy reports on Uganda’s informal economy provide few insights for this thesis. The 
UBOS included a section on informal economic activity in the 2009/2010 edition of its National 
Household Survey, but this is mainly for the purpose of statistical measurement and reveals little 
about how Uganda’s informal sphere  actually operates or the realities that informal actors 
experience.33 This section was left out of the next and most recent National Household Survey for 
2012/2013.34 The World Bank has also examined informal economic activity in Uganda in the 
context of development,35 productivity36 and employment,37 along with the causes of informality 
in Uganda,38 but it has not addressed the themes explored here. A study of informal street vending 
in African cities that includes findings from Uganda prepared by the group Women in Informal 
Employment: Globalizing and Organizing (WIEGO) for the World Bank contains useful 
information on informal economic activity in Uganda, but again does not have a similar scope to 
this project.39 The same is true for a study by the Organization for Social Science Research in 
Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) on women involved in catering in Owino Market,40 an 
International Labour Organization (ILO) report on skills development in the informal sector in 
Kenya, Tanzania and Uganda41 and a joint publication between the ILO and the Ugandan 
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government on child labour in the country’s informal sphere.42 Such policy work fits the broader 
trend of silence surrounding the political dimensions of informal economic activity. This thesis 
attempts to correct for this common deficiency.  
Despite the fact that a number of authors have examined various aspects of informal 
economic activity in Uganda, the analysis of the relationship between state power and the agency 
of informal vendors presented in this thesis still promises to make valuable contributions to 
existing literature. No studies have yet considered how the expansion of state power over time has 
gradually curtailed the agency of informal vendors or how vendors have responded to these 
changes. Similarly, no studies have yet examined the more general reassertion of state power in 
the city that surrounds the introduction of the KCCA, undertaken a full empirical analysis of the 
internal and external politics of markets, addressed the politics of street vending in the city or 
primarily based their findings on extensive interviews with informal vendors. These are significant 
gaps that this thesis fills.  
Before examining the politics of informality and the state in Uganda, however, it is first 
necessary to consider the literature surrounding both informal economic activity and the agency 
of informal actors more generally. The second part of this literature review is dedicated to such a 
task. 
 
Part II: Informal Economic Activity 
  The literature on informal economic activity that is relevant for this project can be 
loosely divided into four categories: work that focuses on informal vending and the state; early 
approaches to informality that largely overlook the importance of agency; neoliberal views of the 
informal sphere as a space of liberation from the state and agency for the urban poor; and studies 
that explore specific manifestations of the agency of informal actors. Each of these is discussed in 
turn. 
 
i. Informal Vending and the State 
Informal vendors have a unique relationship with the state. Interestingly, work on this topic 
almost exclusively focuses on street vending, although it is important to note that some studies fail 
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to distinguish between street and market vending and thus refer to both. Even though, as this thesis 
highlights, street and market vending have important differences and deserve to be studied 
independently of each other, some of the arguments that have been advanced in relation to street 
vending and the state can be applied to informal vending more generally, making them highly 
relevant to the issues explored in this thesis as a whole.  
The relationship between street vendors and the state is commonly defined by a 
considerable degree of ambivalence, incoherence, uncertainty and fluctuation.43 A key aspect of 
this relationship is widespread opposition to street vending by various levels of government. Ray 
Bromley details sixteen different arguments that are commonly presented against street vending: 
it increases urban congestion; it can impede traffic flows; closing off streets for vending reduces 
available traffic routes; it can block exits from major city buildings, creating a safety hazard; it can 
take away customers from formal businesses due to its accessibility; it can take away customers 
from formal businesses due to unfair competition when vendors do not pay taxes; vendors can 
defraud their customers or sell counterfeit and/or low-quality goods; food and drinks sold by 
vendors can be hazardous to their customers’ health; vendors can be unresponsive to complaints 
or problems with their products; it can exploit child labour; some vendors provide illegal goods or 
services; it undermines the revenue base and thus capacity of the state; it can create an environment 
conducive to low-level crime; it can be a nuisance to pedestrians and motorists; it can be seen to 
embody urban disorder, making the city less attractive, noisier and less clean; and it is 
economically inefficient.44 Street vending is therefore often seen as an impediment to modernist 
notions of urban life and economic development by city planners, and thus something that must 
be eradicated or brought into the formal economic sphere.45 Vendors are therefore a ‘problem’ that 
stands in the way of development,46 and their rejection reflects broader trends of urban social 
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exclusion.47  As a result, street vendors commonly face various forms of repression, including 
bans, forced removals, relocation efforts, prohibitive regulation, harassments and arrests. As 
Rosemary Bromley acknowledges, even seemingly technocratic interventions are frequently 
guided by unstated economic concerns, and the actions of any government, regardless of their 
justification, are rarely ‘neutral’.48   
This opposition, however, often coexists with a more favourable view of street vending. 
Ray Bromley also cites eleven different arguments that are commonly used to justify the practice: 
it is integral to a city’s economy; people have a right to choose their occupation; it can provide the 
government with essential revenue; it serves as a type of ‘social safety net’; it allows people to 
gain entrepreneurial skills; it provides opportunities for entrepreneurship and upward mobility; it 
can provide customers with essential goods and services; it can bring desirable economic activity 
and atmosphere to city streets; it can provide seasonal goods or test new markets that could not 
sustain formal businesses; it can be appealing due to its flexible hours; and, following de Soto, it 
can provide a popular alternative to an unjust and unrepresentative state-backed economic 
system.49 Thus the state may tolerate or even sometimes support informal vending. John Cross 
describes this in terms of a transition from the modernist position on informality, which held 
vending to be parasitic or inefficient, to the post-modernist view that it could be an important 
source of economic growth and flexibility. According to Cross, the real ‘problem’ with street 
vending is in fact that it is able to outcompete its formal rivals, and as these businesses are unable 
to eradicate street vending through market mechanisms, they instead turn to the state and rely on 
its regulatory and coercive powers. But viewing street vending as a ‘solution’ to developmental 
issues, he claims, is also problematic, as it adopts what he terms ‘formalomorphism’, or the belief 
that informality is merely an inadequate imitation of formality, while efforts to formalize the 
informal sphere risk eliminating what makes it successful while ignoring the forms of exclusion 
and exploitation that define it.50 And as Marina Karides notes, the interests and experiences of 
informal vendors are often excluded from the rhetoric of ‘assistance’.51 
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It is within this context that vendors exercise agency as they seek to participate in urban 
development. In order to understand the agency of informal vendors, it is necessary to explore 
literature that addresses—or, just as importantly, fails to address—the agency of informal actors 
more generally. It is to these bodies of work that this chapter now turns. 
 
ii. The Informal Sphere as Apolitical 
Early approaches to informal economic activity paid little attention to its political 
dimensions.52 Indeed, informal actors have commonly been viewed as passive, apolitical victims 
of broader political and socioeconomic circumstances rather than active, rational agents. This 
depiction of informal actors characterized the two theoretical approaches that dominated early 
understandings of informal economic activity. The first is defined by the common view, inherent 
in early forms of Marxism, neoclassical economics and modernization theory, that capitalist 
development would necessarily lead to the dramatic transformation of pre-capitalist political 
economies and involve the widespread absorption of labour. From this perspective, the informal 
sphere exists as a result of inadequate demand for the high supply of labour that underdevelopment 
entails; the growth of the formal sector, it was assumed, would increase opportunities for formal 
employment, thereby reducing the disconnect between the supply of and demand for labour that 
resulted in excess capacity.53 Informal actors are those who are yet to be integrated into the process 
of formal development, and, as a result, adopt a variety of economic activities as a form of basic 
subsistence. They are therefore limited in their actions by the dynamics of formal economic growth 
and employment creation, and apparently make little effort to influence these or otherwise engage 
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with the state for their own benefit. Even as seminal studies by Keith Hart54 and the ILO55 began 
to recognize the persistence and diversity of informal economies in the context of 
underdevelopment, along with their importance in survival strategies, the politics of informality 
remained largely unaddressed. The informal sphere was seen as less of a contested space as it was 
a space that was, however permanently, left outside of formal development. Informal actors may 
have been seen to possess agency in relation to their creative livelihood patterns, but this agency 
was not analytically extended to explore the politics of the informal sphere itself. 
The second early approach to informality furthered the understanding of informal actors as 
largely passive victims of broader circumstances over which they have little influence. This 
approach is defined by structuralist accounts that view the informal sphere as inherently 
subordinate to its formal counterpart. For structuralists, the formal and informal spheres are 
connected through a wide range of complex mechanisms and relationships in a way that allows 
the former to function through the exploitation of the latter. According to this understanding, 
informality plays a key role in the capitalist system by supplying low-cost goods and services for 
formal firms, allowing them to maximize profits by minimizing expenditures on labour, production 
and distribution. Formal workers also benefit from the existence of the informal sphere as it allows 
them to survive on otherwise inadequate wages, while wealthier participants in the informal 
economy are able to sustain or improve their socioeconomic position by taking advantage of less 
expensive goods and services. From this perspective, informality is therefore produced and 
sustained through the division of labour and forms of production, distribution and accumulation 
that define capitalism and exist both domestically and internationally, and thus constitutes a form 
of unequal market integration rather than exclusion.56 The emphasis that structuralist accounts 
place upon the exploitation and subordination of informal actors effectively precludes any analysis 
of how the informal sphere is contested. Informal actors are not seen to possess the capacity to 
undertake actions that would affect their marginalization. Similarly, while the hierarchies and 
forms of domination that define informality may be emphasized, these are presented as a natural 
by-product of capitalist development and are largely de-politicized.  
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iii. Neoliberal Accounts of Informal Economic Activity 
The apolitical view of informal actors first came to be challenged by the rise of neoliberal 
accounts of informal economic activity. The work of Hernando de Soto is particularly important 
here. In his analysis of informal economic activity in Peru, de Soto portrays the informal sphere 
as a site of market creativity and dynamism that is populated by a diverse array of small-scale 
entrepreneurs. In doing so, he employs the emphasis that neoclassical economic analysis places on 
rational actors to argue that informal actors weigh the respective costs and benefits that informality 
and formality each entail, and choose the former, despite its undesirability, due to the burdens that 
governments place on the latter. For de Soto, therefore, engaging in informal economic activity is 
itself a form of contesting the state, with the conscious evasion of official legal and regulatory 
structures serving as a popular challenge to the state’s poorly managed economic dominance. In 
contrast to earlier accounts of informal economic activity, the informal sphere does not limit 
agency, but is rather itself the result of the agency of small-scale entrepreneurs acting in accordance 
with their rational self-interest.57  
De Soto does not, however, view informal economic activity as entirely beneficial. Instead, 
he argues, it can have a variety of negative effects: reduced levels of productivity and investment, 
higher prices for services, minimal technological development and difficulties collecting tax 
revenues and constructing macroeconomic policy. De Soto therefore argues that the state must act 
to formalize the informal sphere, and asserts that it is best able to do so by reducing the costs of 
formality and reforming the legal system to provide protections for property rights, contracts and 
extracontractual liabilities.58 De Soto’s work is tied to the broader idea that underdevelopment is 
caused by overly restrictive, burdensome or distortionary state policies and can be ‘solved’ through 
market reforms. The idea that markets are a solution to rather than a cause of informality has 
inspired a vast amount of literature advocating lower taxes, fewer regulations and less bureaucracy 
as the best means of reducing the costs of entering the formal sphere and harnessing the 
developmental potential of informal entrepreneurs, with the neoliberal interpretation of informality 
coming to dominate mainstream scholarship,59 major international institutions, most notably the 
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World Bank,60 and popular accounts.61 De Soto’s work therefore not only provides an important 
understanding of how informal actors contest the state, but also informs orthodox approaches to 
how the state should, in turn, act to reduce informality. It remains a central reference point for all 
contemporary analysis of informal economic activity.  
The idea that participation in informal economic activity is itself a way of contesting the 
failures of the state has been widely adopted. Victor Azarya and Naomi Chazan’s theorization of 
‘disengagement from the state’ in Ghana and Guinea,62 Janet MacGaffey’s study of Zaire’s ‘real 
economy’ in an environment of state collapse63 and Aili Mari Tripp’s analysis of survival strategies 
in Dar es Salaam64 all portray the informal economy as a space of liberation from a state that cannot 
or will not provide for the needs of the majority of its citizens. For Tripp, informal actors do not 
just disengage from the state in the informal sphere, but are also, in doing so, able to have a 
dramatic impact on state policy. Tripp argues that the large-scale evasion of the state that informal 
economic activity involves played a decisive role in Tanzania’s economic liberalization that began 
in the mid-1980s as it forced the state, which was then suffering from reduced capacity due to 
long-term economic mismanagement, to lessen official restrictions on the informal livelihood 
strategies that had become so pervasive in an environment of economic stagnation and decline. 
Following James C. Scott’s conceptualization of everyday forms of resistance—actions that 
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discreetly, rather than openly, contest the application of power65—Tripp claims that informal 
actors in Tanzania employed a form of collective non-compliance as a means of challenging the 
state’s restrictive definitions of social justice and economic fairness. For Tripp, the informal sphere 
is therefore more than a site of simple survival strategies as it also exists as a space where the 
broader contours of state-society relations can be constantly (re)negotiated. The non-compliance 
inherent in informality, Tripp claims, can be a powerful tool for refashioning the social and 
economic dimensions of even unrepresentative, unresponsive states along popular lines.66     
This thesis challenges neoliberal accounts of informal economic activity by arguing that 
they are based on a fundamentally flawed conceptualization of the relationship between agency 
and the state in the informal sphere. It advances this critique by building on alternative treatments 
of the agency of informal actors and placing the role of the state at the centre of its analysis. It is 
to this final body of work on specific instances and manifestations of the agency of informal actors 
that this literature review now turns.  
 
iv. Alternative Approaches to Agency in the Informal Sphere 
There are many dimensions to the agency of informal actors. For informal vendors, much 
of this surrounds the ambivalent and unstable relationship that they have with the state. Peter 
Mackie, Rosemary Bromley and Alison Brown identify four different ‘battlegrounds’ on which 
vendors confront the state: spatial battlegrounds, which concern the access to physical space within 
a city; political battlegrounds, which concern influence over political decision-making; economic 
battlegrounds, which concern the removal of vendors in the interests of middle class residents of 
the city; and socio-cultural battlegrounds, which concern the practices and cultures of vendors that 
are seen as undesirable and antithetical to a certain conception of modernity.67 Similarly, Ilda 
Lindell emphasizes how the governance of informal vendors takes place and is contested at 
multiple sites, including within vending associations, in the relationship between associations and 
the state and in relationships with other associations and civil society groups.68  
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It is possible to categorize the literature on political agency in the informal economy in 
many different ways. This literature review focuses on three ways in which informal actors—and 
informal vendors in particular—are able to exercise agency: by taking advantage of favourable 
opportunities to exercise political influence; by forming or participating in organizations; and by 
engaging in small-scale resistance strategies.   
 
a) Political Influence 
The first major way in which informal actors are able to exercise agency is by taking 
advantage of specific state structures and/or political realities in ways that provide for a degree of 
political influence. These usually take the form of democratic processes and clientelism, often with 
little distinction between the two. Repression and co-option are of central importance here as well 
given that involvement in such processes are often a means of challenging the former but risk the 
latter.  
Rina Agarwala offers a notable analysis of how particular political and economic 
conditions shape the agency of informal actors. Analyzing the efforts of informal actors in four of 
India’s sub-national states, she argues that two conditions are of primary importance for success: 
first, the existence of pro-poor competitive elections in which informal actors are able to offer 
votes in exchange for favourable policies, and second, and of slightly less significance, the degree 
of economic liberalization, which, she argues, actually provides informal actors with a certain 
degree of leverage in their dealings with the state as it allows them to frame themselves as essential 
components of neoliberal forms of production. Differences in these two variables, she claims, 
explains high levels of success in Tamil Nadu (where both are present) and Kerala (where the first 
is but not the second), moderate success in Maharashtra (where the second is present but not the 
first) and low levels of success in West Bengal (where both are absent). The more these conditions 
are present, she therefore argues, the more informal actors are able to make claims upon the state 
for the provision of social welfare. In doing so, she suggests, they are re-forging their social 
contract with the state in a way that helps to legitimize their activities, representing a ‘bottom-up’ 
response to labour inflexibility in an environment of neoliberalism.69  
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It is important, however, to emphasize a key difference that distinguishes Agarwala’s work 
from that of this thesis: whereas this thesis examines (mostly) ‘self-employed’ informal vendors, 
Agarwala examines workers who are informally employed in the tobacco and construction 
industries. Agarwala herself acknowledges the significance of the distinction between these two 
groups, arguing that they represent two sub-classes of informal actors and are integrated into class 
structures in different ways, with ‘self-employed’ informal actors lacking the structural power to 
influence capital—and the states that depend on it—that informally employed workers possess. 
Still, Agarwala emphasizes that informally employed workers make their appeals to the state rather 
than their employers, and they do so by using the rhetoric of citizenship rather than labour.70 Her 
arguments therefore remain relevant for this thesis, even if important thematic differences must be 
recognized.   
Other authors have specifically explored the collective action of informal vendors. John 
Cross’ work on street vendors in Mexico City is perhaps the most significant in this regard, and 
certainly the most influential. Cross’ particular focus is on how organized informal vendors have 
been able to take advantage of poor state integration and the disconnect that exists between the 
design and the implementation of state policy. Policies that are designed to discourage informal 
street vending are often not enforced, Cross argues, because the state officials charged with 
implementing them commonly seek the support of informal actors for their own political or 
monetary purposes. Street vendors are consequently able to form strategic alliances with certain 
government officials while simultaneously opposing particular government policies. Clientelism 
thus offers a means through which vendors can resist the power of the state. Interestingly, Cross 
asserts that the fragmented nature of vendors’ organizations is essential for their success as it 
creates a competitive environment in which vendors’ interests will never become too closely tied 
to any particular political group. Vendors, he claims, will never be able to exert any power over 
the state, but their fragmentation can at least limit the state’s ability to exert power over them. 
Cross also explores historical instances in which the government actively sought to eradicate street 
vending in Mexico City, claiming that early forceful tactics only succeeded in organizing informal 
actors while later attempts to relocate street vendors and encourage them to formalize failed due 
to poor incentives. The government’s insistence that negotiations be undertaken with designated 
leaders significantly increased the power of some vendors within a group, causing clientelism to 
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permeate group hierarchies itself. Furthermore, the ability of leaders to reward their members and 
withhold similar benefits from non-participants overcomes the ‘free rider’ problem that commonly 
defines collective action. For Cross, the state therefore defines both the nature and success of 
informal vendors’ political actions as well as the key characteristics of vendors’ organizations.71  
Cross’ emphasis on the importance of clientelism is replicated elsewhere. Veronica Crossa 
also argues that vendors in Mexico have been able to take advantage of the clientelist structures of 
the state,72 while Lindell notes that associations in Maputo, Mozambique engage in clientelist 
relations with politicians in which they exchange their votes for protection.73 Mackie, Bromley 
and Brown do not refer to clientelism, but still claim that the ability of vendors to back a supportive 
mayor in local elections in Cusco, Peru was crucial for their success in the political battleground, 
and more significant than other associational activities or protests.74 The significance of clientelism 
and democratic elections is not universally held to be beneficial, however. Michael Donovan 
instead argues that the introduction of mayoral elections in Bogotá, along with the decline of 
vendors’ associations, led to the rise of mayors who wanted to demonstrate their ability to impose 
the ‘rule of law’ on the city, and thus contributed to a new policy of relocating informal vendors.75 
 
b) Organizing 
The second way in which informal actors are seen to exercise agency is by forming or 
participating in organizations. Involvement in associations is common amongst vendors since, as 
Lindell acknowledges, these are often the only bodies that defend vendors from local authorities 
and seek to guarantee the legal status of markets.76 A number of studies explore the extent to which 
these associations can further the interests of their members and provide space for agency and 
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voice.77 In the introduction to a volume that they edit,78 Naila Kabeer, Ratna Sudarshan and Kirsty 
Milward outline a variety of tasks that these organizations perform: the employment of ‘soft 
power’, such as the appropriation of cultural features to promote public awareness, the use of 
discursive strategies to alter popular perceptions, the use of information to educate both their own 
members and the broader public and legal activism; the provision of everyday practical support to 
their members; campaigning for social security; participating in formal politics; and forming local 
and global alliances with other organizations.79 Similarly, Fergus Lyon notes how they perform 
essential informational, welfare, dispute resolution and co-operative and coercive functions.80 As 
Sergio Peña argues, these associations also provide essential norms and regulations that can 
compete with or complement the state’s efforts to impose governance.81  
The apparent benefits of organizing are implied in one of the major themes in the literature 
on informal economic activity, which is the ability of external bodies, particularly formal unions 
and international organizations, to either help informal actors to organize or assist existing 
organizations in the informal economy. The ILO has particularly encouraged organization in the 
informal economy as a means of ensuring adequate working conditions, and has published a 
number of reports detailing the achievements of such efforts in a variety of countries.82 It also 
supports the view that formal unions can play an important role in assisting organizational efforts 
by providing the guidance, training, institutional support and lobbying assistance that informal 
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organizations require,83 and that, by protecting informal actors, unions can also strengthen their 
own support and allow themselves to engage in the power structures that define the contemporary 
global economy in a more meaningful way.84 Several scholars have articulated similar positions,85 
with some using case studies to explore specific instances in which informal actors have at least 
somewhat benefited from the support of either unions86 or international groups.87  
Some authors, however, have emphasized the significant obstacles that organizations in the 
informal sphere commonly face. In their comparative study of street vendors’ organizations, 
Alison Brown and Michal Lyons emphasize the importance of an organization’s social capital, 
associational structure and the governance and institutional landscape in which it operates, along 
with the nature of public discourse about street trading, for its success. These factors can vary 
significantly across different contexts, and shape, they argue, the fact that Islamic brotherhoods in 
Dakar have been able to exercise political influence while product associations in Accra have 
proven to be inadaptable, associations in Dar es Salaam have been unable to resist attempts to 
minimize street trading and a vendor’s union in Kathmandu has been largely unable to protect 
street traders from widespread oppression.88  Meagher emphasizes the influence that the nature of 
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the informal activity itself can have on the outcomes of organization efforts, arguing that, in Aba, 
Nigeria, cosmetics manufacturers were circumscribed by gender conflicts and legal 
marginalization, while shoe manufactures experienced social marginalization based on 
occupation, class and education and garment producers suffered due to their informal status and 
were plagued by internal conflicts.89  
Divisions within the informal sphere serve as a particularly significant impediment to 
organizational efforts. Despite his relatively optimistic view of the potential for informal actors to 
organize, Bishwapriya Sanyal also acknowledges that competition amongst traders for market 
share, different ethnic, racial and religious identities and selective assistance from the government 
all impede co-operative action.90 Lindell highlights the multiple actors, identities, subjectivities, 
agendas, relationships and forms of power that exist within the informal sphere, arguing that it 
must be recognized as having a variety of internal class structures rather than a unifying class 
identity. Organizations are affected by these dynamics as well, as they often embody multiple 
identities and divisions along the lines of wealth, gender, age, race, ethnicity and religion. These 
multiple identities mean that informal actors can experience multiple forms of injustice, and thus 
must construct unity around shared meanings.91 Meagher also notes how associations often 
structurally reproduce communal, class and gender divisions, and are more likely to be joined by, 
and benefit, older, wealthier males who belong to a mainstream church than by women and 
younger men from smaller churches and with lower class backgrounds. Furthermore, Meagher 
suggests, associations are primarily used as a vehicle for attaining personal or narrow group 
objectives rather than as a unifying platform for collective agency, thus contributing to, rather than 
overcoming, social fragmentation and competition.92  
Matteo Rizzo’s work on informal transport workers in Dar es Salaam highlights similar 
problems. The over-supply of non-skilled labour, the geographical dispersion of informal minibus 
operators and existing divisions between full-time drivers, part-time drivers and those whose job 
it is to solicit passengers, he argues, serve as barriers to the formation of a collective class identity 
within the sector around which organizational activity could be based. The association that he 
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examines was marred by significant tensions over important issues: the allocation of funds, with 
the desire for support from members far exceeding the association’s monetary capacity; the 
provision of shifts between different categories of workers; and the practice of buying and selling 
shifts. This preoccupation with the ‘struggle over class’, he claims, was paired with a lack of 
engagement with the ‘struggle between classes’, as the association, by focusing on providing for 
the welfare of its members, merely facilitated the exploitative conditions in which its members 
worked without making demands to or putting pressure on the state or employers.93 Blessings 
Chinsinga and Happy Kayuni also address the problem of class fragmentation in their study of 
street vendors in Malawi, claiming that divisions exist between those who are literate and those 
who are not as well as those who are financially successful and those who are less so. Wealthier 
vendors, they claim, are more likely to support the status quo, whereas others are commonly more 
confrontational, creating an impediment for unified action. Furthermore, leaders of associations 
are more likely to be fluent in English, have formal sector experience, support the ruling party and 
have a more elevated socio-economic position, undermining prospects for effective 
representation.94 Divisions between groups based on different economic activities has also been 
cited as a major hindrance to co-operation between informal actors and formal unions, with some 
arguing that it is difficult or impossible to reconcile the interests and relations of production that 
separate those in the informal sector from their formal counterparts.95 
The state can play a major role in creating and/or manipulating divisions within and 
between groups. The literature offers three ways in which this can occur. First, and most basically, 
it can directly interfere in the affairs of vendors’ associations. In making this point, Lindell details 
how municipal authorities possibly provoked the grievances of vendors against their association 
in more than one market in Maputo. The motive behind such disruption is likely to undermine 
groups that limit the government’s ability to control local markets.96  
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Second, as Victor Agadjanian notes in his study of vendors in La Paz-El Alto, Bolivia, 
economic liberalization can lead to increased competition between vendors and the dissemination 
of an ideology that emphasizes self-reliance and individual initiative. These economic and social 
consequences promote significant fragmentation amongst vendors and strengthen smaller, less 
inclusive identity groups that are defined by significant divisions, including those between 
members and non-members of associations, between wealthier and poorer vendors and between 
members of different ethnocultural and religious groups. Political pluralisation, he claims, further 
exacerbates divisions amongst the poor, leading to increased disillusionment with political 
processes. Economic and political liberalization can thus act as a significant barrier to collective 
action.97 In her work on Aba, Nigeria, Kate Meagher asserts that liberalization further hampered 
organization efforts by facilitating internal conflicts and limiting available resources, reducing the 
potential for large-scale mobilization. She also claims that liberalization made informal 
organizations more dependent on the state for resources and influence, effectively limiting their 
autonomy and resulting in political capture.98  
Third, as Quetzil Castañeda demonstrates, efforts to control vendors and govern their 
behaviours can promote divisions between them. Following Foucault’s employment of Jeremy 
Bentham’s panopticon as a model of surveillance and behavioural regulation, Castañeda describes 
a program introduced by the state to organize, ‘modernize’ and regulate vendors at Chichén Itzá 
in Mexico. Castañeda argues that the new rules for vendors that this program introduced, despite 
their apparent neutrality, affected different groups of vendors in different ways, and were intended 
to redefine divisions and redirect resistance to their violation. Race, ethnicity, class, gender and 
culture therefore became the axes around which power and resistance operated.99 
While these insights are extremely relevant for this study, the role of the state in the 
organizational politics of informal vendors has only just begun to be explored. This represents a 
promising line of inquiry that is explored further in this thesis.  
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c) Small-Scale Resistance 
The ability of informal actors to employ small-scale resistance strategies to respond to state 
repression is also commonly emphasized. The work of Asef Bayat is particularly relevant here. 
Informal economic activity, for Bayat, is a manifestation of a broader form of ‘street politics’, 
referring to the various conflicts between individuals or groups and authority figures that emerge 
when a public space is used—whether by vendors, squatters, street children and youth, domestic 
workers or protestors—for purposes other than those for which it is officially authorized and 
intended. Lacking other forms of economic power, and frequently without alternative livelihoods 
due to neoliberal forms of dispossession and exclusion, the urban poor engage in street politics 
through fragmented ‘social nonmovements’ as a way of expressing their discontent.100 This 
involves, according to Bayat, the ‘quiet encroachment of the ordinary’, or the gradual, cautious, 
individual and spontaneous advancement of the interests of the urban poor, including informal 
actors, driven by the necessity of survival or the pursuit of dignity. Like Tripp, Bayat emphasizes 
how this represents a popular sense of morality, and while even though such encroachment lacks 
formal leadership, structure or ideological commitments, it nevertheless aims to alter the 
distribution of social goods and opportunities that exists in society while ensuring the autonomy 
of informal activities from the state. Still, Bayat also claims that informal actors become mobilized 
and undertake more overt collective action when the gains made through quiet encroachment 
become threatened by the state. It is therefore the actions of the state itself that politicize informal 
actors as resistance by the state to everyday encroachments is met with demonstrations, rallies and 
even riots. For Bayat, therefore, informal actors may make gains individually, but they defend 
them collectively.101 
Vendors adopt a number of strategies in response to repression. Spatial exclusion is 
commonly contested,102 and such practices as evading or bribing authorities, concealing 
merchandise, increasing mobility, using children as lookouts, selling at times of low police 
presence and switching activities once goods have been seized are all acknowledged in the 
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literature, as are forms of mutual assistance including watching over each others’ merchandise, 
sharing information on police actions and saving and lending money.103 Vendors have responded 
to attempts to force them into permanent markets—efforts that can reduce their sales and cut them 
off from customers and supply networks—by creating new markets or returning to the streets, 
despite the harassment they face as a result.104 Co-operating with shop owners can also be valuable 
as they can share electricity and street cleaning duties, protect merchandise and provide shelter 
from authorities in exchange for selling their goods on the street.105 According to Griet Steel, such 
efforts are examples of reworking and resilience in response to power rather than resistance.106 
Following the work of James C. Scott and subaltern studies theorists, Francis Musoni suggests that 
deliberately avoiding confrontation with a powerful repressive state and instead employing 
adaptive strategies of evasion can allow traders to survive major eradication attempts. Still, he 
suggests, responses vary due to circumstances and experiences of repression, with factors such as 
a trader’s ties to rural areas, access to financial resources and gender influencing his or her ability 
to recover.107  
Even supposedly supportive actions on the part of the state can engender resistance. Axel 
Baudouin et al. describe the changing relationship between informal waste collectors and the state 
in Addis Ababa, claiming that this was characterized by a shift from negligence on the part of the 
state to the formation of a partnership that ultimately facilitated the state’s political dominance of 
informal workers through excessive interventions and, later, the introduction of government-
supported enterprises that sought to replace informal workers. The state also tried to subsume 
existing independent organizations within a larger, state-sanctioned body, limiting informal actors’ 
capacity for autonomous organization. Informal waste collectors responded to these efforts, 
Baudouin et al. claim, by increasing the frequency of their services, reducing fees and adding 
additional free services to become more competitive while also collectively sharing information 
and planning strategies to respond to the state’s efforts. The ultimate effect of this partnership was 
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a heightened level of mistrust of the state by informal actors, demonstrating, Baudouin et al. argue, 
that collaboration can only take place in an environment of democratic accountability and 
participatory governance where informal actors are recognized and involved in decision-making 
processes.108  
According to Luis Felipe Cabrales Barajas, however, attempts to relocate informal vendors 
are not necessarily defined by the dynamics of repression and resistance. Indeed, Cabrales Barajas 
describes a co-operative and consensual effort to remove vendors from the historic centre of 
Morelia, Mexico that encountered only minimal dissent. Still, the extent to which widespread and 
diverse forms of resistance to state repression by informal vendors have been documented 
elsewhere suggests that this event is rather exceptional, a point that the author concedes.109 
Repression seems to be a major cause of resistance amongst informal vendors, and exactly how 
this is the case deserves further analysis.  
 
Part III: Moving Forward 
The agency of informal actors has therefore emerged as a major subject of focus in current 
literature on informal economic activity. While early analyses of informal economic activity 
largely omitted a focus on agency, neoliberal accounts of informality have come to offer a widely 
influential interpretation of the informal sphere as a space for the agency of the urban poor that 
exists beyond and in response to state power. Informal economic activity exists, according to 
neoliberal accounts, as the urban poor disengage from the state and the unjust, unrepresentative 
political and economic system from which they are excluded. For some, this disengagement can 
have transformative effects on state-society relations. Informality thus reflects a popular sense of 
morality, and informal actors desire is a favourable regulatory and tax environment accompanied 
by targeted assistance to aid their entrepreneurial efforts and provide an attractive path to 
formalization.  
This thesis critiques neoliberal interpretations of informal economic activity by challenging 
their core assumptions about agency and the state in the informal sphere. In doing so, it builds on 
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alternative approaches to agency in the informal sphere by emphasizing the defining role that the 
state plays in shaping the agency of informal actors. The significance of the state can be identified 
in many descriptions of the agency of agency in the informal sphere: most notably, some accounts 
hold that particular political realities can allow informal actors to exercise influence over political 
decision-making processes, while others suggest that the state can influence organization efforts 
and still more demonstrate how repression can foster small-scale resistance strategies. What is 
absent from existing literature, however, is an analysis of how agency is tied in specific ways to 
the evolution of the state over time, how this evolution is the result of internal power dynamics 
and, more specifically, how the centralized (re)assertion of power can limit the ability of informal 
actors to participate in urban development and economic life. Informal actors may have the ability 
to exercise agency, but this is both facilitated and constantly constrained by the state, making them 
particularly vulnerable to periods of political transformation. This thesis examines such a period 
of transformation, and in doing so ties different manifestations of agency into a larger account of 
political hegemony and the Ugandan state over which a particular subset of informal actors exert 
little control. It shows how the expansion of political power by the President and the ruling party 
has led to the contraction, but not the complete disappearance, of agency for informal vendors, and 
how informal actors have responded to this expansion of power in the face of increased 
marginalization. In doing so, it both restores the agency of informal actors and emphasizes that 
this agency is fundamentally dependent on the political circumstances that they must navigate, 
connecting the ability of informal actors to participate in urban development and economic life to 
issues of political control and domination that are at the heart of the state.  
Kampala provides an excellent environment in which to study how the state can impact 
agency in the informal sphere. Such an analysis promises to not only improve understandings of 
informal vending and informality more generally in the city, but also to provide a unique view of 
the Ugandan state that builds on characterizations that can be found in existing literature. Studying 
the state from the ‘bottom-up’ perspective offered by informal vending provides crucial insights 
into how the expansion of power by Museveni and the NRM has occurred, what form(s) this 
expansion of power has taken, what interests it involves and how it impacts major issues of urban 
governance and development. Such a perspective also reveals much about how vulnerable groups 
experience and are constrained by the state, and how broader issues of political power lead to their 
marginalization. By focusing on the politics of informal vending, this thesis therefore makes a 
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valuable contribution to the understanding of political power and the state in Uganda more 
generally. 
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Chapter Three: Informality and the State in Uganda 
 
 An analysis of how the Ugandan state shapes the agency of informal vendors must be 
placed within its proper historical, political, social and economic context. The state not only shapes 
the agency of informal vendors in Uganda through the forms of state power that are the focus of 
this thesis, but is fundamentally inseparable from the existence and nature of informal economic 
activity itself. Without understanding these broader ties between informality and the state, any 
picture of agency in the informal sphere is necessarily incomplete.  
The purpose of this chapter is therefore to provide an overview of Uganda’s informal 
economy and its relation to the state. Part I outlines key features of Uganda’s informal economy, 
both in general and with a particular focus on informal street and market vending. Part II then 
examines the role that the Ugandan state has played, and continues to play, in producing and 
perpetuating informality in the country. Six particular ways in which it does and has done so in the 
past are highlighted: (1) through a history of colonial planning in Kampala that divided the city’s 
economy and introduced influential ideas about urban order; (2) by precipitating formal economic 
collapse through poor governance, instability and insecurity; (3) by adopting extensive economic 
liberalization that has led to inadequate formal employment creation and relies on the informal 
sphere to serve as a safety net for the failures of the market; (4) by overseeing geographic patterns 
of development that promote migration to urban centres, particularly Kampala; (5) by having a 
taxation regime that is regressive and undermined by poor service provision and corruption, 
discouraging formalization; and (6) through extensive corruption that undermines formalization, 
along with the economic interests of some state officials who personally benefit from the existence 
of the informal sphere.  
By focusing on the relationship between informality and the state, this chapter addresses 
some of major themes in the literature on informal economic activity. Most notably, it contributes 
to long-standing debates about the emergence and persistence of informality, arguing that the state 
plays a crucial role in this process. In doing so, it adds to the argument that economic liberalization 
leads to the expansion of the informal sphere, critiques influential interpretations of the role of 
taxation and stresses the importance of specific aspects of a country’s political economy that often 
receive inadequate attention. It also furthers understandings of the livelihoods that informal 
vending contributes to, conveying valuable empirical information on informal vending in Kampala 
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that cannot be found elsewhere, and questions dualist understandings of the formal and informal 
spheres by noting how a variety of linkages suggest significant exchange and interdependence. 
It is necessary to situate the agency of informal vendors within the broader relationship 
between the state and the informal economy, and to emphasize how deeply ingrained and 
multifaceted the relationship between the state and the informal sphere is. The state not only shapes 
the agency of informal vendors, but is also largely responsible for the existence of informality and 
framing the issues that vendors exercise their agency to address. When the state represses informal 
vendors, therefore, it is seeking to limit the viability or independence of livelihoods that are 
adopted in response to circumstances that it largely creates. It is within these circumstances that 
vendors exercise agency as they seek to participate in urban development and economic life.   
 
Part I: Uganda’s Informal Economy 
 Uganda has a large and diverse informal economy. Given its economic, social and political 
significance, it receives inadequate attention from both scholars and policymakers. This is 
especially true for street and market vending. A general overview of informal economic activity 
in Uganda is therefore presented here, followed by a discussion of key features of street and market 
vending in Kampala that provide important context for considering the forms of agency that this 
thesis explores.  
 
i. Overview 
The UBOS is the main source of information on informal economic activity in Uganda. It 
estimates the size of the informal sphere at 31.991 billion UGX in 2014, compared to a formal 
economy of 34.448 billion UGX.1 It breaks informal economic activity down into three groups, 
the largest of which is agriculture, forestry and fishing (15.45 billion UGX), followed by services 
(11.12 billion UGX) and industry (5.421 billion UGX).2 ‘Trading and repairs’, at 4.055 billion 
UGX, is the largest sub-category of services.3  
Interestingly, however, the “Uganda National Household Survey 2012/2013”, the 
organization’s most recent document on livelihoods in the country, omits the chapter on 
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informality that was included in its predecessor.4 This earlier document, the “Uganda National 
Household Survey 2009/2010”, therefore provides the most detailed insight into the country’s 
informal sphere, even if its findings are slightly dated and, as its title suggests, it focuses on 
informal economic activity at the household level rather than as a general phenomenon. This focus 
is particularly problematic as it is not always clear if it is referring to household enterprises or all 
informal activities. Also significant is the fact that the survey defines informality both by the lack 
of registration for tax purposes and by size, counting a business as informal if it has fewer than 
five employees.5 Still, in the absence of alternative sources, it remains valuable. The survey 
identifies about 1,296,000 households with informal enterprises, 164,000 of which are in urban 
areas, in 6,227,000 households surveyed.6 Thirty-six percent of these businesses are in the Central 
region, 26% are in the Western region, 24% are in the Eastern region and 14% are in the Northern 
region.7 Broken down by sector, 27% are engaged in agriculture, 24% in trade, 15% in food 
processing, 14% in manufacturing, 9% in hotels and restaurants, 7% in services, 1% in fishing and 
1% in mining and quarrying.8 It finds about 1.8 million informal businesses involving 3.5 million 
people, 2.1 million of whom engage in non-agricultural activities.9 Of this 2.1 million, 63.6% are 
owners, 13.3% are paid employees and 23.2% are unpaid assistants.10  
The UBOS’s numbers, though, are evidently incomplete. Of the informal businesses it 
surveys, it claims that approximately 76,000 are located in markets or ‘trade fairs’.11 Kampala 
alone likely has around 150,000 market vendors,12 suggesting that the number of enterprises 
located in markets throughout the country is far higher than what the UBOS indicates. The survey 
also indicates that that there are 95,000 street vendors with a fixed location in the country and a 
further 12,000 ‘hawkers’.13 It is impossible to assess whether or not these figures are also 
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inaccurate because there is nothing to compare them to. It is evident, however, that a much more 
thorough study of informality in Uganda is necessary.  
  
ii. Street and Market Vending 
Street and market vending are two of the most visible forms of informal economic activity 




Street and market vending have major similarities. Street vendors typically sell small 
amounts of food, particularly agricultural goods, or manufactured goods, ranging from wallets and 
sunglasses to books, pens and calculators. Most simply sell whatever small items they are able to 
acquire. Some market vendors do the same, but others sell larger amounts and a wider variety of 
goods due to higher amounts of capital. Articles of clothing and accessories, various types of food, 
electronic goods and spare parts are particularly common, some much more so at certain markets. 
Some market vendors provide basic services as well, such as sewing or repairs.  
The main distinction between street and market vending is the location in which each 
activity takes place. Whereas street vendors operate on sidewalks, street corners or even streets 
themselves, market vendors operate in built-up (semi-)permanent markets, which are divided into 
open spaces, stalls and larger lock-up units that vendors use. In Kampala, street and market vending 




Respondents who were interviewed or surveyed for this thesis generally engaged in 
informal economic activity because it seemed to be the most logical and viable means of securing 
an income. This reflects the poor state of the formal labour market, and many referenced the 
difficulty of securing formal employment. Given the virtual absence of any semblance of a social 
safety net for the unemployed, when formal employment is not an option, income-seekers are 
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forced to look to the informal sphere. Informal vending remains an obvious choice, particularly in 
urban areas where large amounts of people and businesses—both as potential customers and 
suppliers—are concentrated. It is important to emphasize, however, that not all vendors are simply 
‘reluctant entrepreneurs’.15 A minority, in fact, view informal economic activity as preferable to 
formal employment due to the fact that it is possible for some to earn a higher income in the 
informal sphere.16 This can be explained by the fact that the switch to informal economic activity, 
as Susanne Teltscher points out, usually involves a change in class position from wage labourer to 
petite bourgeoisie,17 so in circumstances where formal wages are low and the potential for informal 
capital accumulation is high, informality can be desirable. For some, then, informality is a choice, 
while for most it is a necessity. In general, those who choose informality should be more successful 
in their efforts at capital accumulation while those who are forced into it out of necessity should 
be less successful, given the fact that wage employment would lower the incomes of the former 
while raising the incomes of the latter. This reflects the hierarchies and divisions that exist amongst 
informal vendors, a theme that is explored in detail in Chapter Five. 
A particularly appealing feature of informal vending for income-seekers is its relatively 
low entry costs. This is especially true for street vendors. Street vendors who were interviewed for 
this thesis had business capital as low as 10,000 to 15,000 UGX, and generally less than 100,000 
UGX. Although street vending entails challenges that involve indirect costs—notably as a result 
of dealing with state authorities—these come after entry and still may not make street vending 
costlier than market vending. Entry costs are higher for market vendors, who, unlike street vendors, 
have to pay rent and fees in order to access their vending locations. Market vendors are much more 
socioeconomically diverse than street vendors, so between market vendors there can be significant 
differences in initial capital, ranging anywhere from, as estimated by a senior figure in Owino 
Market’s main ownership company, 10,000 to 100 million UGX.18 For vendors at the lower end 
of this range, costs can be burdensome; for those at the higher end, they are much less so.  
Costs are not the only barrier to entry to informal vending. Finding space is also important. 
While street vendors can be mobile, they usually sell in the same locations, which can be important 
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70  Young 
 
for storing goods and building relationships with customers and suppliers. An ideal location would 
be on a busy street with access to a high volume of potential customers, but such a concern must 
be balanced with potential competition from other vendors and the desire to avoid state repression. 
Entry into market vending necessitates finding a space in a market, which can be difficult, 
particularly if a location is to be desirable and affordable. The idea that markets were ‘full’ was 
expressed by some street vendors as a reason for why they did not relocate to a market following 
the criminalization of their economic activity.  
Overcoming certain barriers to entry can be aided by personal ties. Friends or relatives 
requesting assistance or offering an opportunity to get involved in vending can allow entrants to 
access particular vending locations and connect with existing supply and social networks. They 
can also serve as an important source for finance, easing cost barriers. These personal ties were 
mentioned by a number of respondents as important factors behind entry into the informal sphere.  
 
c) Livelihoods 
Informal vending is usually characterized by low capital accumulation. For street vendors, 
earned income often provides no more than basic subsistence, and even earning enough to cover 
essential costs can be difficult. Between losses, particularly of perishable goods, thefts and costs 
incurred in dealing with state officials, profits are not guaranteed. Even when vendors are able to 
get a decent return on capital, low initial capital limits profits. One street vendor estimated that he 
could approximately double the amount of capital he injected into trading; still, his profits were 
low and he slept on the street.19 Many market vendors experience similar difficulties with capital 
accumulation. Although the surveys administered for this thesis do not necessarily capture a 
representative picture of market vendors, virtually all respondents indicated average weekly profits 
of between 30,000 and 200,000 UGX. One market vendor complained of not seeing any profits in 
four years, and being forced to take loans from friends to remain in business.20 Importantly, 
however, some market vendors have incomes that are far in excess of others’, and are significantly 
more successful in their efforts of capital accumulation. This is again indicative of the hierarchies 
and divisions that exist within informal markets.  
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Profits earned by vendors can be reinvested for further business activities, but are also 
required to cover the expenses that vendors face outside of work. These expenses are even more 
burdensome for those who are single parents, notably mothers, and are responsible for all 
household costs. For those who can afford formal or semi-formal living arrangements, purchasing 
land, rent, utilities and general upkeep can take up a large share of income. Many vendors cannot 
afford such living conditions, and live in the slums that house approximately 85% of the city’s 
poor population.21 Food, a daily necessity, is another major cost. Many vendors, as expressed in 
one group interview, “work just to get the daily bread”.22 Poor government service provision 
means that vendors also need to pay for things that might, under different circumstances, be free 
or more affordable. Public transportation in Kampala is extremely underdeveloped, and for 
vendors who do not live near their place of business, private alternatives can be expensive, causing 
some to choose to walk long distances to their vending sites in order to save money. Healthcare 
costs are also high, and can make treatment unaffordable. The most commonly mentioned service 
cost in interviews was school fees, which are charged for all levels of education and can be difficult 
for vendors to afford. The inability to pay school fees can perpetuate informality by forcing 
children to leave school, after which they enter the informal sphere because, as one market vendor 
stated, “[t]here is no other alternative” for livelihood support.23 Education, however, does not 
guarantee entry into the formal sphere, and people of all backgrounds can participate in informal 
economic activity. One respondent claimed that he has paid school fees for ten children, only one 
of whom now has a job.24 
Working conditions for informal vendors are commonly poor. It is normal for vendors to 
work long hours in a day, seven days a week. Because they work outdoors, they face exposure to 
the elements, especially excessive heat and rain, the latter being a particular problem in markets 
as it turns dirt ground to mud. Markets are characterized by a general lack of cleanliness and poor 
hygiene standards, which can provide for a poor working environment and even, in extreme cases, 
cause health concerns, such as when Nakasero Market, the third largest in Kampala, experienced 
a typhoid outbreak during the first phase of fieldwork undertaken for this thesis in February and 
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March, 2015. Cleanliness issues can also harm businesses by causing them to lose customers.25 
Markets can be extremely congested, with thousands of vendors concentrated in certain areas 
throughout the city. Stalls are sometimes only a few feet wide, and open spaces can be quite 
crowded. While congestion is less of a problem for street vendors, their lack of an established 
location raises such problems as inadequate bathroom facilities and a difficulty storing and 
transporting goods (something experienced by vendors in the open spaces of markets as well). The 
challenges that both street and market vendors face can have consequences for their health, 
particularly through stress and fatigue, and illness is not only expensive to treat, but can also cause 
vendors to forego essential income if they are unable to work.  
The struggle between street vendors and the state can be viewed as a struggle over the 
validity of a practice that some of the urban poor depend on for their livelihoods, with street 
vendors seeking to protect their ability to engage in an economic activity that the state deems 
undesirable. Issues surrounding the ownership and development of markets are similarly crucial 
for the livelihoods of market vendors since they fundamentally impact capital accumulation and 
autonomous decision-making. The state can serve as a major obstacle in the livelihood strategies 
of informal vendors, but also has the ability to act in a way that could improve vendors’ livelihoods. 
It is often around these key livelihood issues that vendors exercise agency.  
 
d) Ties to the Broader Economy 
Informal vending is intricately connected to the rest of the country’s economy. As Teltscher 
notes, product and capital supply provide crucial linkages, and how individual vendors fit within 
these linkages determines the success of their activities.26 Informal vendors obtain the products 
that they sell by a variety of means. Some buy agricultural goods directly from producers or 
intermediaries during deliveries into the city. Others buy manufactured goods from wholesalers, 
who acquire their goods from domestic and international producers. Some even purchase goods 
from formal businesses or other informal vendors to resell at a higher price. More successful 
vendors are generally better integrated into larger supply chains, whereas vendors whose activities 
merely provide subsistence are much less connected to established networks.   
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Young  73 
 
Access to capital also differs amongst informal vendors. The major problem, as one small 
moneylender phrased it, is that “money is expensive.”27 The standard lending interest rate at 
Ugandan banks averaged 21.5% in 2014.28 Many banks, moreover, will not lend to informal 
vendors due to a lack of collateral and the belief that such loans will not be repaid, forcing vendors 
to seek out other sources of finance on less favourable terms. Some turn to microfinance 
institutions or SACCOs, which can offer loans at lower rates, but for many interest rates and 
collateral requirements are too high. Private moneylenders remain an option, but they can charge 
monthly interest rates of 20-30%,29 while the head of one vendors’ association claimed that this 
can reach as much as 500% per year.30 The combination of high interest rates and low profits 
means that many vendors are unable to repay their loans, which can cause them to lose their 
collateral or even be taken to court and, unable to afford a lawyer, imprisoned for six months before 
being declared bankrupt.31 Such patterns of access both link informal vendors to the broader 
economy and influence, just as they are influenced by, the success of capital accumulation.   
Formal-informal linkages exist not only on the supply side, however, but also through 
demand. Customers of informal vendors have a range of socioeconomic backgrounds, and are not 
just the urban poor, meaning wages earned in formal employment can directly enter the informal 
sphere. Lower business costs mean informal vendors are able to offer lower prices, allowing them 
to enjoy a competitive advantage over their formal rivals and giving them a general appeal. Some 
formal businesses may even purchase goods from informal vendors for resale, meaning the passage 
of goods between the formal and informal spheres occurs in both directions. This demand exists 
due to a lack of low-cost goods in the formal economy as firms seek to increase their profits. 
Interestingly, demand may also arise due to shortages in the public sector. For example, one 
interview respondent was a primary school teacher who was buying books for his students because 
his classroom was underfunded and under-resourced.32  
These linkages demonstrate the unsuitability of dualist understandings of informality. 
Rather than merely responding to the failures of the formal sphere by absorbing excess labour, the 
                                                          
27 Interview, small moneylender, 16 July 2015.  
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informal economy can be deeply affected by fluctuations in the formal economy. On the supply 
side, rising prices for the goods that vendors buy force them to raise their own prices, making them 
less competitive and their goods less affordable for poorer customers. Inflation is particularly 
harmful to vendors, and was frequently commented on throughout the research undertaken for this 
thesis as the shilling lost over a third of its value against the US dollar over the course of fieldwork. 
On the demand side, underperformance in the formal sphere in terms of growth, employment or 
wages can impact the informal economy by reducing customers or disposable income. Many 
vendors, as the head of a market association in Nakawa noted, are “pressed on both sides.”33 
 
Part II: The Informal Economy and the State 
 The state plays a crucial role in producing and perpetuating informal economic activity 
both in Kampala and in Uganda more generally. Six ways in which it has done and continues to 
do so are explored here: through colonial planning; through a history of poor governance, 
instability and insecurity; through economic liberalization; through geographic development 
trends; through tax policy; and through the self-interest of state officials.  
 
i. Colonial Planning 
Kampala’s physical and economic landscape has been profoundly influenced by its 
colonial heritage. Kampala first became a township under the British colonial administration in 
1902, and with gradual expansion, came to cover what are now the areas of Nakasero, Kololo and 
Old Kampala in Kampala Central Division by the late colonial period. Colonial Kampala was 
adjacent to, but administratively separate from, the indigenous city of Mengo to the immediate 
south and west, which served as the capital of the Buganda Kingdom, the traditional home of the 
Baganda people, Uganda’s largest ethnic group. While Kampala was administered by the British 
colonial authorities and had a population that was almost exclusively made up of European and 
Asian (primarily Indian) settlers and their descendants, Mengo remained an indigenous settlement 
that was outside of the boundaries of Kampala and governed by the Buganda Kingdom. The British 
colonial administration adopted major urban plans for Kampala in 1912, 1919, 1930 and 1951, all 
of which had the same technocratic objective of designing an orderly colonial urban environment 
that was centred on the segregation of European, Asian and African populations for racial and 
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(racialized) sanitary purposes. These plans still underpin the fundamental layout of the present 
city; the major markets in Kampala, for example, are concentrated in what were formerly the 
designated European and Asian trading areas around Kampala Road, particularly to the south and 
west before the boundary with Mengo.34 Kampala was finally expanded to incorporate Mengo, 
along with the other indigenous towns of Nakawa and Kawempe, in 1968, six years after the end 
of colonial rule in Uganda.35  
Colonial planning in Kampala had a significant impact on the evolution of informal 
economic activity in the city. The early separation of Kampala and Mengo effectively created a 
dual city in which the African population of Mengo was excluded from the colonial city centre 
and economy; this division, in many ways, continues to exist. Not only do large segments of 
Kampala’s population remain outside of the city’s formal economy, but colonial understandings 
of urban order serve as an important precursor to the later aspirations of urban management and 
development that have come to play such a crucial role in the city’s politics. The view that informal 
vending is chaotic and that it violates the city’s aesthetic and sanitary standards strongly reflects 
colonial views of well-ordered urban space. What was formerly a system of spatial and economic 
exclusion along racial lines has transformed into a system of exclusion along socioeconomic 
lines.36 Informal vendors, like the indigenous residents of Mengo before them, belong to a segment 
of the population that has little or no access to formal economic life in the city, and they remain 
unwelcome in the city centre due to many of the same understandings of urban order that came to 
prominence in the colonial period.  
 
ii. Governance, Instability and Insecurity 
Poor governance, instability and conflict have been defining features of Uganda’s post-
colonial history. All of these can stimulate informal economic activity by precipitating formal 
economic collapse. Such problems were particularly acute during the presidency of Idi Amin 
(1971-1979), allowing new forms of accumulation to arise.37 The expulsion of the country’s Asian 
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population and the seizure of their assets in 1972, the increased use of the state for patronage 
purposes and the introduction of controls all facilitated economic crisis and the rise of 
informality.38 Indexed to 100 in 1960, Uganda’s per capita GDP fell from 106 in 1971 to 66 in 
1979, while domestic investments decreased from 15% to 6% of GDP, exports declined from 19% 
to 3% of GDP, inflation increased from 4% to 216% and external debt grew from 172.4 million 
USD to 590.2 million USD.39 Conflict and instability continued after Amin was overthrown, with 
the country’s next two leaders, Yusuf Lule and Godfrey Binaisa, removed from office in a period 
of 13 months, Milton Obote returning to the presidency following a disputed election and, most 
significantly, the civil war that ultimately brought the NRM to power. By the end of the war in 
1986, Uganda’s economy was still in far worse shape than it had been in 1971: indexed GDP had 
fallen to 60, domestic investments were at 8%, exports were at 9%, inflation was at 96% and 
external debt was at 1.422 billion USD.40 
The sustained period of economic crisis that the country experienced under Amin led to a 
proliferation of black market activities, known in Uganda as magendo. Scarcities produced by the 
widespread collapse of the formal economy, fuelled by unrealistically low state-imposed price 
controls and an overvalued official exchange rate, resulted in new forms of distribution 
surrounding the sale of high-demand goods and services at significantly inflated profit margins. 
Magendo proved to be highly lucrative for many involved in it, and evolved to the point where it 
developed its own internal class structure that was characterized by an elite group of between five 
and five hundred wealthy mafuta mingi, about 2,500 mid-level magendoists and, at the bottom, a 
group of bayaye, or ‘thieves’, which made up 7% of the country’s population and was comprised 
of labourers, drivers, enforcers and, importantly, street vendors. The extent and cohesiveness of 
these hierarchies is uncertain, but they almost certainly changed dramatically when the political 
conditions that produced magendo largely disappeared with the fall of the Amin regime and a 
period of further political and economic upheaval ensued.41 The fieldwork undertaken for this 
thesis suggested no vertical linkages between street vendors and similar distribution and 
accumulation networks. 
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The NRM’s victory did not end conflict in Uganda. It instead made it more regionalized. 
Tripp identifies twelve major armed groups that have engaged in conflict with the government 
since 1986, including one in the Central region, two in the Western region, two in the Eastern 
region (where cattle raiding has also been a considerable problem) and seven in the Northern 
region, the most notable of which is the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA). The state has played a 
significant role in perpetuating conflict with the LRA by severely neglecting the region and 
carrying out major abuses on its population, pursuing contradictory resolutions to the conflict and 
even allowing the war to continue for economic or political reasons. This reflects a broader 
marginalization of Northern Uganda by the NRM, which has its roots in the southern, and 
particularly western, part of the country.42 Such conflict can prevent formal sector development 
and cause significant population displacement, contributing to the growth of informality. As this 
thesis details, however, relocating to Kampala and engaging in informal vending does not involve 
becoming free from the coercive powers of the state, a reality summarized by one street vendor 
from Northern Uganda: “We had our animals, but they were taken by the government. We come 
down here to earn a living, but they won’t let us... We are hurting. It is very hard.”43 
 
iii. Economic Liberalization 
Uganda has adopted extensive reforms to liberalize its economy. Initiated in two stages, 
first by Milton Obote in 1981 and subsequently by the NRM in 1987, in co-operation with the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), these entailed the introduction of a 
standard set of market-oriented policies that were aimed at promoting growth, stabilization and a 
sustainable balance of payments.44 Due to the country’s subsequent performance, these reforms 
have been viewed as a major success. Annual growth averaged around 7% in the 1990s and 
2000s,45 exceeding the Sub-Saharan African average in both decades (2%46 and 5.7%,47 
respectively). Inflation decreased, trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) grew and services and 
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industry have increased significantly, at the expense of agriculture, as a percentage of GDP.48 
Livelihoods in the country have also undergone a major transformation, with the number of 
Ugandans living in poverty falling from 55.7% in 1992/9349 to 19.7% in 2012/13.50  
This performance, however, has important caveats. Early growth, while high, was 
significantly aided by the end of conflict, higher coffee prices and international aid, and nominal 
GDP per capita only returned to its 1971 level in 1996,51 while in real terms, it still lagged its 1960 
level in 1999.52 The impact of reforms is therefore difficult to measure. Growth has also been 
uneven; poverty would have declined by a further 20% between 1992/93 and 2009/10 if inequality 
levels had remained constant.53 Urban inequality has risen, from a Gini coefficient of 0.363 in 
2005/06 to 0.410 in 2012/13, even while rural inequality has dropped.54 Early performance levels 
have also proven difficult to sustain, with growth slowing from 2012, and inflation remains 
erratic.55 The country’s privatization process itself was defined by pervasive cronyism and 
corruption,56 while the support provided by foreign donors for liberalization reforms has fuelled 
patronage by providing the government with extensive resources that can be distributed with little 
accountability.57  
What is particularly relevant here is how economic liberalization has impacted informality. 
While a lack of economic data on the historical evolution of Uganda’s informal sphere makes it 
difficult to empirically assess the effect of liberalization, three primary mechanisms that define 
this causal relationship more generally can be identified. The first of these is privatization and the 
reduction of public employment. Throughout the 1990s, 62 of the country’s 156 public enterprises 
were subjected to some form of privatization and a further 31 were liquidated,58 while the number 
of civil servants employed by the state fell by about 50%, from 320,000 to 160,000, between 1992 
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and 1999.59 Efforts to reduce state spending and introduce market pressures can have an immediate 
negative impact on formal employment by causing large numbers of people employed in the public 
sector and/or by parastatals to lose their jobs. Without an equivalent increase in formal 
employment in the private sector, many of these people will be forced into the informal sphere to 
secure their livelihoods. Second, free trade can increase imports that harm domestic producers, 
and demand for exports (where it exists) may fail to produce employment if it is met through 
productivity growth.60 Such an occurrence is contrary to key components of neoclassical trade 
theory—notably the Heckscher-Ohlin model, which states that developing countries will take 
advantage of their abundant supply of cheap labour to export labour-intensive goods while 
importing capital-intensive goods, and the Stolper-Samuelson theorem, which states that a rise in 
prices for labour goods will result in increased labour demand, raising wages—but is nevertheless 
empirically observable.61 The fewer sectors in which a country has a comparative advantage, the 
larger the rise in informality resulting from liberalization will be.62 Finally, FDI can also harm 
formal employment by driving out domestic firms, by introducing new technologies and through 
mergers and acquisitions.63  
Proponents of liberalization maintain that the labour market effects of reforms represent 
short-term shocks rather than long-term consequences.64 Liberalization, however, has certainly not 
yet led to adequate formal job creation in Uganda. Growth in output in non-agricultural sectors has 
not been matched by a proportional growth in demand for labour, with over 70% of Ugandans still 
engaged in agriculture despite its diminishing share of GDP.65 The sectors of the economy that 
have experienced the most growth are not labour intensive, while sectors that do require more 
labour have seen little productivity growth.66 This means that an asymmetry exists between 
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economic growth and new employment, with high growth sectors not adequately contributing to 
formal employment and high employment sectors not adequately contributing to growth. 
Employment patterns have also changed across firms. Total employment actually declined in firms 
with more than five employees outside of trade, manufacturing and hotels and restaurants during 
the 1990s,67 and the average number of employees at larger firms fell in the 2000s.68 Across all 
sectors and firms, the total number of jobs that have been created falls significantly short of the 
needs of the country’s labour market. Uganda has the fastest growing labour force in the world,69 
outpacing job creation to the point that only about 20% of labour market entrants are able to secure 
wage employment.70  
The informal sphere acts as a cushion to absorb this excess labour capacity, making it a 
key feature of Uganda’s structural transformation. Indeed, as a study by the World Bank points 
out, with high productivity growth and insufficient employment opportunities, the informal sphere 
allows the country’s transition to be more broad-based, contributing to faster growth, less 
inequality and lower poverty.71 Without it, a significantly larger share of the country’s population 
would be stuck in low-productivity agriculture, waiting to be absorbed into the formal labour 
market to participate in the country’s narrow growth. Following structuralist accounts, the informal 
sphere also buttresses the formal economy by providing it with low-cost inputs and cheap labour, 
providing goods and services to formal workers with low wages and acting as a source of demand 
for formal sector goods. Economic liberalization therefore not only helps produce informality, but 
is dependent upon it for its success.  
 
iv. The Geography of Development 
Development varies significantly across Uganda, with notable differences both between 
and within regions. In 2012/13, 4.7% of the population in the Central region lived in poverty, 
compared to 8.7% in the Western region, 24.5% in the Eastern region and 43.7% in the Northern 
region.72 While the number of people living in poverty in the Central region fell by more than half 
between 1992/93 and 2009/10, it rose by about 300,000 in the Northern region over the same 
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period.73 Within regions, the main differences exist between rural and urban areas. In 2012/13, the 
urban poverty rate stood at just 9.3%, and only 0.7% in Kampala.74 Access to basic services in 
Kampala exceeds both rural areas and other urban centres.75 Employment opportunities are also 
concentrated in urban areas, which experienced 65% of Uganda’s job creation between 2001 and 
2010, and in Kampala and the surrounding area in particular.76 Wages for these jobs are in excess 
of those in rural areas.77 In total, urban areas account for 70% of non-agricultural GDP.78  
These differences make urban centres attractive alternatives to the countryside, fuelling 
urban growth. Although Uganda remains a largely rural country, with only 18% of its population 
living in cities, it is experiencing the fastest rate of urbanization in Africa.79 Kampala is by far 
Uganda’s largest city, containing 4.8% of the country’s population80 and 29.9% of its urban 
inhabitants.81 Kampala’s population has increased from just 755,000 in 1990 to 1,936,000 in 
2015,82 and the city experienced an average annual growth rate of 3.88% per year between 2010 
and 2015.83 These growth trends are likely to continue on their upward trajectory, with the UN 
estimating that Kampala, with an average annual growth rate of 5.09%, will be the fourth fastest 
growing city in the world between 2025 and 2030, behind only Niamey (6.09%) and Zinder 
(6.08%), Niger, and Bujumbura, Burundi (5.24%).84  
This urban growth contributes to the prevalence of informal economic activity. This is 
primarily because it is not accompanied by adequate formal job creation. In fact, the portion of the 
country’s jobs located in urban areas fell from 75% in 2001 to 70% in 2010.85 The state is heavily 
implicated in this process of urban growth and informality. Primarily, as discussed above, it has 
failed to prioritize formal job creation, forcing the informal sphere to absorb the impact of the 
transition from agricultural to non-agricultural work. It has also facilitated this process by failing 
to address, or, through its development plans, exacerbating, rural/urban differences. One street 
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vendor argued that the government does not sufficiently invest in agricultural development given 
the share of the country’s population that is involved in the sector,86 while another similarly 
complained that “the government doesn’t care to look for markets for the [agricultural] products 
we have.”87 As a Member of Parliament from Kampala pointed out, the government has allowed 
Kampala to become the country’s unrivalled economic and political centre where jobs and services 
are concentrated, but uses its coercive power against the informal street vendors who come to the 
city in search of better livelihoods.88 As this study details, such efforts have caused many vendors 
to leave Kampala and relocate either to the city’s periphery or back to the countryside. They have 
not yet, however, succeeded in eradicating street vending.  
 
v. Taxation 
The government of Uganda is currently undertaking a concerted effort to formalize the 
country’s informal sphere by bringing it within the national tax structure. The primary rationale 
for such efforts is to enhance revenue collection by broadening the tax base, but proponents of 
similar plans elsewhere also claim that taxing the informal sphere can have the more general 
benefits of promoting economic growth and good governance.89 Uganda’s need to boost domestic 
revenue collection is clear: at 11.9%, the share of its GDP that the government takes in as revenue 
is extremely low, falling considerably short of both the regional average and total expenditures.90 
This figure has remained stagnant since reaching around 12% in 1997 after rising from just 7% in 
1991.91 Efforts to tax the formal sphere were intensified with the introduction of Uganda’s 2015/16 
National Budget, which, amongst other changes, made TINs mandatory and increased the 
threshold for presumptive tax from 50 million UGX to 150 million UGX. The URA expected the 
changes introduced with the budget to raise revenue mobilization to 14% of GDP, a figure that is 
still comparatively low.92 By June 2015, one month before these measures came into effect, 21,047 
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people, including 20,368 in Kampala, had already been registered through TREP, bringing in 800 
million UGX,93 while the URA had identified 100,000 informal businesses to target for tax 
payments.94 
Of course, neoliberal analyses of informal economic activity point to taxation as a major 
source of informality. The logic of this argument rests on the comparative costs and benefits of 
formality and informality: as taxation raises the costs of formality, it offsets the benefits of 
formalization, changing the calculus that enterprises face.95 There is evidence to support this view. 
Dissatisfaction with what was seen as excessive taxation was frequently expressed in interviews 
and surveys. A spokesperson for KACITA criticized the number of taxes formal businesses are 
subject to, including corporate income tax (30%), value-added tax (18%), withholding taxes (6%) 
and import duties (25%).96 One small shop owner complained of having to pay 200,000 UGX in 
taxes on a 400,000 UGX income, with a further 150,000 UGX going to rent.97 Another was 
similarly unhappy about having to pay 2 million UGX in combined taxes and rent on an income 
of 2.5 million UGX.98 A third complained that taxes, combined with various fees and 
transportation costs, can raise the cost of importing a container of goods in excess of the value of 
the goods themselves.99 Operating in the informal sphere does not mean that one is free from the 
effects of these taxes. Informal vendors may pay some taxes themselves, which can force them to 
raise their prices, diminishing their competitiveness and making their goods unaffordable to many 
of their customers, particularly those who also engage in informal activities.100 Even a vendor who 
does not personally pay taxes can still be affected by higher prices when a supplier is taxed.101 
Concerns about taxes are tied to broader complaints about the costs that Uganda’s current 
regulatory structure imposes on formal businesses. The World Bank’s Doing Business project 
ranks Uganda’s regulatory environment at 122nd in the world according to a set of criteria derived 
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from the principles of economic liberalism, noting that it takes 27 days and 39.7% of per capita 
income to start a business and that such tasks as acquiring construction permits, getting electricity 
and property registration can be both lengthy and costly.102 The country’s Business Licensing 
Reform Committee “conservatively” estimates the annual costs of adhering to all requirements for 
a business license to be 725.73 billion UGX, equal to 3.49% of GDP.103 Concerns about these costs 
were expressed in interviews with both the Kampala City Traders Association (KACITA)104 and 
the Private Sector Foundation Uganda (PSFU).105 It is possible that such costs serve as a 
disincentive for formalization.  
The relationship between taxation and informality, however, is not as simple as the 
neoliberal argument suggests. Uganda’s taxation system likely contributes to the prevalence of 
informal economic activity in the country, but the reason it does so is not because rates are too 
high. Three other factors are commonly ignored: that poor service provision by the Ugandan 
government means that there are few incentives to pay; similarly, that widespread corruption 
means that many believe money paid in taxes will not be spent for the public good; and that rates 
are not necessarily too high, suggesting that all business taxes needs to be reduced, but that they 
are too regressive, with the government neglecting to implement more progressive alternatives that 
would target different sources of revenue.  
A significant dissatisfaction with the poor quality or lack of services provided by the 
government was expressed by a number of interview respondents. This was explicitly linked to 
views on taxation, and the argument that people would be much more willing to pay their taxes if 
they felt their money would be spent on services that had an identifiable personal or social benefit. 
As one respondent claimed, “[p]eople would be much happier to pay if they saw where their money 
was going”, stating: “I would be much happier to pay tax if I went to public schools and they had 
facilities, if I went to hospitals and they had medicine.... Why should I give you my money for 
garbage collection when I’m going to have to pay someone to collect my garbage? If you want me 
to pay you, then get somebody to collect my garbage.”106 This is particularly pronounced for 
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informal actors who receive little from the government either as economic agents or members of 
the urban poor. As one street vendor put it, the government “milk[s] the cow without giving it 
grass”, demanding taxes from informal vendors while providing them with little or no support.107 
The URA’s internal research recognizes that popular perceptions of the government have a major 
impact on tax compliance, with views of service provision the most important factor in this regard. 
The problem from the perspective of the URA, however, is that it is specifically tasked with the 
collection of revenue, and detached from the broader political processes that form policy and 
influence compliance.108 If paying taxes involves a calculation of costs and benefits, the 
government is not providing adequate inducements for formalization.  
Paired with the widespread dissatisfaction with service provision is the popular perception 
that money paid to the state in taxes will merely be stolen by corrupt officials.109 A spokesperson 
for KACITA questioned why a person should have to pay their taxes “to send the money to 
government for personal use rather than public good”.110 Corruption is a significant problem in 
Uganda, with the country ranked 139th of 175 in Transparency International’s Corruption 
Perceptions Index.111 Corruption is pervasive throughout major government institutions, including 
the URA, where real wages are declining, poor performance has few consequences and political 
interference and patronage are common.112 The fact that officials may accept or demand bribes in 
exchange for tax relief further undermines revenue collection. One study finds that, for a firm, on 
average, a one percent increase in bribe payments per employee results in a seven percent reduction 
in taxes per employee.113  
There are also significant problems surrounding the progressivity of Uganda’s tax system. 
Even though the country’s corporate tax rate is set at 30%, and presumptive taxes are 
approximately 1.5% to 3% (and 0% under 150 million UGX),114 non-agricultural household 
enterprises, many of which are informal, have an effective tax rate of 52%.115 This means that 
taxes on businesses are, in effect, regressive, and consume a larger share of income for smaller 
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enterprises than larger firms. While the Ugandan government seeks to expand the country’s tax 
system within the informal sphere, it ignores other major sources of revenue. Uganda is one of the 
few countries in the world where owner-occupied residential properties are not taxed,116 despite 
the fact that property taxes have minimal impact on economic activity and are generally 
proportionate to a taxpayer’s wealth. Foreign investors also receive generous exemptions. One 
study lists three different tax incentives offered to all investors, four to exporting companies, two 
special corporate and withholding tax exemptions, seven incentives for businesses operating in 
designated free trade areas and a variety of sector-specific incentives.117 The African Development 
Bank estimated the total revenue lost to these incentives in 2009/10 to be at least 690 billion UGX, 
equivalent to two percent of GDP.118 This figure rose to about 1.5 trillion UGX in 2013/14, a year 
when total revenues were approximately 8 trillion UGX.119 As a result, more of the tax burden is 
falling on (generally) poorer informal actors than wealthier international investors. Such 
exemptions are not only damaging to revenue collection, but also make little economic sense. One 
survey found that over 92% of investors benefiting from tax incentives in Uganda would have 
made the same investments even if no incentives were on offer.120 Indeed, many of the foreign 
donors that Uganda depends upon for a significant portion of its national budget have expressed 
dissatisfaction with the impact of the country’s tax incentives on domestic revenue mobilization.121  
Uganda’s tax system therefore contributes to the prevalence of informality in the country. 
It does so, however, not because rates are too high, but because revenues are disconnected from 
service provision, corruption undermines compliance and the entire regime is regressive and 
poorly designed for revenue maximization. Failures in the country’s tax system therefore reflect 
broader failures in governance. The informal economy is currently being targeted while these 
remain unaddressed.  
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vi. The Self-Interest of State Officials 
State corruption, as discussed above, can promote informality by reducing tax compliance. 
More generally, it can also reduce economic growth,122 and while growth has not led to adequate 
formal employment creation in Uganda, lower growth due to corruption is not conducive to formal 
sector expansion. At a lower level, corruption amongst state officials who are charged with 
carrying out efforts to reduce informality can result in poor enforcement. This, again, can be true 
for tax administrators, or, as detailed in this study, for those charged with implementing Kampala’s 
ban on street vending. Indeed, the problem that street vendors in particular face is not merely that 
the state is excessively regulatory, but that it is also predatory, with state agents taking advantage 
of vendors’ vulnerability.123  
Besides merely being corrupt, state officials may also have direct economic interests in 
particular informal sectors. Kampala’s ubiquitous matatus are commonly owned by politicians, 
particularly in the NRM, who are able to undermine attempts to regulate the industry, and have 
experienced a level of success in resisting the attention of the state that stands in notable contrast 
to, as one Member of Parliament highlighted, the experiences of street vendors.124 Less widely 
known is the fact that many state officials allegedly own structures, often several, in major markets 
throughout Kampala,125 something that is likely facilitated by plans to sell market space to 
investors to finance redevelopment projects. These economic interests offer little incentive to alter 
the status quo surrounding informality, or, in the case of markets, provide a strong incentive to 
support development plans that will lead to personal financial gain.  
The interest that state officials have in the informal sphere is not merely financial. As this 
thesis explores, politicians can rely on informal actors for electoral support, and in exchange for 
providing this support, informal actors are able to enjoy a certain degree of political protection. 
Thus, the desire for expanding or reinforcing political power can clash with other regulatory 
objectives surrounding urban management and development, allowing informality to thrive despite 
official formalization or regulation efforts. As this thesis details, however, such a system of 
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exchange is dependent on particular political circumstances; when these circumstances change, it 
can similarly be in the interests of state officials to repress informal actors or seek to impose forms 
of urban management and development that are exclusionary. How and why these circumstances 
change in the context of efforts by the President and the ruling party to monopolize political power, 
and how informal vendors respond to these changes as they seek to participate in urban 
development and economic life in Kampala, is precisely what this thesis studies.  
 
Part III: Conclusions 
Informal vending in Uganda is therefore inseparably tied to the state. Through past colonial 
planning, a history of poor governance and instability, economic liberalization, geographic 
development trends, its taxation regime and the self-interest of state officials, the state has played 
a major role in the emergence and growth of the country’s informal sphere, both in Kampala and 
elsewhere. In the absence of adequate formal employment opportunities and formalization 
incentives, the informal sphere has become a key livelihood source for a significant portion of the 
country’s population, underlying the supposed success of Uganda’s economic transformation. 
Despite the crucial developmental role that it plays, however, the informal sphere is nevertheless 
targeted by the state for failing to adhere to a particular notion of development, meaning that the 
state both creates conditions in which informal economic activity becomes a crucial form of 
livelihood support while also (inconsistently) punishing those who engage in it.  
 With an appropriate understanding of the relationship between the state and the informal 
economy in Uganda, it is possible to analyze how the state shapes the agency of informal vendors. 
The following two chapters undertake this task. Each focuses on a particular instance in which 
efforts by the President and the ruling party to monopolize political power have limited, but not 
completely eliminated, the agency of informal vendors in Kampala: first, the rise and subsequent 
criminalization of street vending; and second, ongoing disputes surrounding market ownership and 
development. The narratives of expanding political power and contracting vendors’ agency 
provided in these chapters together form the core of this thesis. 
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Chapter Four: The Rise and (Partial) Fall of Street Vending in Kampala 
 
Street vending is fundamentally inseparable from the political environment in which it 
takes place. It is with the state that vendors must negotiate access to the public space that they 
depend on for their livelihoods, and it is the state’s aspirations for urban management and 
development that street vendors must contend with or try to insert themselves into. The relationship 
that street vendors have with the state can define their very existence: if the state is 
accommodating, vendors can be free to trade on the streets with minimal hindrance and assert their 
right to participate in an urban economy from which they are otherwise excluded; if, on the other 
hand, the state is more hostile, then street vendors can face repression and active attempts to 
eradicate their activities, perpetuating their marginalization. This relationship is not merely static, 
but evolves over time as political conditions change and the ability of street vendors to influence 
decision-making expands and contracts as a result. The significance of such changes is particularly 
notable in Kampala, where street vendors have been profoundly impacted by the political evolution 
of the city under the NRM.  
This chapter explores how the political evolution of Kampala has impacted the agency of 
street vendors and limited their ability to participate in urban development and economic life. It 
argues that the ability of street vendors to exercise agency benefited significantly from the 
decentralization and democratization programs introduced by the NRM, and was subsequently 
restricted as the central government reversed decentralization and democratization by taking over 
the city’s government. Decentralization and democratization in Uganda were always implemented 
in a way that benefitted the ruling party and the President, and manipulated or reversed for the 
same purpose when necessary. In Kampala, they resulted in a situation where a newly empowered 
city government was controlled by the opposition, and where major divisions between the 
opposition and the NRM led to an intense competition for popular support that street vendors were 
able to take advantage of as a key urban voting demographic. Seeking to regain control of the city, 
the central government introduced a new city government in 2011 that is largely under the control 
of centrally appointed technocrats rather than elected politicians. Since the introduction of the 
KCCA, these technocrats have sought to secure their control over policy formation and 
implementation, further marginalizing elected officials. As a means of justifying its existence, the 
KCCA has introduced ambitious development and urban management initiatives aimed at 
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transforming Kampala into a supposedly modern, orderly and well functioning city. Street 
vending, which has been framed as an embodiment of urban chaos, uncleanliness, insecurity and 
a lack of economic order—the antithesis of everything the KCCA stands for—has been banned 
and vendors face significant repression, while restricted political environment that exists under the 
KCCA has meant that street vendors no longer have the ability to improve their condition by 
exercising political influence. The agency of street vendors has greatly diminished as a result, 
resulting in their widespread exclusion from urban development and economic life even as they 
have sought new ways to respond to repression.  
This chapter is primarily divided into two parts. Part I addresses how decentralization and 
democratization created a highly divided political environment under the KCC that allowed street 
vendors to provide support for politicians in exchange for favourable treatment. This allowed street 
vendors to remain on the streets despite attempts to evict them or regulate their activities. Part II 
examines how the introduction of the KCCA dramatically transformed the political circumstances 
in which street vendors are able to operate. It discusses how the KCCA, in both its structure and 
operation, marginalizes elected politicians at the expense of technocrats that are appointed by the 
central government (and often by the President), closing the channels for external influence that 
street vendors previously took advantage of. It also emphasizes the role that notions of 
development and urban management play in justifying the existence of the KCCA, and 
demonstrates how this has led to the repression of street vendors as undesirable elements of a 
modern urban landscape and economy. It then explores how street vendors have responded to 
repression compliance and co-operation, resistance and attempts at further organization. Each of 
these strategies has been met with major obstacles and all have major flaws, even as they 
demonstrate how street vendors are able to exercise at least some agency despite their lack of 
political influence. Finally, it considers the effect of the return of political competition during the 
2016 elections, arguing that while reduced repression allowed street vendors to make small gains, 
these gains were mainly temporary as repression resumed shortly after the election period was 
over.  
 
Part I: Decentralization, Democratization and Street Vending in Kampala 
 The agency of street vendors in Kampala dramatically expanded as a result of the 
decentralization and democratization programs carried out by the NRM in the county as a whole. 
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Due to the NRM’s reforms, the KCC gained significant powers over the management of Kampala 
while also becoming much more subject to the influence of popular opinion as transmitted through 
local elections. This created a situation in which local politicians with considerable control over 
the construction and implementation of policy also relied on popular support for their positions, 
causing many, in the city’s highly divided political environment, to pursue the support of key urban 
voting demographics to allow them to remain in office and gain an advantage in partisan political 
struggles. Street vendors were able to take advantage of this situation by offering their support for 
politicians in exchange for protection. As a result, street vending thrived under the KCC.  
  
i. Decentralization and Democratization Under the NRM 
Decentralization and democratization have been two key features of Uganda’s political 
evolution under the NRM. Both have increased opportunities for political participation, but both 
have also unfolded in a way that has benefited the NRM’s political dominance and the power of 
the President. Each is explored here.  
 
a) From Resistance Councils to Local Government 
The NRM has championed decentralized participatory forms of political organization from 
as early as 1981, the first year of its war with the Obote government. This support was most notably 
manifested in the establishment of village-level political units known as Resistance Councils (RCs) 
in areas under NRM control. Originally set up in 1981 to provide support for the NRM’s war effort, 
in 1982, RCs were made more inclusive and democratic to encourage broad-based participation, 
and came to serve as the de facto government in many areas, providing security, law enforcement 
and essential services. Despite being a wartime creation, RCs were maintained after the NRM 
came to power, and with the passage of the National Resistance Council and Committees Statute 
in 1987, they were introduced across the country as official local government bodies, with a 
hierarchical five-tier government system from the village to the district level. Elections were held 
at the village level, while representatives would appoint members of higher level committees and 
councils. The central government, however, maintained significant control over personnel 
decisions and revenue under the 1987 statute, while district political leaders were directly 
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appointed by the President.1 Museveni introduced a policy of further decentralization in 1992, 
leading to a further transfer of powers under the Local Governments (Resistance Councils) Statute 
of 1993 and greater financial support through the newly established Local Government 
Commission.2  
Resistance Councils were renamed Local Councils (LCs) in 1995. Decentralization was 
enshrined in the country’s Constitution in the same year, which stated that “decentralisation shall 
be a principle applying to all levels of local government and, in particular, from higher to lower 
local government units to ensure peoples’ participation and democratic control in decision 
making.”3 The structures of the country’s decentralized political system were legislatively outlined 
in the Local Governments Act of 1997, which officially adopted the hierarchical system of 
decentralized authority that still exists in the country:  
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1 Lambright, Gina M. S., Decentralization in Uganda: Explaining Successes and Failures in Local Governance, 
Boulder: FirstForumPress, 2011, 24-25; and Carbone, 31-32.  
2 Rubongoya, 108-109.  
3 Quoted from “Constitution of the Republic of Uganda,” 1995, Chapter Eleven, Article 176, Section 2, Subsection 
(b).  
4 Adapted from “Local Governments Act,” 1997, Part III and Part V; and Makara, 51.  
Young  93 
 
The Act provides for district/city councils (LC5) to be led by a popularly elected chairperson 
serving as an executive and political head. In city councils, this position is given the title ‘mayor’. 
District/city councils are made up of elected councillors representing geographic areas and other 
councillors representing particular demographic groups. The chairperson/mayor and other 
appointed councillors make up an executive committee that, amongst other duties, formulates 
policy that is approved by the council.5 District/city councils have both planning and legislative 
powers,6 along with the authority to raise revenue and design and implement budgets.7 Lower local 
councils at the sub-county, municipal, municipal division/town and city division (LC3/LC4) levels 
have similar structures with chairpersons/mayors, councils and executive committees.8 They too 
have legislative powers in their ability to pass byelaws,9 and possess the same budgetary and 
revenue powers.10 Administrative units at the county (LC4), parish/ward (LC2) and village (LC1) 
levels lack such powers, and instead have more advisory, problem-solving, monitoring and 
assistive functions.11 The executive committees of parish/ward and village councils are also to 
engage in “self-help projects”, recruit for security/law enforcement bodies, communicate with 
other levels of government and monitor other government projects and activities.12 All adults who 
are 18 years or older are members of a village council, from which an executive committee is 
formed; all members of village executive committees in a designated area form a parish/ward 
council, from which another executive committee is formed; and all members of sub-county 
executive committees in a designated area form county councils, from which a chairperson and 
vice chairperson are elected by council members.13 
The NRM had significant reasons for promoting decentralization and constructing the 
RC/LC system. As Rubongoya argues, a decentralized political system cohered with the social 
roots of the NRM, and particularly Museveni’s own combination of populism and paternalism, by 
building on its rural support base and empowering the peasantry at the expense of the centralized 
state.14 Other reasons were more firmly grounded in self-interest. During and immediately after 
                                                          
5 “Local Governments Act,” Part III, Sections 9-22. 
6 Ibid, Part IV, Sections 35-38, 40-44.  
7 Ibid, Part VIII, Sections 74-85. 
8 Ibid, Part III, Sections 23-26.  
9 Ibid, Part IV, Section 39.  
10 Ibid, Part VIII, 74-85.  
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the war, RCs allowed the NRM to broaden its support base and attain legitimacy,15 with 
Rubongoya even going so far to claim that “during the first five years of NRM rule, the LC system 
[sic] was without question the most important legitimizing strategy adopted by the NRM”.16 
RC/LCs have been extremely popular for extending participatory democracy to villages 
throughout the country that had no history of such inclusive governance,17 providing a crucial link 
between the country’s centre and peripheral regions that have traditionally been excluded from 
political power.18 They also allowed the NRM to gain widespread popular support at the expense 
of the country’s traditional political parties,19 and undermined calls by Baganda elites for a federal 
system that would give more power to the Buganda Kingdom (now a subnational kingdom in 
Uganda’s Central Region).20 Popular opinion also played an important role in Museveni’s 1992 
endorsement of greater decentralization, which was partly due to the public input gathered by the 
Constitutional Commission.21 It was not only domestic opinion that mattered, however. 
Decentralization also followed from the recommendations of the World Bank,22 given how crucial 
foreign support and the economic growth that this allowed for was, and continues to be, for the 
NRM’s legitimacy.23 The policy of decentralization received widespread international praise, and 
the NRM’s efforts were presented as a model for other developing states to follow.24  
Decentralization therefore strengthened the NRM’s political hegemony throughout 
Uganda. The primacy of self-interest in guiding decentralization has meant that maintaining or 
expanding the power, influence and dominance of the Movement has hindered truly independent 
forms of popular decision-making. Decentralization has been directed by and carried out in a way 
that suits the NRM, and has been undermined or even reversed accordingly.25 This has taken many 
forms: the existence of Resident District Commissioners (RDCs), appointed by the President, who 
report problems with LCs to the central government; the loss to the central government of the 
                                                          
15 Ibid, 67-69 and 104-112. 
16 Quoted from ibid, 69. Emphasis in original.  
17 Kasfir, Nelson, ““No-Party Democracy” in Uganda,” Journal of Democracy 9 (2) 1998: 53. 
18 Carbone, 35. 
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20 Makara, 144-149.  
21 Rubongoya, 108-109.  
22 Ibid.  
23 Carbone, 63-76; and Rubongoya, 86-90, 118-124 and 152-157.  
24 Carbone, 32; and Tripp (2010), 114. 
25 Divisions existed within the NRM concerning how much power should be devolved from the central government, 
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ability to appoint and replace Chief Administrative Officers (CAOs), the heads of local 
administration, who then took over the power to appoint members of tender boards, the bodies 
responsible for awarding contracts; the central government’s influence over the membership of 
District Service Commissions, which oversee the appointment of district government staff; the 
2001 amendments to the Local Governments Act that gave the LC1 chairperson the power to 
nominate five of the remaining eight (previously elected) executive committee members; the 
erosion of financial independence and the increasing reliance on the central government for 
funding (explored in Chapter Five); the takeover of salary payment by the central government; 
and, as this chapter explores, the takeover of the KCC.26 There has always been a tension between 
RC/LCs as state bodies and as local organs of the NRM. While they are formally state institutions, 
they are also closely tied to the Movement, a duality that was made even more acute by the 
ambiguity of the NRM under the Movement system (discussed below). RC/LCs have certainly 
performed pro-Movement functions, with complaints that some have used coercive power against 
the opposition during elections,27 while RDCs have openly campaigned for the NRM.28 This lack 
of independence means, as Green notes, the RC/LC system is “less a check on the power of the 
central government than an extension of its control into local areas.”29 
RC/LCs suffer from further problems. They have often been dominated by local elites, a 
problem that is exacerbated by education and literacy requirements for holding office. Corruption 
is endemic, damaging popular support.30 Local officials may not be adequately qualified to 
perform their duties, and the large-scale proliferation of districts has been costly and inefficient.31 
Because the RC/LC structure involves a hierarchy of appointed positions, RC/LCs have been in 
some ways less democratic and representative at higher levels. A recommendation to make 
positions at all levels directly elected was rejected by the NRM on the grounds that such a measure 
would increase sectarian divisions.32 A lack of reliable local revenue streams also makes RC/LCs 
largely dependent on the central government for financial support, a problem that has become 
                                                          
26 Lambright (2011), 26-31; and Tripp (2010), 117-120.   
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31 Green (2015), 497-503. 
32 Kasfir (1998), 54-55.  
96  Young 
 
increasingly acute as the percentage of local budgets made up by local revenue generation fell 
from a highpoint of about 80% to as low as 5% in the mid-2000s. Local decision-making is further 
limited by the fact that most of the money transferred by the central government is in the form of 
conditional grants.33 A culmination of such problems has seen popular participation in the LC 
system decline even as LCs themselves remain popular.34  
More generally, as this chapter shows, the failures of the LC system can also precipitate 
conditions that provide the central government with the opportunity to justify further interventions 
into local politics. Since many of these failures stem from the central government’s continuous 
manipulation of decentralization, recentralization can be seen as a response to conditions that the 
NRM is in many ways itself responsible for. This process has perhaps most notably played out in 
Kampala.  
 
b) From ‘No-Party’ Democracy to Multipartyism  
Like decentralization, the NRM has also expressed support for democracy virtually from 
its inception. And like decentralization, the NRM has pursued a form of democratization that has 
aided its consolidation of power, and continuously manipulated and undermined democratization 
for its own purposes. Support for democratic governance was the first point of the NRM’s Ten 
Point Programme, its major policy document released during the civil war.35 The RC system that 
emerged during the conflict was an early and visible manifestation of this position. The reforms 
introduced at the national level were no less transformative. Upon taking power in 1986, the NRM 
introduced a broad-based coalition government that included representatives from across the 
country’s social and political spectrum.36 At the same time, in its first legal notice in January 1986, 
it banned almost all political party activities in the country.37 This ban was justified based on the 
position that the country’s post-independence history of conflict and instability was the result of 
sectarian regional, ethnic and religious differences that were embodied in and exploited by 
traditional political parties. Logically, therefore, political parties had no place in a truly democratic, 
inclusive, representative and stable system of government.38 It also had its roots in Museveni’s 
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pseudo-Marxist—and indeed both flawed and condescending—claim that Uganda, as a primarily 
rural agricultural country, largely lacked the class divisions that existed in more ‘developed’ 
countries, and that the underdeveloped political consciousness of the peasantry could be taken 
advantage of by divisive political organizations.39 The alternative established by the NRM was a 
‘no-party’ system in which candidates ran on individual merit within the structure of the 
Movement, which was framed as an all-encompassing political system rather than merely a 
political party. For Museveni, political parties were sectarian vehicles to advance elite interests; 
the Movement, on the other hand, transcended party divisions and allowed for true popular 
democratic participation.40  
After early attempts to build a broad-based coalition, the inclusivity of the government 
slowly eroded from the end of the 1980s as the NRM began to exercise a more exclusive hold on 
power, marginalizing those outside of the Movement (known as ‘multipartyists’ for their support 
for a return to multiparty politics) and its regional support base in the southwest of the country.41 
The NRM’s increasing monopolization of power is reflected in the creation of the country’s new 
Constitution. A Constitutional Commission (also known as the Odoki Commission) was 
established from 1989 to 1992 in order to both consult with and educate Ugandans about the 
creation of a Constitution. It received at least 25,547 submissions from the public.42 Senior NRM 
figures were part of the Commission, which was financed by the central government, while not a 
single member openly opposed the Movement system. The Commission wrote a draft Constitution 
which domestic critics claimed reflected more the desires of the NRM hierarchy than popular 
input.43 Elections for delegates to a Constituent Assembly that would adopt a new Constitution 
were then held in 1994. The NRM supported favourable candidates and campaigned against 
multipartyists and proponents of a broad-based government, and even arrested some multipartyists 
within the government, charging them with treason.44 Two hundred and fourteen seats in the 
Constituent Assembly were directly elected, while another 74 were open to appointment. Eight of 
these appointed seats were allocated to political parties (two of which declined to make 
appointments, leaving four seats vacant), while 66 appointees relied on the NRM in various ways 
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for their positions.45 Once the Constituent Assembly was elected, a Movement Caucus formed 
within it to advance the official positions of the NRM.46 Supporters of the Movement system 
successfully defeated the efforts of multipartyists within the Constituent Assembly.47  
‘No-party’ democracy based on the Movement system was made the key feature of 
Ugandan politics in the 1995 Constitution. Article 70 stated that the Movement system “is broad-
based, inclusive and non-partisan”, and that it conforms to the principles of “(a) participatory 
democracy; (b) democracy, accountability and transparency; (c) accessibility to all positions of 
leadership by all citizens; (d) individual merit as a basis for election to political offices.”48 As 
Carbone acknowledges, the Movement system was only vaguely outlined beyond these principles, 
leaving its specific features to be legislatively defined when necessary49 since Article 70 also gave 
Parliament the power to “create organs under the movement political system and define their roles” 
and “prescribe from time to time any other democratic principle of the movement political system, 
as it may consider necessary.”50 These powers were (officially) limited by Article 75, which 
prohibits Parliament from establishing a one-party state.51 Indeed, political parties were authorized 
under Article 72, and while they are subject to Parliamentary regulation under Article 73, it is 
stated that such regulations “shall not exceed what is necessary for the political system adopted to 
operate.”52 Still, parties faced significant restrictions, including, under Article 270, “(a) opening 
and operating branch offices; (b) holding delegates’ conferences; (c) holding public rallies; (d) 
sponsoring or offering a platform to or in any way campaigning for or against a candidate for any 
public elections; (e) carrying on any activities that may interfere with the movement political 
system for the time being in force.”53 A referendum on the country’s political system was mandated 
to be held in the last month of the fourth year of the first Parliament elected under the Constitution 
(i.e. 2000), and campaigning for the referendum was to begin in the Parliament’s third year.54 
Multipartyism, which would be the main alternative in the referendum, was also subjected to 
limitations, most notably that all parties must have “a national character” and that membership 
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“shall not be based on sex, ethnicity, religion or other sectional division”.55 The first national 
elections under the new Constitution were held on May 9th (for the Presidency) and June 27th, 1996 
(for Parliament). Museveni was elected President with over 74.3% of the vote, and Movementists 
won 156 of 276 seats in Parliament (all candidates ran independently under the Movement 
system).56 
Parliament used its powers to further define and build the structure of the Movement with 
the 1997 Movement Act. The Act made all Ugandans members of the Movement, from village 
Movement councils at the local level to a National Movement Conference for Members of 
Parliament (MPs). The hierarchical system of LCs was essentially replicated under the Movement 
system, with village to district bodies all falling under the National Movement Conference, which 
acted as a national secretariat.57 The structure of the Movement thus became a state-funded 
bureaucracy,58 with bodies that were staffed exclusively by those holding public office.59 As a 
report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) comments, “it is difficult to see the role of this second 
system of structures which essentially duplicates the first—except as a form of partisan party 
structure normally associated with one-party states.”60 What the Movement Act essentially did, 
the report notes, was create “a state-sponsored political organization disguised as a “political 
system””, the purpose of which was “to mobilize support for the NRM’s movement government 
system and for a vote in favor of the retention of this system in the [2000] referendum.”61 The Act 
was passed by Parliament despite the fact that, even with the NRM’s significant parliamentary 
majority, a quorum for the vote was not met, suggesting divisions within the NRM itself 
surrounding the nature of the Movement.62  
The constitutionally mandated referendum on the return to multipartyism was held on June 
29th, 2000. When the first Referendum Act was passed on July 1st, 1999, its vote, like that for the 
Movement Act, fell short of quorum, with the support of only 50 MPs, and was subsequently 
declared unconstitutional by the Constitutional Court. A second piece of legislation, the 
                                                          
55 Quoted from ibid, Chapter Five, Article 71, Subsection (a) and (b).  
56 “Elections in Uganda,” African Elections Database, accessed 11 March 2016, 
http://africanelections.tripod.com/ug.html.  
57 “Hostile to Democracy”, 79. 
58 Rubongoya, 139.  
59 Carbone, 95.  
60 Quoted from “Hostile to Democracy”, 80.  
61 Quoted from ibid.  
62 Rubongoya, 139.  
100  Young 
 
Referendum (Political Systems) Act, was passed on June 6th, 2000 in just three hours after 
parliamentary rules were suspended and the secret ballot for the vote was eliminated. This second 
act was also declared unconstitutional in 2004, although the referendum on multipartyism that was 
held in accordance with it was allowed to stand. Because political party activity was not 
deregulated prior to the referendum, the NRM was the only political organization allowed to 
campaign. The Movement also had access to state funds and influenced state administrators. The 
referendum campaign was characterized by significant problems with voter registration, 
intimidation and access to information that led to a widespread lack of understanding of the exact 
purpose of the vote. The country’s two largest opposition parties, the Uganda Peoples’ Congress 
(UPC) and the Democratic Party (DP), led a boycott of the vote based on the principle that political 
organization is a fundamental right. Many Ugandans who opposed both the Movement and the 
country’s traditional political parties simply did not vote. As a result, the referendum passed with 
90.7% of the vote with a voter turnout of only 51.1%.63 Research by Michael Bratton and Gina 
Lambright suggests that a strong minority of Ugandans supported multipartyism at the time, while 
majorities did in Kampala and Northern Uganda.64 Museveni subsequently won the 2001 
Presidential election with over 69.3% of the vote while Movementists continued to dominate 
Parliament.65 
In March 2003, Museveni, at a meeting of the Movement’s National Executive Committee, 
recommended a transition to multipartyism.66 This reversed the Movement’s long-held position on 
multipartyism just nine months after the extremely restrictive (and subsequently overturned) 
Political Parties and Organisations Bill was passed by Parliament in June 2002.67 In October 2003, 
the NRM-Organization (NRM-O) registered as the first official political party of the Movement 
period. The NRM-O formally coexisted with the separate Movement structure until 2006, but the 
two shared a basic infrastructure and key positions were filled by the same people, making any 
distinction between them superficial. The NRM-O was even being funded by the state during this 
time. The Movement’s transition from a ‘system’ into a political party therefore involved very 
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little change.68 The second referendum on the return to multipartyism, held on July 28th, 2005, 
reversed the results of the first, passing with over 92.4% of the vote with a voter turnout of 46.2%.69 
Crucially, the Movement Act was not repealed.70  
In March 2003, the same month that Museveni first recommended the switch to 
multipartyism, a proposal was also presented to amend the Constitution to remove the two-term 
limit for holding the office of the President, a change that would allow Museveni to run in the 2006 
elections and remain in office indefinitely. The Constitution was successfully amended after, 
Mwenda claims, “Museveni’s lieutenants made free use of bribery, blackmail, and naked 
intimidation.”71 Two hundred and thirteen of 305 MPs were given bribes of 5 million UGX to 
support the amendment,72 and senior NRM figures who opposed it were removed from their 
positions.73 The return to multipartyism was widely seen as a concession in exchange for the lifting 
of Presidential term limits, but as Michael Keating argues, it is possible to view both as beneficial 
to Museveni and the NRM. The transition to multipartyism can also be understood as an attempt 
to strengthen executive power at the expense of a somewhat independent and occasionally 
oppositional Parliament by furthering parliamentary divisions and leading to the imposition of 
party discipline.74 It also satisfied the international donors that provide such crucial support for the 
NRM.75 Changing popular opinion may have been a factor as well: a 2002 poll found that support 
for multipartyism was at 67%, while 63% already viewed the Movement as a political party (and 
it was, importantly, the most popular political party in the country).76 Museveni has won three 
Presidential elections—in 2006, 2011 and 2016—since the repeal of term limits, and the NRM has 
won large majorities in Parliament on the same three occasions since the return to multipartyism.  
Like decentralization, therefore, the defining feature of Uganda’s democratization process 
has been increased political openness under conditions that are favourable to the ruling party, and 
a resistance to or reversal of democratization if and when such steps further or maintain the 
political dominance of the NRM. The President, of course, has played a key role in this process.77 
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Museveni has always engaged in a highly personal form of rule in which he conflates strengthening 
or acting in the interests of the executive with public empowerment. For example, he publicly 
framed his campaign to eliminate presidential term limits as an effort to remove an unnecessary 
government restriction that prevented the will of the country’s people from being realized, and has 
also presented disputes with the judiciary in similar terms. No-party democracy, like 
decentralization, followed from Museveni’s populist approach to politics and antipathy to 
traditional political parties and institutions, as well as his self-styled image as a political outsider 
with a stated desire to return political power to the people from the central government.78 The 
switch to multipartyism allowed the President to stay in office and consolidate his power.  
The Movement system was crucial to the NRM’s strategic implementation of 
democratization reforms. This is most notable in the significant tension that always existed 
between the Movement’s de jure status as a political system and its de facto status as a political 
party. Such a duality blurred the lines between party and state to such an extent that the country 
effectively became a one-party state with all democratic activity taking place under a hegemonic 
body, or at best what Carbone describes as a “hegemonic party-state system” that is between a 
one-party state and a pluralist democracy, with a dominant group exercising power in the presence 
of weak and ineffectual opposition groups.79 The benefits of characterizing the Movement as a 
political system rather than a political party are obvious. Doing so allowed the government to 
maintain the significant amount of international support that it enjoyed as a result of its willingness 
to carry out political and economic reforms and the ‘successes’ that these had entailed. It also 
allowed the NRM to effectively engage in all of the activities that it denied to its rivals by 
maintaining the structures and performing the functions of a political party.80 Forced to run on 
‘individual merit’, opposition candidates lacked the types of organizational support that 
Movementists enjoyed, making the task of challenging the Movement extremely difficult. There 
was an effective balance, therefore, between legitimacy and control, with hegemony disguised as 
universality. Of course, claims to inclusivity were exaggerated: not only were multipartyists and 
opposition parties marginalized, but ethnic and geographic divisions also remained as the NRM 
maintained a highly regionalized power base with political positions largely occupied by 
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individuals from the country’s southwest, the region that also disproportionately benefited from 
the country’s economic growth.81 The continuous creation of new administrative districts further 
politicized ethnicity and facilitated internal divisions.82 The nature of the country’s democracy 
during the Movement period was complicated further by the fact that the NRM, for much of its 
early history, had effectively no internal democracy. As Kasfir notes, “[u]ntil the 1995 Constitution 
required Parliament to establish a structure for the Movement, the NRM had never held an election 
for any of its officers, never convened a body to deliberate or vote on its policies, nor even written 
a charter for itself.”83  
 The NRM’s efforts to monopolize political power have not been curtailed by the end of the 
Movement system, but have instead continued in other ways. The return to multipartyism, which 
can itself be viewed as a move to strengthen the executive, was accompanied by the lifting of 
presidential term limits. Significantly for this chapter, the same bill that ended presidential term 
limits, The Constitution (Amendment) Act of 2005, also provided for the central government’s 
eventual takeover of the city of Kampala.84 Democratization has been accompanied by many other 
examples of the expansion of executive power: attempts to intimidate the judiciary, the most 
notable being the ‘Black Mamba’ episodes of November 2005 and March 2007 when paramilitary 
units surrounded the High Court to influence decisions on members of an alleged (and fictitious) 
rebel organization, supposedly including opposition leader Kizza Besigye; attempts to influence 
Parliament by bribing, withdrawing support from or even coercing MPs; efforts to silence dissent 
by arresting journalists and raiding the offices of media outlets; and the repression of political 
opponents, particularly during election periods.85 It is within this context and the NRM’s—and 
executive’s—continuing efforts to maintain and/or expand power that the events described in this 
chapter must be considered.  
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ii. The Kampala City Council in Local and National Politics 
Decentralization and democratization had a profound impact on the politics of Kampala. 
With roots in Uganda’s pre-colonial and colonial history, Kampala first became a municipality 
with 31 councillors and a mayor, all of whom were appointed, in January 1949. A city council was 
established in September 1962, immediately before the country’s independence the following 
month.86 Local governments in Uganda became largely elected bodies with independence, but after 
1962, no local elections were held until 1980, and even then, most local councillors were appointed 
during Obote’s second presidency.87 This changed significantly under the NRM. Within the LC 
hierarchy, the KCC was a city council (LC5) with a directly elected mayor and 31 elected 
councillors, above five city divisions (LC3)—Central Division, Kawempe Division, Lubaga 
Division, Makindye Division and Nakawa Division—each of which also had its own elected 
chairperson and councillors. Below the city divisions were a further 99 parishes (LC2) and 811 
villages (LC1).88 The NRM also greatly expanded the powers of the KCC, devolving to it 80% of 
all services and leaving only national roads and secondary and post-secondary education under the 
control of the national government.89 Thus the twin processes of decentralization and 
democratization simultaneously gave the KCC more powers and autonomy over its affairs while 
also making its officials more subject to popular opinion and dependent on popular support. 
While the NRM continued to dominate both national politics and the Local Council system 
across the country, the opposition established itself as the leading political force in Kampala under 
the KCC. In 1998, the city’s first mayoral elections were won by multipartyist and populist Nasser 
Ntege Sebaggala (commonly known as ‘Seya’), who defeated incumbent and NRM favourite 
Christopher Iga in what was commonly seen as a rejection of the President.90 Sebaggala was 
arrested in the United States just two months later for fraud related to forged traveller’s cheques 
and given a 15 month jail sentence in February 1999.91 A by-election held in 1999 was won by 
John Ssebaana Kizito (known as Ssebaana), another multipartyist, who was re-elected in 2002. 
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Sebaggala was again elected mayor in 2006 after having returned to Kampala in 2000 to what the 
BBC described as a “hero’s welcome”.92 Both Sebaggala and Ssebaana were widely known to be 
DP supporters, but ran as multipartyists before 2006 since the DP could not officially field 
candidates under the Movement system. In 2006, Sebaggala ran as an independent due to conflicts 
with the DP leadership, defeating the DP candidate, Hasib Takuba, along with his other 
opponents.93 Significantly, Sebaggala left the DP in February 2010 before joining the NRM the 
following September, a change that is explored further in the following chapter. Still, 
multipartyists/DP supporters won the four mayoral elections held under the KCC. The DP also 
controlled the city council after the return to multipartyism; from 2006-2011, 17 KCC councillors 
were DP members, 11 represented the NRM and three were independents.94 The opposition thus 
dominated city politics throughout the KCC’s existence.  
The opposition’s power, however, was constantly challenged by the NRM, turning the 
KCC into what an article in the Daily Monitor referred to as “Uganda’s main political 
battleground.”95 As described in the following chapter, this mainly occurred in two ways: first, 
through direct interference, particularly by the President, in matters under the KCC’s authority; 
and second, by denying the KCC essential funding and sources of revenue that it needed to 
properly function. These conflicts significantly undermined the KCC’s ability to address the 
various developmental and urban management challenges that it faced, a reality that was often 
lamented by local politicians, including both Sebaggala and Ssebaana.96 Traffic congestion, poor 
roads and inadequate local service delivery such as garbage collection were constant problems in 
the city, while the KCC also oversaw the growth of informal structures and slum areas, the 
proliferation of boda-bodas and matatus and, as this thesis addresses, conflicts over street and 
market vending.97 Indeed, the growth of Kampala under the KCC occurred in such a way that one 
politician referred to the city, in a frequently quoted phrase, as a “modern executive slum”.98  
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It is not simply the case, however, that the opposition-led KCC regularly attempted to 
implement forms of urban management that were ultimately and consistently undermined by the 
NRM. While this certainly occurred, the defining political reality of the KCC is that divisions 
between the NRM and the opposition in Kampala caused crucial issues pertaining to the 
government of the city to become politicized, and also caused concerns surrounding political 
advantage to supersede those of policy formation and implementation. This made politicians 
particularly dependent on support to further interests that were often unrelated to governance. Such 
a reality provided space for street vendors to exercise political agency.  
 
iii. Street Vending and the Kampala City Council 
Street vending was officially regulated by the KCC. At a national level, the Trade 
(Licensing) Act of 1969 mandated that street vendors must possess a licence from a local authority 
outlining the type of goods they could sell, the area in which they could operate, the hours during 
which they could be on the street and “such other conditions as the [local] licensing authority may 
think fit to impose.”99 A license could be refused or revoked at any time, was valid for a year and 
had to be produced upon request.100 The KCC sought to implement further regulatory measures. It 
first ordered vendors to be evicted in December 2000,101 then did so again in July 2001102 and 
September 2001.103 In April 2002, the KCC undertook Operation Safe City, a major effort to 
remove vendors from the city’s streets.104 Vendors largely complied with minimal 
confrontation,105 while those who did not faced prosecution.106 In 2006, the KCC passed the Local 
Governments (Kampala City Council) (Maintenance of Law and Order) Ordinance, which banned 
all forms of street vending for those lacking official permits.107 The Town Clerk (the equivalent of 
a CAO in urban areas) again banned street vending in October 2010.108  
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Despite these efforts, street vending was still common under the KCC. Interview subjects 
for this thesis expressed a widespread agreement on this fact, both in positive (by vendors 
themselves) and negative (by those opposed to street vending) terms.109 Vendors were occasionally 
harassed, and periodic attempts to remove them from the city’s streets certainly occurred, but 
orders to leave the streets were often ignored, or if they were followed, vendors would quickly 
return. It was the politics of the KCC that allowed this to happen.  
 In a competitive electoral environment, KCC politicians effectively entered into what 
Judith Tendler refers to elsewhere as a ‘devil’s deal’ in which promises of protection are traded 
for political support from informal actors.110 In simple terms, politicians and vendors in the city 
entered a tacit—and sometimes explicit—agreement in which access to space was effectively 
exchanged for votes; politicians, seeking advantage in Kampala’s highly contested local politics 
and with the power to influence enforcement, were willing to relax or undermine enforcement as 
a means of strengthening their political positions, allowing street vendors to use their position as 
a key urban voting demographic to pursue their political objectives.111 As a result, laws against 
street vending, as a KACITA spokesperson complained, “were enforced selectively” by politicians 
who valued their positions of power more highly than city streets free of vendors.112 Vendors were 
aware of their own power when faced with evictions; even Sebaggala himself reflected on the 
political pressure that street vendors could exert: “Whenever I wanted to evict people who were 
trading in illegal areas, they would threaten that they would not vote for me again.”113 The demands 
of staying in office and gaining the upper hand in the constant struggles between the NRM and the 
opposition outweighed any concerns about eradicating street vending.   
Street vendors also organized under the KCC to exercise their political agency. In fact, 
KCC officials supported organization as a means of facilitating revenue collection, promising 
further support.114 One former street vendor leader claimed that there were 17 major street vendor 
organizations with about 500 members each under the KCC.115 This would suggest that 
organization was extremely widespread, particularly considering that there were an estimated 
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8,500 street vendors in Kampala near the end of the KCC’s existence.116 The extent of 
organization, however, could not be verified, and such a claim was not supported by other 
respondents. What is more certain is that street vendors who worked in shared geographic areas 
often organized in groups of various sizes, with the largest having at least a few dozen members 
who would elect leaders to serve specific administrative functions. These larger associations would 
support politicians who offered favourable treatment, and could also communicate with elected 
officials, particularly the mayor, on issues of primary importance to street vendors, including 
access to space, arrests, cleanliness and security. Politicians would not only offer protection and 
seek to resolve conflicts in vendors’ favour, but would also sometimes offer financial support for 
vendors to cover costs such as school fees. Associations would also organize revenue payments, 
and organize and assist payments on behalf of members related to permits, debts and bills in the 
event of illness or death.117 They had certain disciplinary functions as well, with one former leader 
saying they would ensure that only “honest” vendors were able to sell in their areas of influence.118 
The NRM’s democratization and, with decentralization, political empowerment of the 
KCC therefore had a profound effect on the agency of street vendors in Kampala. By giving local 
politicians extensive powers over the city’s development and making them reliant on popular 
support for their positions, reforms created a political situation in which street vendors were able 
to leverage the support they could provide in exchange for favourable treatment from local 
authorities. Thus, the trend that Cross identified in Mexico City—vendors resisting laws by 
aligning themselves with self-interested politicians—could also be found in Kampala under the 
KCC, where the dynamics of competition between the ruling party and the opposition and the split 
between the local and national government assumed a greater importance.119 The legal restrictions 
and occasional evictions that vendors in the city faced demonstrate the type of ambivalence that 
characterizes treatments of street vendors in a wide variety of settings.120 That ambivalence, 
however, was dependent upon the peculiarities of the political realities that existed in Kampala. 
When these realities changed, the ambivalence disappeared.  
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Part II: The Politics of Repression  
 If decentralization and democratization precipitated the rise of street vending in Kampala 
under the KCC, then a reversal of these processes led to its decline under a new recentralized, less 
democratic city government. The repression of street vending followed directly from the central 
government’s takeover of the city, with the KCCA pursuing a form of development and urban 
management that excluded street vendors and street vendors lacking the opportunity for political 
influence due to reduced political competition in a less democratic system of local government. 
The ‘devil’s deal’ that street vendors were able to profit from under the KCC all but disappeared 
under the KCCA; no longer able to trade their political support for protection, vendors saw their 
agency greatly reduced and were forced to find new ways to adapt to their changed political 
circumstances. These efforts have experienced little success, meaning vendors’ political exclusion 
has translated into a broader exclusion from urban development and economic life in the city.   
 
i. The Introduction of the Kampala Capital City Authority and the National Resistance 
Movement’s Reassertion of Power 
The repression of street vending in Kampala can only be understood within the context of 
the transition of the city’s government from the KCC to the KCCA, the nature and implications of 
which are explored here. 
 
a) The Introduction of the Kampala Capital City Authority 
The opposition’s control of Kampala instilled in the central government a longstanding 
desire to take over the KCC and bring the city back under the direct control of Movementists/the 
NRM. Both the President and supportive MPs publicly expressed a desire to do so as early as 
2001.121 While campaigning before the 2001 parliamentary elections, Museveni publicly criticized 
the performance of the KCC under Ssebaana, citing its apparent failure to address the problems 
with the city’s drainage, road and waste management systems. Claiming that the KCC’s urban 
management and development failures meant that it was not adequately serving the interests of the 
city’s residents, he threatened to use his powers under Article 202 of Uganda’s 1995 
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Constitution,122 which gives the President, with the approval of two-thirds of MPs, the power to 
“assume the executive and legislative powers of any district” under the following conditions: “(a) 
where the district council so requests it and it is in the public interest to do so; (b) where a state of 
emergency has been declared in that district or in Uganda generally; or (c) where it has become 
extremely difficult or impossible for the district government to function.”123  
For Museveni, implementing Article 202 had obvious benefits. Most obviously, it provided 
a legal means of regaining control of Kampala from the opposition within the country’s existing 
constitutional framework. Of equal importance, it also allowed the President to justify the central 
government’s takeover of the city in reference to the KCC’s urban management and development 
failures, and vague references to public interest and proper government functioning suggest that 
considerable room for interpretation surrounding the use of this power existed. The utility of 
Article 202, however, also had a notable shortcoming: while it allowed the central government to 
assume control of a district, the Constitution stipulated that the use of this power was to be 
temporary; the President could theoretically extend his control indefinitely,124 but the 
constitutionally stated final objective was to return power to the local government.125 This was not 
conducive to permanent political dominance.  
The central government therefore needed a new legal basis on which to justify its takeover 
of Kampala. This came with The Constitutional (Amendment) Act of 2005, the same document 
that legislated a return to multipartyism and repealed Presidential term limits, making the central 
government’s reassertion of power in Kampala an important part of the apparent trade-off that 
brought an end to the Movement system.126 Under Uganda’s amended constitution, Kampala is 
listed as a distinct entity that is not classified with other regions and districts, thereby making it no 
longer subject to the provisions that apply to either,127 and is to be “administered by the central 
government” subject to provisions adopted by Parliament.128 In June 2009, Local Government 
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Minister Adolf Mwesige presented to Parliament what would become, when eventually passed in 
November 2010, The Kampala Capital City Authority Act (KCCA Act).129  
The KCCA Act, in its final form, outlined the structure of the KCCA. Some of the key 
features of the KCC were maintained for the KCCA, most notably the existence of a directly 
elected mayor, now with the title of ‘Lord Mayor’, along with 34 elected councillors (now with 
four elected by and to represent engineers, architects, doctors and lawyers).130 The position of Lord 
Mayor, however, was given reduced powers, assigned such functions as presiding over meetings, 
hosting dignitaries, monitoring administration, assisting in the administration of city divisions and 
performing “ceremonial functions and civic functions”, although, significantly, it was also given 
the power to “head the Authority in developing strategies and programmes” for development.131 
The executive committee was eliminated entirely. Much of the true power in the KCCA was to 
instead rest in the newly created position of Executive Director, the “chief executive” of the KCCA 
appointed by the President.132 The Executive Director was to be the head of the public service and 
administration, and amongst its various functions (23 outlined in the KCCA Act, compared to only 
eight for the Lord Mayor), was to oversee the KCCA’s finances and assets, implement policy, 
enforce ordinances and byelaws, oversee service delivery and “mobilise the urban community for 
development and sustainability of infrastructure and services”.133 The Executive Director was also 
supposed to “advise the mayor and Authority on Government policy” and “liaise with the central 
Government and other institutions on behalf of the Authority”, tying the position even further to 
the central government.134 Both the Lord Mayor and Executive Director were to have deputies.135 
Even with the presence of the Executive Director, there was also still to be a Resident City 
Commissioner (RCC) with the responsibility, amongst others, to “represent the President and the 
government”.136 
The basic hierarchy of the local government system was maintained. Below the city level 
were to be the five lower divisions with elected councillors and an elected chairperson, now with 
                                                          
129 Gyezaho, Emmanuel and Ismail Musa Ladu, “Government Finally Takes Over Kampala,” Daily Monitor, 4 
November 2010; and Kato, Joshua, “Why Some Leaders Are Against Government Take-Over of Kampala City,” New 
Vision, 1 July 2009b.  
130 “The Kampala Capital City Act,” 2010, Part III, Article 6.  
131 Ibid, Part III, Article 11, Section 1.  
132 Ibid, Part III, Article 17, Sections 1 and 2.  
133 Ibid, Part III, Article 19.  
134 Ibid, Part III, Article 19, Subsections (e) and (o). 
135 Ibid, Part III, Article 9 and Part V, Article 23.  
136 Ibid, Part IX, Article 72, Section 1, Subsection (a).  
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the title of ‘mayor’. A city division mayor was to be the political head of a division, with a Town 
Clerk serving as the administrative head in a separation of powers similar to that which was to 
exist between the Lord Mayor and Executive Director at the city level.137 City divisions were still 
in turn further subdivided into ward urban councils, which were themselves above, and made up 
of the executive members of, village urban councils consisting of all adults 18 and over, while 
elected street committees were added at the lowest end of the hierarchy.138  
Finally, there was to be a Minister for the KCCA in Parliament with the power to, amongst 
other things, “give directives on policy and general development”, “vary or rescind” decisions that 
are “in contravention of any law or Government policy” and “receive or take appropriate action” 
on reports submitted by the Lord Mayor, the Executive Director or a commission of inquiry.139 
The Lord Mayor was to be answerable to the Minister and to the KCCA as a whole in the 
performance of his or her functions.140 As a Member of Cabinet appointed by the President, the 
KCCA Minister’s ties to the central government were, like those of the Executive Director, also 
obvious.  
The introduction of the KCCA followed the broader pattern of decentralization and 
democratization under the NRM in which reforms were strategically designed and implemented 
to benefit the interests of the ruling party and halted or revered they did not. Introducing an elected 
local government with a relatively broad authority may have been useful to the NRM as a means 
of establishing its legitimacy after coming to power, but when the popular opposition began to 
dominate the city, concerns about legitimacy were superseded by the desire for political control. 
The NRM continually tried to undermine the KCC to strengthen its electoral support at the expense 
of the opposition, but also consistently pursued other means of reasserting centralized control that 
would allow for a more permanent state of political dominance. In search of a legal justification 
for a takeover of the city by the central government, the NRM first turned to Article 202 of the 
Constitution; when this ultimately proved undesirable, it made the status of local government in 
Kampala a major focus of its efforts to reform the Constitution. The country’s amended 
constitution, adopted in 2005, gave the central government the authority it needed to disband the 
KCC and redesign the city’s local government structure, which it ultimately did with the KCCA 
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138 Ibid, Part VI.  
139 Ibid, Part XI, Article 79.  
140 Ibid, Part III, Article 11, Section 2.  
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Act. The introduction of the KCCA, therefore, was the culmination of a concerted effort to 
establish political hegemony in the city that dated not only from the drafting of the KCCA Act, 
but from the early implementation of decentralization and democratization reforms in Kampala. 
The central government’s takeover of Kampala was unsurprisingly met with resistance. 
Most notably, Sebaggala and Kampala Central MP Erias Lukwago criticized the move as a cynical 
and politically motivated attempt by the NRM to regain control of the city after long being unable 
to do so through electoral means.141 Sebaggala also warned that it would undermine the central 
government’s decentralization efforts, and suggested—referring to problems explored in the 
following chapter—that what the KCC truly needed was not to be replaced, but to be adequately 
funded and free from political interference.142 In January 2008, the KCC pledged to give each of 
its councillors 5 million UGX to consult with their constituents and campaign against the 
takeover.143 It was not just opposition politicians who were against the change. A poll conducted 
in 2008 found that of the 33% of Ugandans who were aware of the central government’s plans, 
38% approved and 59% disapproved. Divisions were also notable across party lines: 91% of DP 
supporters disapproved, compared to 69% of UPC supporters, 68% of Forum for Democratic 
Change (FDC) supporters (Besigye’s party), 63% of independents and those supporting other 
parties and, interestingly, 44% of NRM supporters.144 Such opposition ultimately had little impact, 
but served as a precursor for some of the political struggles that were to follow. The KCCA was 
introduced on March 1, 2011.145 
 
b) Technocracy over Politics 
The NRM’s efforts to expand its power in Kampala have continued after the introduction 
of the KCCA. While the KCCA has made the party (and, by extension, the central government) 
the dominant political force in the city, the fact that some positions in the city government are 
                                                          
141 Mwanje, Robert, “No Justification to Take Over Kampala City – Mayor,” Daily Monitor, 11 December 2007b; and 
Kato (2009b).  
142 Maseruka, Josephine, “Kampala Mayor Opposes City Take-Over,” New Vision, 10 February 2010.  
143 Mwanje, Robert, “KCC Bosses Get Shs160m to Fight City Take-Over,” Daily Monitor, 13 January 2008.  
144 Gyezaho, Emmanuel, “Ugandans Don’t Want Govt to Run City,” Daily Monitor, 15 November 2008.  
145 Interview subjects unanimously claimed that the KCCA was introduced in order to allow the central government 
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elected means that this dominance is not complete. This is something that the ruling party has 
sought to rectify. 
Although Kampala has traditionally been a stronghold of the opposition (particularly the 
DP), the NRM actually won the most council seats in the 2011 local elections. The DP also failed 
to win the mayor’s office in each of the city’s five divisions.146 This can probably be explained in 
a large part by dissatisfaction with the DP’s performance in managing the city. Still, support for 
the opposition was strong, and most notably expressed with the election of Erias Lukwago, the 
former MP for Kampala Central and a major opposition figure with the support of both Besigye 
and the FDC, to the position of Lord Mayor with 64.41% of the vote, with his closest rival, NRM 
candidate Peter Ssematimba, receiving just 33.43%.147 Jennifer Musisi, a lawyer with a 
background at the URA, was appointed to the position of Executive Director by Museveni in 2011. 
Although Musisi was a technocrat rather than a politician, the unofficial requirement of sympathy 
for and a willingness to co-operate with the NRM in order to secure an appointment by the 
President is obvious. Beatrice Wabudeya, the Minister for the Presidency, was also named Minister 
for the KCCA in 2011, and was replaced in both these positions by Kabakumba Masiko, another 
NRM MP, who served until December of that year, being replaced, again in both positions, by 
Wilson Muruli Mukasa, a third NRM MP. Frank Tumwebaze, an NRM MP for Kibale County in 
Kamwenge District in Western Uganda, was appointed as both Minister for the Presidency and 
Minister for the KCCA in August 2012. The overlap of the two ministerial positions is particularly 
revealing about the close ties between Museveni and the KCCA hierarchy.  







                                                          
146 Kasozi and Ssenkabirwa. For a full list of KCCA councillors and mayors once all positions had been filled, see 
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Conflicts between the political (elected) and technocratic (appointed) wings of the KCCA 
quickly emerged. These particularly took the form of the technocratic wing, led by Executive 
Director Musisi, attempting to expand its power at the expense of the political wing, led by Lord 
Mayor Lukwago. These conflicts have become so entrenched that they have been one of the 
defining features of the KCCA.  
Lukwago has been an outspoken opposition figure throughout his career. He has also been 
a prominent champion of the city’s urban poor. This has made him extremely popular. As an MP 
he criticized both the performance of the KCC and the introduction of the KCCA,149 and later 
referred to his election as Lord Mayor as “a battle between me and the state” in which he “defeated 
President Museveni and the NRM rigging machinery”.150 This victory, however, was short-lived. 
Lukwago quickly accused Musisi of overstepping her authority as Executive Director, claiming 
that she acted to construct and impose policies despite the fact that the KCCA Act, in his view, 
invested those powers within the body’s political wing.151 This led to major disputes between the 
Lord Mayor and Executive Director about their respective powers within the KCCA, causing 
Lukwago to go to court to obtain rulings on, amongst other issues, who is the head of the KCCA, 
whether or not Lord Mayor is mainly a ceremonial role and who has power over developmental 
planning.152 The court threw out Lukwago’s case, instructing the KCCA to resolve its issues on its 
own.153 The power struggle between Lukwago and Musisi continued, culminating in Lukwago’s 
impeachment on November 25, 2013 for abuse of office (inciting the public against paying taxes, 
unilaterally appointing and recalling KCCA representatives and failing to convene meetings), 
incompetence (failing to recognize the importance of standing committees and failing to renew 
their mandates, as well as failing to sign the minutes of meetings) and misconduct or misbehaviour 
                                                          
149 Ssenkabirwa, Al-Mahdi, “Lukwago Blames Poor Sanitation Roads, on KCC,” Daily Monitor, 3 September 2008; 
and Kato (2009b).  
150 Quoted in Kiyonga, Derrick, “How Museveni Plotted Lukwago’s Fall,” The Observer, 24 November 2013.  
151 Interview, Erias Lukwago, 10 August 2015.  
152 Mugisa, Anne, “KCCA’s Musisi Beats Mayor Lukwago in Case Over Power,” New Vision, 10 July 2012.  
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(publicly spreading inaccurate information about the KCCA and failing or refusing to implement 
Ministerial directives).154 Twenty-eight KCCA councillors voted in favour of Lukwago’s 
impeachment, including 16 from the NRM, four from the DP, two from the FDC and five 
independents, while four councillors opposed the motion (three from the DP, one of whom 
abstained, and one from the NRM) and two were absent.155 Councillors who voted for Lukwago’s 
impeachment reportedly received millions of shillings, along with 3,000 young chickens and 3,000 
kilograms of chicken feed, from the President.156    
Lukwago’s impeachment led to protests in Kampala that were forcefully suppressed by the 
police.157 On November 28, 2013, a High Court judge overturned Lukwago’s impeachment against 
the objections of the Attorney General, initiating lengthy court battles over Lukwago’s status that 
continued throughout the remainder of his first term in office.158 Throughout this entire process—
indeed, from long before his impeachment—Lukwago has been arrested, detained or blocked by 
the police from holding rallies, meeting with supporters and leaving his house on several 
occasions.159  
The NRM sought to strengthen its power in the KCCA with Lukwago’s absence. A group 
of NRM and other supportive councillors attempted to elect NRM councillor Baker Serwamba as 
the new Lord Mayor, with the position of Deputy Lord Mayor given to Bernard Luyiga, a DP 
councillor who voted to impeach Lukwago. With Lukwago’s status still uncertain, however, their 
efforts were unsuccessful.160 Perhaps more seriously, in November 2015, Attorney General and 
NRM MP Fred Ruhindi introduced the KCCA (Amendment) Bill to Parliament, which would, if 
adopted, have made the Lord Mayor appointed by the council rather than popularly elected, and 
                                                          
154 Bamugemereire, Catherine, Joska Ocaya Lakidi and Alfred Oryem Okello, “The Report of the KCCA Tribunal 
(2013),” November 2013.  
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156 Lubwama, Siraje, “KCCA Councillors Get Cash, Promised Chicks,” The Observer, 29 August 2014.  
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would also have made the KCCA Minister rather than the Lord Mayor the political head of the 
KCCA. The bill was withdrawn due to widespread popular criticism.161 Lukwago accused the 
technocratic wing of the KCCA of “disenfranchising people in Kampala” by “trying to get rid of 
adult suffrage” in an effort “to rob me of my political base”.162 This was not the first time the 
central government made such a move, since the early version of the KCCA Act did away with 
the position of directly elected Mayor altogether, stipulating instead that the Mayor would be 
appointed by elected councillors; the sentiment expressed at the time by Gordon Mwesigye, a 
former KCC Town Clerk, that “[t]he experiment of an executive Mayor universally elected has 
simply been a disaster and should be discouraged” clearly did not change within the ruling party 
with the introduction of the KCCA.163 Musisi even publicly stated that, with Lukwago impeached, 
it was “fantastic” to be able to do her job without a Lord Mayor.164 
It is not only Lukwago who has complained about Musisi exceeding her powers and, along 
with the rest of the KCCA’s technical wing, infringing on the authority of elected officials. The 
city’s division mayors, including those belonging to the NRM, along with councillors within both 
the KCCA and city divisions have also voiced the common complaint that Musisi and the 
technocratic wing make and impose decisions unilaterally.165 According to Lukwago, division 
mayors have been forced to “just sit and compile wish lists” because they lack control over their 
own finances, making them entirely dependent upon the KCCA’s technocrats.166 The dominance 
of the KCCA’s technocratic wing over its political wing therefore occurs at all levels.   
The NRM’s efforts to regain control of Kampala from the opposition thus did not end with 
the introduction of the KCCA. While the KCCA significantly increased the ruling party’s power 
in the city by introducing appointed technocrats to limit the powers of elected officials, it still, at 
least officially, left some room for the opposition to exert influence. Technocrats within the KCCA, 
along with their allies in the central government, have sought to minimize this influence further by 
marginalizing and subsequently impeaching a popular opposition Lord Mayor (and indeed trying 
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to fundamentally change the position by making it unelected), and more generally by excluding 
politicians from decision-making. The contrast between the realities of the KCCA and the NRM’s 
earlier stated commitment to decentralization and democratization is stark. The KCC was 
relatively autonomous and democratic, but this allowed it to be dominated by the popular 
opposition. Faced with a choice between political control and its twin programs of decentralization 
and democratization in Kampala, the central government emphatically chose the former, 
recentralizing power and de-democratizing the city through the KCCA. The politics of the city 
have been dramatically transformed as a result.  
 
c) Development and Urban Management 
It is crucial to stress the primary role that arguments about development and effective urban 
management played in justifying the introduction of the KCCA. The idea that the KCC was failing 
to adequately manage and oversee the development of the city was commonly held, and was, of 
course, tied to the political struggles that dominated the city: first, since politicians often pursued 
political advantage over governance functions; and second, because the central government could 
undermine the effectiveness of the KCC, then use this ineffectiveness to point to the KCC’s failure 
and its own obligation to replace a democratically elected government. A notable example of this 
logic was presented in a 2005 commission established by Local Government Minister Tarsis 
Kabwegyere to investigate land deals in the city, which found, in the words of the Daily Monitor, 
“widespread abuse of office by city officials, corruption and influence peddling, abuse of tender 
and procurement regulations and the presence of a “Kampala Mafia””, concluding that the KCC 
“lacked the political will as well as the technical capacity to enforce urban development.”167 In its 
own words, the commission also lamented that the KCC had been “captured by a political group 
that is consistently at loggerheads with the Central Government”—referring to the fact that the city 
was largely controlled by the (elected) opposition DP—and recommended that the KCC be taken 
over by the central government.168  
The logic of development and urban management also featured prominently in the KCCA 
Act. Mwesige described the bill he presented to Parliament as “development-oriented”, obviously 
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implied to contrast with the performance of the KCC.169 Not only were the Lord Mayor and 
Executive Director given powers concerning the development and, particularly for the latter, 
management of the city, but a key feature of the KCCA was to be a new Metropolitan Physical 
Planning Authority to direct development in the city. The body was to consist of five members 
appointed by the KCCA Minister, and was tasked with producing a physical development plan for 
the city, “handling and addressing planning issues”, organizing infrastructure and utilities, setting 
up green spaces and “beautification”.170 It was also to be given the significant power to ensure that 
land use in the city adhered to “designated plans, irrespective of the tenure of land”.171 The 
Metropolitan Physical Planning Authority, however, was never established, but a Physical 
Planning Committee was set up in accordance with the country’s Physical Planning Act of 2010, 
and a detailed development plan was approved by the National Physical Planning Board in 2013.172 
“The proposed Vision for the long term development of Kampala”, according to the plan, “is that 
of a Modern, Functional Balanced City and Metropolitan System.”173 
The KCCA wasted little time acting on its developmental and urban management 
ambitions. Many of the steps that it has taken have surrounded the performance of administrative 
duties, such as processing building plans, issuing permits and inspecting construction sites.174 It 
has also focused on high visibility “cosmetic projects” such as garbage collection and planting 
trees in order to demonstrate, according to one civil society leader, “that Kampala City, under the 
management of the opposition, was poor, compared to Kampala City under the management of the 
President and the Executive Director”.175 Many of the KCCA’s efforts, however, have been far 
more interventionist and coercive, perhaps most notably:  
 
• The demolition of illegal structures around the city where owners lack proper 
permits and approval, including residences and commercial buildings;176  
                                                          
169 Quoted in Kato (2009b).  
170 “The Kampala Capital City Act,” Part IV, Section 1.  
171 Ibid, Part IV, Section 3.  
172 Email interview, KCCA spokesperson, 12 February 2016. Also see: “Kampala Physical Development Plan: 
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Final Report, September 2012; and “The Physical Planning Act,” Acts Supplement No. 5, 28 May 2010.  
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• The eviction of tenants from places that serve important public functions, including 
Centenary Park,177 the city’s wetlands178 and areas along the city’s railway lines 
(with the railway line evictions alone affecting 40,000 people);179 
• The demolition of traders’ structures at such places as Luzira Stage Seven Market180 
and the Old and New Taxi Parks;181  
• Attempts to ban boda-boda stages from the city centre182 and take over the 
management of the matatu industry; 183 
• Attempts to assume the management of and redevelop the city’s markets (as 
explored in Chapter Five); and 
• The banning of begging on the city’s streets184 and removals of street children.185 
 
The logic of urban management and development has underpinned all of these actions by the 
KCCA. The ban on street vending must be understood in the same way.  
  
ii. The Repression of Street Vending 
The repression of street vending in Kampala follows directly from the introduction of the 
KCCA. The KCCA’s developmental ambitions caused it to commit to eradicating informal 
vending from the city’s streets, while its recentralized and de-democratized structure eliminated 
the conditions that street vendors had formerly relied on to exercise agency. Lacking the political 
protection that they were able to access under the KCC, street vendors in Kampala have faced a 
city government that is far more committed to the eradication of their activities.  
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The Third Schedule of the KCCA Act gives the KCCA the power to “[p]rohibit, restrict, 
regulate or licence” street vending.186 The act also gives the Executive Director the power to 
“promote trade order” in the city,187 and the concept of ‘trade order’ is commonly referenced in 
the context of outlawing street vending.188 Ultimately, however, the KCCA justified its ban by 
invoking the 2006 ordinance passed by the KCC.189 This had two notable advantages: first, it meant 
that the KCCA did not need to pass its own legislation; and second, it served to contrast the 
effectiveness of the KCCA with the inability or unwillingness of the KCC to enforce its own 
adopted policies. Musisi announced a ban on street vendors in the city’s Central Business District 
on July 10, 2011,190 and just weeks later at the end of August the KCCA announced that vendors 
had to vacate the city by September 4 or face evictions.191 Masiko, the Minister for the President 
and the KCCA, made a similar announcement on September 2.192 The decision was apparently 
made by the central government.193 
It is possible to identify four distinct arguments that are commonly employed to justify the 
KCCA’s ban on street vending:194 
 
1. Promoting cleanliness and order: street vendors are seen as a source of urban disorder 
and chaos who both are themselves unclean and make the city unclean with their 
presence. Such a view holds them to be not only detrimental to the city’s aesthetics, but 
also to the city’s proper and efficient functioning. A KCCA spokesperson claimed that 
the new city government “found the city in a mess” in 2011, with the streets “littered 
with vendors causing unnecessary traffic congestion” and impeding pedestrians on city 
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sidewalks.195 Removing street vendors, according to this logic, was therefore essential 
to the effective management of otherwise open, unoccupied public spaces. 
2. Promoting security: street vending is also seen as a potential threat to public security. 
This often comes from the fear that street vendors may be criminals. Petty theft is the 
most common concern in this regard, but one KCCA official claimed that criminals 
would disguise themselves as street vendors in order to commit house robberies, doing 
“their surveillance during the day” before returning “preferably in the night to execute 
their mission”.196 The idea that criminals can pose as street vendors due to the low entry 
costs that characterize street vending has echoes in the similar (if more outlandish) fear 
that terrorists may do the same. Immediately before issuing the September 4, 2011 
eviction deadline, Musisi said to journalists that “[i]n this era of terrorism and bomb 
threats”, the government must be able to “control and regulate the number of illegal 
street vendors”, suggestively adding that “no one knows the kind of merchandise they 
trade in.”197  
3. Ending unfair competition: by operating on the streets, vendors are free from the taxes, 
regulatory costs and business expenses (particularly rent) that are more easily or 
inescapably incurred by their counterparts in shops. They also have easy access to 
potential customers due to the visibility and accessibility that comes with occupying 
public spaces. This gives them a major competitive advantage over (more) formal 
businesses that may be forced to charge higher prices for similar goods and may 
struggle to attract customers due to less favourable locations (something that is 
particularly relevant for businesses outside of the city centre, off of major streets or 
inside the city’s indoor shopping arcades). Eradicating street vending would therefore 
benefit these businesses that ‘play by the rules’ by ensuring that they are no longer 
undercut by unfair competition.  
4. Improving revenue collection: forcing vendors off of the city’s streets and into markets 
could give them a more permanent position and ensure that they could be more 
effectively regulated and taxed.  
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Each of these is a standard justification for outlawing street vending used by governments 
around the world. Interestingly, the only argument used in Kampala that is not identified in 
Bromley’s comprehensive international overview from 2000 is the one relating to terrorism,198 
pointing to a more common usage of security discourses and the impact this has had on the logic 
and rhetoric of development. References to terrorism were likely to have had particular resonance 
in Kampala when the KCCA banned street vending in 2011 given the suicide bombings that took 
place in the city on July 11, 2010, in which 74 people were killed and a further 70 were injured. 
These attacks, of course, had nothing to do with street vending, with the Somali group al-Shabaab 
claiming responsibility.199 Concerns about terrorism have permeated the politics of street vending 
nonetheless.  
The other reasons that are commonly presented reflect the idea that street vendors have no 
place in the modern urban economy and physical landscape that the KCCA has pledged to create. 
With their associations with urban disorder, a lack of cleanliness, criminality, terrorism, poor 
business performance and low revenue intake, street vendors are seen to embody the problems that 
prevent Kampala from becoming a modern, developed, well managed city. In the context of the 
city’s politics, they were, in 2011, a visible manifestation of the KCC’s failure to promote 
development and undertake effective urban management; their removal, by contrast, would be a 
notable indication of the KCCA’s superior ability to run the city, the primary justification given 
for the central government’s takeover. The class dimensions of this logic are obvious: street 
vendors, as visible members of the urban poor, prevent the city from properly functioning for other 
residents by being visually unappealing, blocking traffic and pedestrians, posing a potential 
physical or monetary threat, undercutting businesses and undermining local government finances. 
Their livelihood needs are considered secondary to such concerns.200   
These class dimensions are particularly evident from the major role that KACITA played 
in promoting the ban on street vending in Kampala, which was so significant that a spokesperson 
referred to the ban as the organization’s “brainchild”.201 KACITA, as the primary organization 
representing the city’s traders, has long been a prominent opponent of street vending, regarding 
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the practice as a source of unfair competition and an impediment to shop owners’ access to 
potential customers.202 On at least one occasion in 2007, KACITA even helped the KCC organize 
an eviction of street vendors and provided security personnel to assist KCC enforcement 
officers.203 According to a KACITA spokesperson, the organization lobbied the KCC to remove 
vendors from the city’s streets, but was unsuccessful because elected officials relied on street 
vendors for support. MPs and presidential candidates were apparently reluctant to act for the same 
reason. KACITA then lobbied Museveni, telling him to do a cost-benefit analysis of street vending 
that factored in revenue from taxes and licensing fees paid by formal businesses as well as potential 
security costs. The President was apparently persuaded by this logic, along with the fact that, with 
the 2011 elections over, he no longer needed street vendors’ electoral support.204 Threats by 
KACITA to go on strike in September 2011 further pressured the KCCA to act to ban street 
vending when it did,205 just as a strike by traders to pressure the KCC into taking action in April 
2002 was shortly followed by Operation Safe City.206  
KACITA’s efforts are in line with Cross’ observation that businesses turn to the coercive 
powers of the state when they are unable to eliminate street vending through market competition.207 
While it would be inaccurate to portray all members of KACITA as part of a class of relatively 
wealthy business owners, they are nevertheless above the class of urban poor that most accurately 
categorizes street vendors. What makes street vending so attractive and gives it its competitive 
advantage is precisely its low entry costs and minimal capital intensity, making it accessible to the 
urban poor in a way that owning a larger business in a shop, with all of the costs that this would 
entail, is not. Larger traders wish to eliminate this competitive advantage, but in doing so close off 
one of the only avenues that the urban poor have for participating in the city’s economy and 
securing a basic livelihood. Since the introduction of the KCCA, these traders, through the KCCA, 
have been able to get the state to intervene decisively on their behalf.  
Political divisions, of course, also shaped the KCCA’s ban on street vending. These cut 
across the obvious fault lines of power in the city under the KCCA: between the opposition and 
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the ruling party, and between politicians and technocrats. Lukwago has been a particularly vocal 
critic of the evictions, accusing the KCCA of treating street vendors with an “iron fist”208 and 
arguing before the ban took effect that more time should be allowed for proper consultations to 
take place.209 A number of opposition MPs—although not all—opposed the eviction in Parliament 
on similar grounds, but a motion to suspend it failed due to a lack of quorum.210 Lukwago also 
claimed that the decision to ban street vending was not properly discussed within the KCCA, 
leading to accusations that his powers were not adequately respected.211 This fuelled his conflict 
with Musisi and the KCCA’s technocratic wing, forming a key part of disputes surrounding the 
proper division of powers and issues of development and urban management. These disputes have 
allowed Lukwago’s opponents, including both Musisi and Museveni, to characterize him as an 
obstacle to development who stands in the way of the KCCA’s plans and wastes valuable time and 
resources, ultimately justifying his removal.212  
Street vendors were largely seen to support Lukwago in his 2011 election victory, leading 
to speculation in the Daily Monitor as to whether or not this would be “his poisoned chalice when 
he moved to redeem the city” (that is, whether or not their support would prevent him from 
undertaking supposedly necessary evictions).213 In contrast to the KCC, however, the KCCA has 
been structured and operates in a way that renders the support of elected officials an ineffective 
way of exerting political influence. With the existence of the powerful technocratic wing that has 
taken over policy formation and implementation, along with continuous efforts to disempower the 
Lord Mayor, the KCCA imposes significant de jure and de facto restrictions on politicians that 
prevent them from coming to the aid of street vendors even when they desire to do so. Electoral 
competition has been minimized and its outcomes have been made less relevant, making the 
arrangement that existed under the KCC in which vendors could exchange electoral support for 
political protection practically impossible under the KCCA. Unelected technocrats are immune to 
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such reasoning altogether, and because they derive their legitimacy from their ability to direct 
development and urban management, they have few reasons to sympathize with street vendors and 
strong reasons to pursue the eradication of street vending. As one (former) street vendor leader 
described, when vendors wanted anything under the KCC “they would run to the Mayor, they 
would run to MPs, they would run to councillors, but now with KCCA, they don’t run to them 
because they don’t have the power.”214 The problem with the KCCA, another stated, is that “we 
have no right to vote for the Executive Director”, and therefore no longer have the ability to 
influence local government policy.215 A third agreed, lamenting that the KCCA gets its orders from 
the President, and therefore has “no need to listen to us”,216 while another vendor similarly 
complained that decisions now come “from the State House” rather than elected local officials.217 
The introduction of the KCCA has reversed decentralization and democratization in Kampala, and 
limited the agency of street vendors as a result.  
 
iii. The Effects of Repression 
The effects of this have been both serious and significant. Virtually every street vendor 
interviewed for this thesis spoke negatively about his or her treatment by the KCCA, often with 
little or no provocation. This was often named alongside or even above other primary concerns 
about the poverty in which street vendors usually live, which is understandable given that it not 
only involves vendors being harassed and brutalized, but also being prevented from undertaking 
an activity that at least somewhat secures their livelihoods. Street vending is a crucial income 
generating strategy for the urban poor in Kampala, and the KCCA is committed to eradicating it.  
Street vendors who have continued to operate in Kampala despite the city’s ban face arrest 
by the KCCA. The scale of these arrests has been considerable. In just one three month period 
from January to April 2013, 633 people were arrested and charged for street vending by the 
KCCA.218 In 2015, Lukwago estimated that over 2,000 people were in jail for street vending.219 
The courts that vendors are tried in are run by the KCCA, causing some vendors to question their 
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accountability and impartiality.220 One street vendor recalled being arrested, fined 500,000 UGX 
and sent to prison for six months, where “they treat you like any other prisoner, like a thief or a 
murderer or that kind of thing”.221 When he was released, he returned to street vending because he 
“had no option”; no other means of livelihood support were realistically available.222 The fines 
that accompany arrests can also be extremely burdensome: one street vendor reported being 
charged 400,000 UGX, far in excess of her average daily profits of about 15,000 UGX;223 another, 
however, reported a more favourable ratio of 70,000 UGX to a daily profit 30,000 UGX.224 In 
2013, the KCCA also began arresting the customers of street vendors for supporting an outlawed 
activity and undermining eradication efforts.225 Even when street vendors are not arrested, they 
may still have their goods confiscated, a punishment that can be quite severe since the costs of 
acquiring new goods to sell can be high, particularly in relation to profits and savings. One group 
of vendors claimed that they had their goods confiscated so often in the past year that they could 
not even guess the total number of times this had happened.226 Their goods, they claimed, were 
auctioned off by the KCCA; on previous occasions, confiscated goods had simply been 
destroyed.227 A spokesperson for the KCCA claimed on at least one occasion that vendors were 
instructed to collect their confiscated goods but failed to do so.228 
The treatment of street vendors by the KCCA gained widespread attention in November 
2014 when a two year-old child was struck and killed by a KCCA vehicle while being taken to 
visit his mother, who was in prison for illegally selling fruit on the street.229 Outrage over the 
incident—particularly, as expressed in interviews for this thesis, from other street vendors—did 
not result in any changes to the way street vendors are treated, even though a number of KCCA 
officers were suspended a week later for improper conduct in the performance of their duties.230 
Other criticisms of the treatment of street vendors, including those voiced in Parliament, have also 
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had little effect.231 For those who see street vendors as undesirable features of a modern urban 
landscape and economy, such concerns apparently fail to resonate.  
Street vendor organizations have also been greatly affected by the KCCA’s ban. Many of 
the larger ones, as described below, decided to co-operate with the KCCA. Others had their leaders 
harassed and/or arrested,232 and many disbanded because their leaders feared similar treatment.233 
Within the city’s closed political environment, the ability of such groups to exert political influence 
had also greatly diminished, damaging their utility.  
The repression of street vendors has been particularly harsh given the role of the state in 
producing and sustaining informality, as explored in Chapter Three. This fact has not been lost on 
many who have criticized the KCCA for its treatment of vendors. Lukwago castigated the 
government for adopting “draconian” policies as a substitute for its failure to aid the country’s 
manufacturing and agricultural industries as well as the unemployed, and says that street vendors 
“have nowhere to go” because the government “has not developed alternatives”.234 “The reason 
they do their business is a breakdown of economic policy”, Lukwago claims, so the primary issue 
“is not really about street vending”, but rather the fact that the government “has no real policy to 
help the urban poor”.235 One street vendor complained that the government would rather put 
vendors in jail and confiscate their goods than give them jobs or aid their businesses, adding: “This 
is what it’s like in Uganda. It’s like we are not Ugandans.”236 
 
iv. Responding to Repression 
 The recentralization and de-democratization of political power in Kampala that occurred 
with the introduction of the KCCA severely restricted the agency of street vendors. The 
competition between local politicians with control over policy formation and implementation that 
existed under the KCC was significantly reduced by both the structure and operation of the KCCA, 
leaving vendors without the avenue of influence that they took advantage of under the KCC. 
Unable to exert political influence, street vendors have been forced to respond to repression in 
other ways. These can generally be classified into three categories: efforts to comply with the ban 
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on street vending and/or co-operate with the KCCA; efforts to remain on the streets despite the 
ban; and attempts at further organization to exert renewed political influence. Such actions have 
met with limited success and are often motivated by desperation or necessity, and have frequently 
been confronted by further state power. Still, they suggest that while street vendors’ agency has 
greatly diminished, it has not disappeared entirely, even as they struggle to participate in urban 
development and economic life in the city.  
 
a) Compliance and Co-Operation 
Street vendors who have complied with the KCCA’s ban have left the streets of Kampala. 
Many have left the city and returned to the countryside,237 meaning that the state, for at least one 
segment of the urban poor, has been able to use its coercive power to stem or even reverse the 
predominant trend of urban migration. One street vendor interviewed for this thesis even expressed 
a desire to relocate to South Sudan to escape state repression.238  
The KCCA’s position is that vendors need not return to the countryside, or even give up 
vending. Its solution is instead for street vendors to relocate to the city’s markets.239 When 
announcing the ban in 2011, it claimed that it had identified over 8,000 spaces in 69 markets around 
Kampala that the city’s 8,500 street vendors could move into.240 Street vendors could still sell their 
goods in the city, but would just have to do so in designated areas. This plan, however, has notable 
flaws. Most obviously, the fact that market vendors, unlike street vendors, have to pay fees for the 
use of market space means that moving to markets would entail new and continuous costs for street 
vendors. In Owino Market, for example, access to the least expensive market space costs 8,000 
UGX per month;241 since street vending is a low capital intensity activity and profits are often 
small, such fees, while modest, are burdensome and can even make market vending difficult to 
afford. These costs also mean that important divisions exist between market and street vendors, 
since, like other traders, some market vendors view street vendors as a source of unfair 
competition. Vendors at Owino Market, for example, also protested before Operation Safe City in 
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April 2002,242 and even joined police to chase away vendors from a nearby street on at least one 
occasion.243 As detailed in Chapter Five, markets in Kampala have their own internal hierarchies 
as well, along with significant problems surrounding ownership and development. Their lack of 
appeal to street vendors is therefore understandable.    
Similar problems have characterized the primary attempt by street vendors to co-operate 
with the KCCA. After the passage of the KCCA Act, leaders of some of the largest street vendors’ 
associations in the city joined together to found Twengate Vendors Association in 2010. Knowing 
that street vending would be outlawed under the new city government, the new association 
requested that a new market be created in Kampala to accommodate the vendors who would be 
evicted from the city’s streets. The request was granted by Parliament, and the KCCA entered into 
an agreement with a company called Safinet Uganda Ltd., owned by Omar Nasoro Ssekamatte, to 
establish a market for street vendors on a plot of land in Katwe, close to a busy traffic junction 
near the Pan African Freedom Square that links the southern part of the city with Kampala’s 
Central Business District. The market was to be named ‘Usafi’, so Twengate Vendors Association 
changed its name to Usafi Vendors Association (UVA).244  
Usafi Market opened on February 4, 2013.245 In contrast to most markets in the city, Usafi 
has a well planned and organized layout. The arrangement of vending stalls and spaces follows a 
general pattern, and vendors are separated into five zones based on the goods that they sell. Each 
zone is identified by a colour, and vendors are expected to wear this colour so they can be easily 
identified. They are expected to wear an identity card around their necks as well. The market itself 
is covered by a roof to protect both vendors and customers from the elements, and has an artificial 
floor, plumbing and lighting. It also has defined entrances and exits with security guards.246 In 
short, Usafi embodies the ideal of ‘trade order’ that the KCCA is apparently committed to imposing 
on the city. If street vending is chaotic, then Usafi Market both clears the city’s streets and makes 
vendors easier to manage and regulate. This sense of ‘order’ is extended to the vendors themselves. 
Not only are they forced to adhere to certain aesthetic and business standards, but their behaviour 
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can also be more closely monitored and policed; according to one spokesperson for the market, for 
example, having vendors wear different colours would make them easier to identify in the event 
of “indiscipline”.247 In the words of an article in the Daily Monitor: “the message is clear, 
cleanliness and organisation first and the rest will follow.”248  
‘The rest’, however, has failed to follow. Vendors at Usafi Market may be free from the 
harassment that they would have faced on the streets and able to trade their goods in a well 
organized market, but they are having difficulty accessing the customers that they need to sustain 
their businesses. The lack of customers was mentioned repeatedly in interviews with those who 
work at Usafi, and becomes self-evident when visiting the market. To attract more customers, the 
UVA requested that the KCCA create a new taxi park near the market to increase its access to 
people moving in and out of the centre of the city.249 The request was granted, and Usafi Taxi Park 
was established on part of the property owned and managed by Safinet. In early 2014, the KCCA, 
in an attempt to reduce congestion in the city centre, declared that taxis using several routes 
between the city centre and the south and west of the city had to use Usafi Taxi Park, a move that 
led to dissatisfaction amongst taxi drivers and passengers over longer commute times.250 Usafi 
Taxi Park has not been able to improve business at Usafi Market. For vendors, customers are still 
in short supply.   
Problems caused by a lack of customers were initially compounded by the excessive cost 
of rent at Usafi Market. Safinet originally charged 120,000 UGX per month for rent, a high amount 
in relation to both vendors’ income and comparable rates at other markets.251 The UVA tried to 
get the rent lowered, arguing that vendors could only afford to pay 10,000 UGX per month.252 
Ssekamatte, however, ignored their pleas; in the words of one respondent: “He said it was a 
business. He wanted to make profits.”253 According to another, his attitude was “if you can afford 
it, you stay. If you can’t afford it, you move out.”254 Vendors were also unhappy about being 
charged a further 50,000 UGX if they brought in someone from outside of the market to help them 
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with their businesses.255 These costs have forced vendors to raise their prices, making them less 
competitive. Without the ability to offer low prices or easily access potential customers, vendors 
lose the very advantages that make street vending a viable livelihood strategy. Usafi Market may 
provide shelter from the repression that vendors face on the streets of Kampala, but for many, it 
also makes vending economically unsustainable.  
The high cost of rent led to conflicts between vendors and Safinet. The KCCA eventually 
intervened, first by reducing rent to 80,000 UGX per month in June 2013,256 then by taking over 
the management of the market in January 2014257 and finally by purchasing the market and taxi 
park from Safinet in April 2015.258 This purchase was plagued by controversy. Ssekamatte 
acquired the lease for the land, which totals 6.18 acres and is made up of 22 different land titles, 
from the city in early 2011 before the introduction of the KCCA, paying 110 million UGX.259 He 
sold the land back to the KCCA for 39 billion UGX.260 In August 2014, while the KCCA was in 
the process of purchasing Usafi, an internal report on corruption in the local government authority 
raised questions about how the deal was being handled.261 Tumwebaze, the KCCA Minister, told 
members of the Parliamentary Presidential Affairs Committee that accusations of corruption in the 
purchase of Usafi Market were “politically engineered schemes to tarnish the image of a hard 
working team at the KCCA”.262 Lukwago also claimed that the land was publicly owned and 
fraudulently sold by the KCC in the first place,263 but Yusuf Nsibambi, the head of the Kampala 
District Land Board (KDLB), argued that the lease was properly obtained since the 1998 Land Act 
gives district land boards the power to lease public land, and that the legal rate is 10% of the 
unimproved value of the land.264 Still, the difference between the 2011 leasing price and the 2015 
purchase price is significant. The KCCA failed to adhere to its payment schedule—perhaps 
understandably given that 39 billion UGX represents almost half of its annual revenues265—
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causing Ssekamatte to initiate a lawsuit that was settled out of court, while the payment has been 
complicated further as other claimants to the land on which Usafi sits have since emerged.266 
Meanwhile, revenue collected from both the market and the taxi park has fallen considerably short 
of the 1 billion UGX per month originally projected by Musisi, with the market itself only bringing 
in a monthly total of 60 million UGX by October 2016.267 
Upon purchasing the market, the KCCA reduced the rent charged to vendors to 6,500 UGX 
per month. This, however, could change; as one respondent warned: “it’s just the beginning. Just 
wait.”268 The KCCA also suspended the UVA, an act that members felt robbed vendors of their 
“voice” in the market.269 In August 2015, the chairperson and spokesperson of the UVA were 
arrested for leading a demonstration against the KCCA’s reallocation of market stalls.270 The 
KCCA instead oversaw elections for representatives from all of the zones in the market, but in 
December 2015 introduced a new, unelected interim leadership that did not include these zonal 
leaders. The KCCA has promised future elections, but at the time of writing these have not yet 
taken place.271 The KCCA also plans to upgrade Usafi by replacing the market’s wooden structures 
with something more permanent in line with the ideals of market development explored in Chapter 
Five.272 
The problems that vendors have experienced at Usafi have caused some to question 
whether or not they have benefited from relocating to the market. Summarizing this sentiment, one 
respondent declared: “we thought we would get relief, but we didn’t get what we hoped for.”273 
Others are convinced that their fortunes have actually worsened. In the words of one, before the 
introduction of the KCCA, “we would get by for ourselves, without begging. We would pay for 
school fees, we would pay for housing. But now, even with Usafi Market, we are not making 
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enough.”274 “It’s a waste of time coming here,” one respondent admitted,275 so some vendors have 
left the market and returned to the streets. Those who have returned to street vending, and those 
who never abandoned it in the first place, further undermine Usafi by selling similar goods for less 
money in more accessible locations, illustrating how the market has further divided and increased 
competition between vendors.276 They also undermine the market in another way: originally 
planned to accommodate 10,000 vendors277 and able to hold about 5,000 when it opened, Usafi 
Market may have only held over 1,000 people shortly after it was purchased by the KCCA.278  
The fact that so many street vendors have left or refused to relocate to Usafi reveals much 
about the market’s problems. Street vendors in Kampala face constant harassment by the KCCA, 
with arrests, extortion and confiscations all common occurrences. While vendors are not 
completely free from harassment at Usafi,279 working conditions at the market are certainly better 
than they are on the streets. And yet, because of high costs and few customers, many vendors 
choose or are forced to sell on the streets instead. Those who do eschew co-operation and 
compliance in favour of resistance.  
 
b) Resistance 
The KCCA’s ban on street vending means that vendors who remain on the city’s streets 
are forced to adopt strategies that allow them to do so. Political influence is not an option given 
the structure and operation of the KCCA, and neither is direct confrontation since the KCCA, in 
the words of one NGO worker, has the “support of the government coercive machinery”.280 
Instead, street vendors rely on certain small-scale resistance strategies that allow them to avoid, 
survive or otherwise cope with repression.   
A common strategy for street vendors is to bribe the KCCA’s enforcement agents, offering 
money in exchange for being left alone and allowed to continue to sell their goods. The primary 
risk that comes with this strategy is that vendors may not always have enough money to pay a 
bribe, particularly if they pay one officer only for another to demand one later. Failing to pay a 
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bribe leaves a vendor without protection; for example, the vendor mentioned above who was fined 
and sent to prison was unable to pay a 10,000 UGX bribe.281 Evasion is another strategy that 
vendors commonly employ. If vendors see an enforcement officer approaching, they will often 
conceal their goods and walk away, or at least try to appear as if they are doing something other 
than street vending (such as merely loitering). Small groups of street vendors may co-operate in 
evasion efforts by alerting each other when enforcement officers appear. Some vendors also sell 
at times when enforcement is low, such as during the evening or at night, and/or avoid areas of the 
city where enforcement is heaviest, particularly near the major businesses, government buildings 
and hotels in the Central Business District. These adjustments can even be good for business for 
reasons other than avoiding repression; selling in the evening, for example, gives vendors access 
to the many people in the city who are returning home from work at the end of the day, while many 
areas in Nakasero and Kisenyi where research for this thesis was undertaken have extremely busy 
streets and no shortage of potential customers.282 
The strategies employed by street vendors in Kampala to remain on the city’s streets can 
be understood in different ways. Scott’s work on everyday resistance is particularly relevant since 
the actions of street vendors may not constitute outright confrontation—and indeed, directly avoid 
it—but nevertheless resist the application of power, in this case efforts by the state to eradicate 
street vending in the city. Following Scott, street vendors reject (or lack the ability to participate 
in) large-scale organized public action aimed at political transformation, and instead favour the 
less visible pursuit of short-term gains, focusing on self-preservation, subsistence and access to 
basic resources in a way that is both personal and spontaneous. The KCCA’s coercive power and 
unresponsive nature makes open dissent both costly and ineffective; while vendors are unable to 
challenge the KCCA and the social, economic and political hierarchies that underpin its ban on 
street vending, they can still adopt strategies that mitigate the effects of its power.283  
By responding to repression by remaining on the streets, street vendors in Kampala 
effectively seek to (re)negotiate rights of access to urban space and (re)insert themselves into a 
system of development from which they are actively excluded. If urban space is, in the words of 
Setšabi and Leduka, “an embodiment of relations of power and powerlessness”, vendors challenge 
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their marginalization by refusing to vacate the spaces that they depend on to support their 
livelihoods.284 Their very presence raises fundamental questions about who and what public space 
is for and how the city should be properly developed and managed, illustrating two seemingly 
contradictory views of Kampala: one, held by the KCCA, KACITA (and other traders in the city) 
and members of the growing urban middle and upper classes, that Kampala should strive to be an 
aesthetically pleasing, decongested, well ordered ‘modern’ city with an effective government that 
acts to regulate economic competition and ensure security; and another, held by certain segments 
of the urban poor and those who operate in the informal economy, that the city should 
accommodate and provide opportunities and viable livelihood strategies for all of its residents, not 
just those who adhere to narrow and exclusionary understandings of development and urban 
management. Street vendors constitute a segment of the urban poor that is seen as unwelcome in, 
and even an obstacle to, a modern urban landscape and economy; by remaining on the streets, they 
reject their exclusion and insist on benefiting from the economic opportunities the city has to offer. 
Space in Kampala has therefore become a battleground that is contested, by the KCCA, with 
arrests, fines and the confiscation of goods, and by street vendors, bribery and various forms of 
evasion.285 It is a battleground that is inseparably linked to the other arenas in which street vendors 
experience and combat exclusion: in politics where struggles occur over representation and voice, 
in economic life where vendors seek the right to engage in their trade and in society where vendors 
confront widespread opposition to their activities.286 Under the KCCA, the forms of exclusion 
faced by street vendors have significantly increased in extent and severity. Yet still, struggles over 
access to space in Kampala continue.  
It is important, however, not to over-emphasize the agency that street vendors have in 
remaining on the streets in Kampala. Street vending can be a matter of necessity rather than choice 
given that other options for securing a livelihood are unrealistic or unavailable: relocating to a 
market or shop entails costs that many street vendors are unable to afford; leaving Kampala to 
return to the countryside most likely requires access to land, crops and/or animals and functioning 
markets (or other means of exchange), along with agricultural experience; and formal employment 
is unobtainable given the state of the country’s labour market and the fact that vendors often lack 
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employable skills or extensive education. Vendors may simply remain on the streets because they 
have nowhere else to go and no other means of supporting themselves and their dependents; they 
resist state repression and exclusion not as an act of defiant opposition, but because failing to do 
so would have disastrous consequences. Recognizing street vendors’ lack of options complicates 
interpretations of their actions; from one perspective, for example, the payment of money to 
enforcement officers is an effective way of avoiding harassment, but from another, it is a form of 
extortion that vulnerable vendors have no choice but to pay. Rumours that some female vendors 
are forced to exchange sexual favours for protection are more troubling, and point firmly to 
coercion and desperation rather than agency. Agency still exists for street vendors to resist 
repression, but it does so in the context of limited choice, personal risk and livelihood threats, and 
often merely mitigates only the worst effects of the coercive power of the state. While these 
strategies play an important role in allowing vendors to remain on the city’ streets, it is necessary 
to acknowledge their significant limitations.   
 
c) Further Attempts at Organization 
The KCCA’s ban on street vending and its co-option and repression of street vendor 
organizations has significantly altered the organizational landscape for street vendors in Kampala. 
The organizations that vendors formerly relied on for various forms of support have mostly 
disappeared or co-operated with the KCCA, primarily in the establishment of Usafi Market, 
leaving no large groups to oppose the KCCA’s ban or speak against its treatment of vendors who 
remain on the streets. Attempts by vendors to form new organizations of any size have faced major 
obstacles. Since street vending is now an illegal activity, it is difficult for groups of street vendors 
to gain legitimacy and recognition, and fear of arrest acts as a powerful deterrent. Given the 
charged political environment that exists in the city (and in the country as a whole), some street 
vendors are concerned about being seen as participating in ‘anti-government’ activities.287 Under 
the KCCA, street vendors who wish to organize face little chance of influencing policy and a high 
chance of further repression. In such a situation, a lack of organization is understandable.  
Street vendors who wish to organize also have important practical concerns. The Public 
Order Management Act means that vendors (like all other Ugandans) who plan to hold public 
meetings, rallies or demonstrations require official approval that, given their political status, is 
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obviously not forthcoming. Some respondents stated that when they try to find a place to hold a 
meeting, they get scared when asked about the meeting’s purpose, reflecting the climate of fear 
and intimidation in which organization has to take place.288 It can be difficult to organize meetings 
given that street vendors generally work all day, after which they are often tired, stressed and busy 
with other obligations (such as caring for dependents). Even when meetings do take place, people 
often voice common concerns, such as difficulties arising from a shared condition of poverty, that 
have no obvious solutions.289 The fact that vendors are so focused on earning a living, and that 
doing so entails competition, also serves as an impediment to co-operation. One respondent stated 
that street vendors might be able to “get a politician” if they organized effectively, but stated that 
“it is very difficult to come together and form an organization, because everyone is always on his 
business” and not thinking of the benefits of co-operation.290 Given how the KCCA is structured 
and operates, however, even if street vendors were able to ‘get a politician’, the effects would 
likely be limited. 
Yet rare attempts to organize still occur. These are certainly much less common than they 
were under the KCC, and have not only failed to have any influence on political decision-making, 
but also usually fail to overcome the problems that come with organizing street vendors under the 
KCCA. The scope of this organization is so small that it ranges from the failed meetings that 
vendors described in interviews to more ambitious efforts that prove difficult to sustain. As an 
example of the latter, a group of vendors interviewed for this thesis had founded an organization 
called Kampala Hawkers Association two months previously. These vendors, who formed a nine-
person committee that led the organization, sought to recruit members by taking advantage of the 
social networks that permeate the informal sphere, and claimed that their efforts had been met with 
an overwhelmingly positive response. Still, their efforts were running into familiar obstacles: after 
hosting a meeting that was apparently well attended, the group was struggling to raise money and 
find locations to hold further meetings. In pursuit of political influence, the group planned to 
bypass the KCCA and appeal directly to the President, who was viewed as the “only person who 
can solve the problems of our state”.291 At the time of writing (over one year after the initial 
interview was conducted), the Kampala Hawkers Association still exists, but has thus far not been 
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able to communicate with the President. Rejecting Usafi Market as too expensive for many street 
vendors, it has turned its focus to helping street vendors acquire skills that will allow them to move 
out of informal vending and into other trades, such as agriculture or craftsmanship, reflecting the 
view that their best chances of securing a decent livelihood involves abandoning informal vending 
altogether.292 The Kampala Hawkers Association has so far avoided the fate of an unknown 
number of other attempts by street vendors to organize under the KCCA that fail to have any 
meaningful impact or disband entirely. This, however, makes it an exception. 
There have been some attempts by outsiders to organize street vendors. The National Union 
of Informal Economy Workers’ Organizations (NUIEWO) brings together already existing street 
and market vendor organizations to collectively advocate for vendors’ rights and provide various 
forms of aid. It is affiliated with StreetNet, an international NGO based in South Africa that 
provides financial and technical support as well as assistance with training, logistics and 
advocacy.293 The fact that NUIEWO is made up of existing organizations rather than individual 
members, however, means that it depends on these organizations to exist in the first place. Another 
organization, Platform for Vendors Uganda (PLAVU), recruits both individual informal vendors 
and organizations in its efforts to improve vendors’ representation in policymaking and provide 
programs that improve vendors’ livelihoods. It, too, faces significant challenges. Street vendors, 
even when interested in organizing, are often sceptical that progress can be made, and may fear 
that the organization will just take their money and abandon them. Questions surrounding how the 
organization will be able to combat repression are particularly pertinent given the KCCA’s 
commitment to eradicating street vending and its lack of responsiveness to input.294 The opposite 
of political exclusion is a problem as well; the leader of PLAVU claims NUIEWO has started 
working too closely with the government, compromising its ability to champion the concerns of 
vendors, and professed his desire to avoid being co-opted in the same way.295 The organization 
also struggles with resources, which is understandable considering that its members are generally 
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poor and have little money to contribute.296 This, along with the political environment in which it 
operates, makes progress extremely difficult.  
While the ability of formal unions to assist those in the informal economy is a major topic 
in the literature on informal economic activity,297 formal unions in Kampala have not shown any 
interest in organizing street vendors. Like many others in the formal sphere, unions view street 
vendors as a source of unfair competition.298 The fact that street vendors are self-employed, and 
therefore lack the employer-employee relationship that unions are generally structured around, 
complicates matters further. While unions, with their significant resources and established 
channels of political communication, may have the potential to assist street vendors, the 
differences between the two in this case seem, at least at present, to be insurmountable.  
In general, most of the street vendors interviewed for this thesis were unaware of any 
organizations, at any level, that they were able to join and that worked to advance their interests. 
The organizations that existed under the KCC have mostly disbanded or been co-opted, and little 
has emerged to take their place. Rare attempts by street vendors to organize have been almost 
entirely unsuccessful, while civil society groups that work with vendors face major problems of 
their own. It is the introduction of the KCCA, with its repression of street vendors and their 
organizations and the fact that it does not rely on external input and support, that has so 
dramatically altered the organizational landscape for street vendors in Kampala. With so few 
opportunities for organization left, street vendors’ agency has been greatly limited.  
 
v. The 2016 Elections and the (Brief) Return of Political Competition 
While street vendors in Kampala have suffered from the restricted political environment 
that followed the introduction of the KCCA, the local and national elections that take place every 
five years still offer the possibility of renewed political competition on a regularly recurring basis. 
Interview respondents frequently stated that elections offer periods of reduced repression,299 and 
the UVA planned to appeal to the President during the election period, viewing it as an opportunity 
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for political influence at all levels of governance.300 The 2016 elections, however, were the first in 
Kampala since the introduction of the KCCA. This is of course significant since the KCCA is far 
less dependent on electoral support than the KCC given the degree to which it is controlled by the 
central government and unelected technocrats. Still, positions in its political wing remain elected, 
regardless of how marginalized politicians may be. Perhaps even more significantly, local 
elections roughly coincide with Presidential elections, during which candidates compete for 
political support and Museveni frequently resorts to populist appeals (as explored further in 
Chapter Five).  
Street vendors in Kampala have a history of taking advantage of favourable circumstances, 
no matter how rarely these may arise. In the past, changes to the potential costs and benefits of 
street vending have caused large numbers of vendors to return to the city’s streets: under the KCC, 
increased demand for goods around Christmastime;301 under the KCCA, a strike by traders in shops 
in opposition to fees for the inspection of goods;302 and, perhaps most notably, during the brief 
period following Lukwago’s impeachment when the KCCA suspended all of its operations due to 
the treatment of its staff by the public.303 By offering a brief period of political competition, 
elections even more dramatically alter the political circumstances of street vendors. It is during 
these times that street vendors are able to transcend the everyday resistance that they engage in to 
remain on the streets and instead participate in what Bayat terms ‘the quiet encroachment of the 
ordinary’, or “the silent, protracted, pervasive advancement of the ordinary people on the 
propertied, powerful, or the public, in order to survive and improve their lives”.304 Following 
Bayat’s critique of Scott, they cease merely resisting state power through defensive measures, and 
instead proactively make claims that advance their own interests in a way that is fundamentally 
offensive.305 Simply remaining on the streets and avoiding harassment by the KCCA is generally 
the most that street vendors in Kampala can strive for; during periods of exception, however, street 
vendors may have the opportunity to make certain gains that improve their livelihoods. These 
periods are invariably followed by further repression that eliminates most, if not all, of the gains 
made by vendors and returns them to their previous position. Nevertheless, such times give a 
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certain degree of dynamism to the otherwise relatively balanced equilibrium that characterizes the 
relationship between street vendors and a highly repressive state. 
A cycle of enforcement can therefore be seen to exist around elections. The repression of 
street vendors is greatest when electoral concerns are less relevant, then diminishes during election 
periods before sharply increasing again once elections are over. The existence of the KCCA 
certainly diminished the extent to which significance of political competition in the 2016 elections, 
but the competition still existed nonetheless. Street vendors interviewed for this thesis reported 
lower levels of repression as early as July 2015,306 and many returned to the streets in the months 
leading up to the elections despite warnings by the KCCA not to do so.307 In May 2015, the KCCA 
began closing off Luwum Street in the city centre on Sundays in order to set up a temporary 
‘market’ for street vendors, a move that was widely seen as influenced by upcoming elections.308 
Like Usafi, however, the Sunday market has significant problems. The KCCA, which runs the 
market, charges vendors a fee of 10,000 UGX for a space, making it too expensive for many, and 
a rule banning the sale of food acts as a further restriction. Traders at the Sunday market generally 
sell large amounts of goods—usually clothing or accessories—suggesting that they are not poor 
street vendors. In fact, many actually come from other markets in the city. The Sunday market 
does have one unexpected benefit for vendors, however: the KCCA officers that run and police 
the market are taken away from their usual duty of patrolling the city’s streets, reducing 
enforcement for vendors who do not relocate to Luwum Street on Sundays.309   
The NRM’s efforts to gain support in Kampala proved to be unsuccessful. In the general 
elections held on February 18, 2016, Besigye won Kampala with a total of 334,919 votes, more 
than doubling Museveni’s total of 157,098.310 Museveni was re-elected by a strong national 
majority, but this was his worst performance in the city in his five electoral victories since 1996.311 
Less than a week later, on February 24, Lukwago was re-elected as Lord Mayor of Kampala with 
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75.5% of the vote, an increase of over 11% from his previous victory in 2011.312 Lukwago again 
framed himself as a champion of “the aspirations of the people” and criticized the “repressive 
policies initiated by government where a handful benefit” at the expense of the majority of the 
city’s population.313 The NRM similarly performed poorly in the KCCA council elections, losing 
the majority it had won in 2011 by winning only six council seats while the FDC won 19, the DP 
won two and three were won by opposition-leaning independents.314 It also failed to win a single 
city division mayoral seat.   
On February 21, following his defeat in the city but before the KCCA elections, Museveni 
suggested that he may have performed so poorly in Kampala due to the KCCA’s treatment of street 
vendors. The President did not express opposition to the ban on street vending, but did express his 
apparent displeasure with the fact that the evictions were carried out before a viable alternative for 
vendors to trading on the streets could be established.315 Street vendors apparently took these 
statements as a sign of support from Museveni, and returned to the city’s streets in even larger 
numbers.316 KACITA, as it did in 2002 and 2011, put pressure on the KCCA to evict the street 
vendors, which the KCCA agreed to do in a meeting with KACITA on March 9. Evictions took 
place on March 11 in an exercise that was called ‘restoration of trade order and sanity’.317  
Following his victory in the 2016 Presidential elections, Museveni adopted the slogan 
‘Kisanja hakuna mchezo’ to define his new term in office, which, loosely translated, promises an 
end to ‘business as usual’ in the country.318 The opposition’s victory in Kampala has certainly led 
to one major change in the relationship between the KCCA and the central government: Musisi, 
after being blamed for the President’s electoral defeat, has been marginalized in favour of Beti 
Kamya-Turwomwe (commonly known as Beti Kamya), the new Minister for the KCCA who 
replaced Tumwebaze in June 2016. Kamya’s appointment is particularly notable given her past as 
an opposition figure; from 2006 to 2010 she served as an MP for the FDC in the city, and 
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subsequently formed her own political party, the Uganda Federal Alliance (UFA), for which she 
ran for President in 2011 and later campaigned against the concentration of power around the 
Executive.319 She is the first KCCA Minister who does not also serve as the Minister for the 
President, with the office now elevated to the position of an independent Ministry.320 While 
Museveni’s appointment of Kamya may appear to suggest a willingness to work with the 
opposition, it is much more widely viewed as a way of bringing an already sympathetic figure 
closer to the ruling party.321 Although she has denied effectively joining the NRM, Kamya has 
acted as an effective surrogate for Museveni in Kampala, expressing the opinion that the KCCA 
has too much independence, criticizing opposition leaders for abusing their powers and pledging 
her support to the President in the 2021 elections—despite the fact that he will be 77 years old at 
the time and therefore exceed the age limit of 75 established by the Constitution for Presidential 
candidates—in which she has predicted he will win 80% of the vote in the city.322 Breaking sharply 
with her opposition past, Kamya has become, in the words of the Daily Monitor, the President’s 
“go-to mobilizer in Kampala”.323  
Struggles between the opposition and the ruling party remain a defining feature of the 
KCCA as the central government refuses to loosen its hold on power in the city. Before leaving 
his post as KCCA Minister to become Minister of Information and Communications Technology, 
Tumwebaze stated that although Lukwago was re-elected as Lord Mayor, the “NRM won to lead 
Uganda”, and therefore “Lukwago has no choice but to implement NRM policy idea[s]” in the 
city.324 He also proposed amendments to the KCCA Act in the run-up to the 2016 elections that 
would make the Lord Mayor appointed by councillors rather than elected by popular vote, and 
while these were not debated before the elections were held, he hopes that they will be considered 
by the new Parliament.325 The KCCA’s elected councillors continue to complain about being 
marginalized within the local government, and accuse Kamya of failing to attend their meetings 
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or act on the resolutions that they pass.326 Any changes that the 2016 elections may have brought 
to the political landscape of Kampala remain superficial. The President and the NRM continue to 
dominate the politics of the city while the opposition struggles to exert any influence within the 
KCCA’s rigid structure.   
Street vending has again emerged as a primary point of contention under the new KCCA. 
On September 30, Kamya announced that street vendors would be evicted in two months after the 
KCCA had the opportunity to study conflicts in the city’s markets.327 She then issued a directive 
on October 19 that vendors must leave the streets voluntarily or be forced out by the KCCA, and 
on October 25, the KCCA began undertaking major evictions that were, according to the Daily 
Monitor, characterized by “bloodshed and bullets”.328 Kamya later justified the evictions by 
emphasizing the need to restore ‘trade order’ in the city and cited concerns about traders in shops 
losing business, owners of commercial buildings being unable to collect rent from their tenants, 
taxi drivers having nowhere to park and residents being unhappy with poor sanitation in the city.329 
She also claimed that street vendors could not coexist with traders in the city’s shops because they 
block entrances to the city’s arcades,330 and that the existence of street vending had led to violence 
between the two groups.331 Further adhering to the discourse that had long been used to justify the 
removal of street vendors from the city, Kamya also stated that vendors pose “a security threat”, 
lead to “littering” and “make it impossible to maintain and clean the roads and walkways”, and 
called upon all residents “who want and need a clean, vibrant and orderly city to cooperate with 
the KCCA enforcement team”.332 Before the evictions were announced, traders in the city’s shops 
were apparently refusing to pay their taxes due to the amount of business they were losing to street 
vendors.333 In fact, Kamya even claimed that the revenue losses caused by street vending were so 
severe that the KCCA would likely only collect 50 billion UGX in 2016/2017, down from 87 
                                                          
326 Ngwomoya, Amos, “Minister Kamya Rendering Us Irrelevant – Councillors,” Daily Monitor, 16 December 2016c.  
327 Ngwomoya, Amos, “Minister Kamya Wants Vendors Off City Streets in 2 Months,” Daily Monitor, 2 October 
2016d. 
328 Quoted from Ngwomoya, Amos, “Museveni Tasks KCCA to Create More Markets,” Daily Monitor, 28 October 
2016e. Also see: Nantaba, Agnes, “Kampala City Vendors Versus Minister Kamya,” The Independent, 31 October 
2016; Ngwomoya, Amos, “KCCA Councillors Gazette Some Roads for Street Vendors,” Daily Monitor, 25 October 
2016a; Ssali, Godfrey, “Minister for Kampala Kamya Kicks Out ‘Illegal’ Street Vendors,” The Independent, 19 
October 2016; and Ngwomoya (2016g).  
329 Ngwomoya (2016g). 
330 Ibid.  
331 Kasule, Farooq, “Vendors Petition President Over KCCA Harassment,” New Vision, 30 October 2016. 
332 Quoted in Ssali.  
333 Ngwomoya (2016e). 
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billion UGX in the previous fiscal year.334 Such a dramatic decline, if it indeed occurs, would 
almost certainly not be caused solely by street vendors given the diversity of the KCCA’s revenue 
sources (as outlined in Chapter Five).335 Still, street vendors continue to be blamed for many of 
the city’s problems.  
Facing evictions and renewed harassment by the KCCA, street vendors appealed to the 
President to come to their aid.336 Given the tacit support that he appeared to offer them in the run-
up to the elections, vendors’ hopes that he would again intervene in the city’s politics on their 
behalf were understandable. With the elections over, however, Museveni declared his support for 
the evictions on November 2, stating that the presence of street vendors harms revenue collection 
from the city’s shops and impedes the flow of traffic.337 The only support he offered was to order 
the KCCA and city divisions to establish new locations where vendors can sell their goods and 
instruct government authorities to provide vendors with financial assistance to help them relocate 
to markets.338 As usual, the support that street vendors received came mainly from the opposition 
in the city. Lukwago criticized Kamya’s eviction directive, arguing that she should stop targeting 
poor vendors and instead respect the decisions made by the KCCA’s political wing.339 On October 
24, KCCA councillors held a meeting to address the issue of street vending in Kampala in which 
they unanimously voted to allow vendors to operate on certain city roads—namely Nakivubo 
Road, Allen Road, Nakivubo Mews Road and Kafumbe Mukasa Road, all of which are near 
Nakivubo Stadium and thus the markets of Owino and Park Yard—in the evening,340 but this is 
one of the many resolutions that Kamya has failed to act on.341 The KCCA began its large-scale 
evictions the next day. 
The 2016 elections may have caused a return of political competition in Kampala that street 
vendors were able to take advantage of, but this was short-lived. The repression of street vendors 
has resumed, and there is no evidence that the KCCA will change its policies on street vending. 
Its structure and operation give it little reason to do so.  
 
                                                          
334 Kasule.  
335 See Figure 7 in Chapter Five. 
336 Kasule.  
337 “Vendors Must Leave Kampala Streets- Museveni”. 
338 Ibid; and “Government Plans Relocation Package for City Vendors,” Daily Monitor, 23 October 2016. 
339 Mukhaye, Damali, “Lukwago Tells Off Kamya Over Eviction of Vendors,” Daily Monitor, 20 October 2016. 
340 Ngwomoya (2016a).  
341 Ngwomoya (2016d). 
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Part III: Conclusions  
 The political evolution of Kampala has had a dramatic impact on the city’s street vendors. 
The NRM’s twin programs of decentralization and democratization empowered the KCC and 
made its leaders subject to popular support. This resulted in a highly divided political environment 
in which politicians from the ruling party and opposition engaged in intense competition for 
control of the city, allowing street vendors to take advantage of their position as a key urban voting 
demographic and trade their political support to accommodating self-interested politicians for the 
right to remain on the city’s streets (and other forms of favourable treatment). The circumstances 
created by decentralization and democratization in Kampala provided street vendors with the 
opportunity to insert themselves into the city’s political decision-making process, an opportunity 
that they took full advantage of.  
 This situation, however, did not last. Decentralization and democratization were always 
undertaken by the NRM for self-interested reasons, and frequently manipulated or reversed 
accordingly. In Kampala, decentralization and democratization facilitated the rise and political 
dominance of the opposition; this was not something that NRM-led central government would 
abide. The central government therefore recentralized and de-democratized political power in the 
city by replacing the KCC with the KCCA, investing a significant amount of power in technocrats 
appointed by the central government and President at the expense of elected local officials. Since 
the introduction of the KCCA, the body’s technocratic wing has sought to further minimize the 
power of local politicians by dominating decision-making and trying to force out a popular Lord 
Mayor. The ability of street vendors to exercise political influence has all but disappeared.  
To justify its existence, the KCCA has implemented major urban development and 
management initiatives that are aimed at transforming Kampala into a supposedly ‘modern’ city. 
Street vendors, who are seen to represent the disorder, insecurity and economic chaos that the 
KCCA seeks to eradicate, have no place within the KCCA’s vision of a developed, well managed 
city, and face significant repression as a result. The closed political space that exists under the 
KCCA means that street vendors have lost the ability to influence the formation and 
implementation of policy that they enjoyed under the KCC, forcing them to respond to repression 
in other ways: through compliance and co-operation, through resistance and through further 
attempts to organize. These efforts have been met with limited success, but nevertheless 
demonstrate that the city’s new restricted political environment has not caused the agency of street 
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vendors to disappear entirely. Street vendors also tried to take advantage of the return of political 
competition that accompanied the 2016 elections, but these gains were small and largely 
temporary.  
After having their agency expand under the KCC, therefore, street vendors have seen it 
contract significantly under the KCCA. The political competition fuelled by decentralization and 
democratization that existed in Kampala has disappeared, and in its place is a new system of 
centralized control in which technocrats are attempting to impose a form of development and urban 
management that is hostile to street vending. The modern political evolution of the city has been 
directed by the interests of the NRM: decentralization and democratization allowed it to secure 
and expand its control of the country after coming to power, and the takeover of Kampala by the 
central government allowed it to regain control of the city from the opposition. Such considerations 
of the powerful may seem far removed from the lives of street vendors, but because they have 
fundamentally altered the political fabric in which vendors exist, their effects have been profound.  
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Chapter Five: The Politics of Market Ownership and Development  
  
Like street vending, market vending is an activity that is fundamentally shaped by the 
politics that surround it. Whereas street vendors in Kampala negotiate their ability to access urban 
space and participate in an otherwise exclusionary economy by resisting state-led eradication 
attempts, market vendors do so by engaging in struggles to lead the management and development 
of the informal markets that they depend on for their livelihoods. The state, in its various forms, 
plays a crucial role in these struggles by formulating policies concerning the management and 
development of markets and involving vendors in crucial decision-making processes to varying 
degrees. As a result, vendors are profoundly impacted by changes in their relationship with the 
state over time.  
This chapter examines how the state has shaped the agency of market vendors in Kampala. 
It argues that market vendors were able to take advantage of the divisions that existed between the 
opposition-led KCC and the President to successfully oppose market privatization, but 
subsequently had their agency reduced due to the proliferation of internal conflicts that the state 
has played an important role in initiating and manipulating. While opposition to privatization 
united vendors, the later policy that vendors could manage and develop their own markets reignited 
and exacerbated significant divisions that exist within markets by provoking major disagreements 
about representation in market leadership and how, exactly, development projects should be 
designed and implemented. Since the introduction of the KCCA, some groups of market vendors 
have been able to seek support from either the President or the KCCA to advance their competing 
claims; this has allowed the President and the KCCA, in turn, to take advantage of the support 
offered by vendors to pursue their own interests in the city’s markets, which are, for Museveni, 
increasing his personal popularity at the expense of the opposition, and for the KCCA, controlling 
markets to improve revenue collection and lead urban development. Market vendors’ agency is 
further restricted by the fact that market associations regularly face co-option, neglect or 
repression, and often reflect the deep socioeconomic hierarchies that exist within markets, fail to 
represent the interests of their members and struggle to implement their management and 
development plans. Still, the President’s efforts to improve his popularity amongst market vendors 
have experienced little success, and market vendors primarily take advantage of elections as 
periods of brief political competition that allow them to advance their own interests, even if the 
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gains they are able to make are limited and do not fundamentally alter their political, social and 
economic marginalization.  
This chapter is divided into two parts. Part I explores how market vendors successfully 
blocked efforts by the KCC to privatize Kampala’s markets by securing the support of the 
President for their cause. Noting the extent to which the KCC’s financial problems that led to 
privatization were largely the result of political conflicts between the opposition and the ruling 
party, it shows how market vendors united in opposition to privatization and appealed to the 
President to intervene on their behalf. It describes how Museveni, who was always willing to 
undermine the authority and effectiveness of the KCC and intent on attracting popular support at 
the expense of the opposition, acceded to these appeals, and announced a new policy that vendors 
have the right manage and develop their own markets. To capture the complexity of the KCC’s 
market privatization process, it explores how these events unfolded in three of the city’s largest 
markets: Owino, Kisekka and Nakawa.  
Part II examines the conflicts surrounding management and development that came to 
consume Kampala’s markets following the President’s intervention. It first situates these conflicts 
in the context of the central government’s increasingly ambitious plans for market development in 
Kampala and the country as a whole, as well as plans by the KCCA to take over the management 
of the city’s markets to improve revenue collection and realize its urban development goals. It then 
examines how these conflicts have played out in Owino, Kisekka and Nakawa, demonstrating how 
different groups in these markets are able (or unable) to advance their claims by securing the 
backing of either the President or the KCCA, and how the President and the KCCA take advantage 
of this support. These conflicts highlight major divisions with deep socioeconomic roots that exist 
within markets, and the nature of these divisions and the extent to which they ultimately limit 
agency by serving as a major obstacle to collective action is considered. Part II concludes by 
arguing that the President’s efforts to increase his popularity in markets have been largely 
unsuccessful, and that market vendors are able to take advantage of the divisions that exist between 
the ruling party and the opposition during elections for their own limited gain, although doing so 
does not greatly enhance their ability to participate in urban development and economic life in the 
city.  
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Part I: The Privatization of Kampala’s Markets 
 The privatization of Kampala’s markets can only be understood in the context of the 
politics of the city under the KCC. Privatization was largely driven by the KCC’s chronically poor 
financial situation, but the city government’s underperformance was itself largely due to partisan 
conflicts between the opposition and the ruling party. It is these same conflicts that market vendors 
ultimately took advantage of to secure the support of the President and put an end to the KCC’s 
market privatization program.  
 
i. The KCC’s Financial Struggles 
The KCC, like all local governments in Uganda under the LC system, was financed in two 
primary ways: first, through grants from the central government; and second, though local revenue 
derived from taxes and fees. Grants took three primary forms: 
 
1. Unconditional Grants: money given to local governments to finance services in the 
country’s decentralized political system.1 Unconditional grants are calculated 
according to the amount given in the previous fiscal year adjusted for price and 
budgeting changes.2 
2. Conditional Grants: money given to local governments to finance specific programs 
under particular conditions agreed upon with the central government.3 
3. Equalization Grants: money given to poorer local governments to improve service 
provision in accordance to national standards.4  
 
Taxes and fees were more varied. The most important were:5  
 
                                                          
1 “Constitution of the Republic of Uganda,” Chapter Eleven, Article 193, Section 2; and “Local Governments Act,” 
Part VIII, Section 83, Subsection 2. 
2 “Constitution of the Republic of Uganda,” Seventh Schedule.  
3 “Local Governments Act,” Part VIII, Section 83, Subsection 3. 
4 Ibid, Part VIII, Section 83, Subsection 4.  
5 Some of these are outlined in “Local Governments Act,” Fifth Schedule. This list is compiled based on research 
undertaken for this thesis.  
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1. Graduated Tax: a tax levied on all males at or above the age of 18 regardless of 
employment status and all females at or above the age of 18 engaged in employment 
or business. The amount owed was dependent on assessed income.  
2. Property Tax: a tax levied on the value of property.  
3. Trading Licences: a tax collected from registered businesses that authorizes business 
activities.  
4. Local Hotel Tax: a tax on the occupation of a hotel room.  
5. Local Service Tax: a tax levied on the wealth and incomes of individuals engaged in 
employment or business.  
6. Ground Rent: money collected from the lease of land owned by the KCC.  
7. Taxi Fees: money collected from Uganda Taxi Operators and Drivers Association 
(UTODA), the organization that monopolized the taxi industry and managed the taxi 
parks in Kampala.   
8. Market Fees: money collected from market vendors for the use of a market.  
9. Land Fees: a tax levied on land transactions.  
10. Building Plan Fees: fees for the necessary approval of building development plans.  
11. Other: a collection of sources of small amounts of income, including parking, 
advertising and various fines and penalties.  
 
Despite its many sources of income, the KCC constantly struggled with significant 
financial problems. Throughout its time within the LC system, it consistently failed to meet its 
own revenue targets, forcing it to downgrade its budgetary plans.6 According to Goodfellow, from 
2001-2009, local revenue growth averaged 3.63% per year, trailing Kampala’s GDP growth 
(7.63%), inflation (6.77%) and population growth (4.14%).7 In 2001, 61% of the KCC’s funds 
came from local revenue; in 2008, this had fallen to 42%.8 Low revenue growth made the KCC 
increasingly reliant on the central government for financial support, negatively impacting its 
autonomy, while decentralization resulted in a rise of conditional grants in relation to 
unconditional grants, further increasing the central government’s control.9 Financial problems also 
                                                          
6 Goodfellow (2012), 244-246.  
7 Ibid, 246.  
8 Ibid, 245.  
9 Makara, 167-168.  
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caused paralysis throughout the city’s government structure; Makara, for example, finds that 
officials in Kampala’s five city division councils (LC3) often accused the KCC of failing to remit 
required funds, and village councils (LC1) similarly accused divisions of failing to meet funding 
obligations.10  
The KCC’s financial struggles had deeply political roots. The grants that it became 
increasingly reliant on for its funding got caught up in the ongoing struggles between the NRM 
and the opposition that defined the city’s politics, with the NRM-led central government 
inadequately funding the opposition-led KCC as a means of undermining its legitimacy and ability 
to carry out its core functions. For example, Lambright finds that in 2009/10, central government 
transfers to the KCC were only 47.5% of the per capita average for districts across the country; for 
unconditional grants, the figure was only 38.8%.11 Transfers from the government to nearby 
Entebbe, which was controlled by the NRM, were 250% of what Kampala received, and 
unconditional grants were higher still at 435.6%.12 Unrecorded transfers for patronage purposes 
may have widened the gap further.13 Given that Kampala is the country’s largest city and political 
and economic centre, and therefore a place where services and physical assets are highly 
concentrated, such discrepancies are particularly damaging.  
Political interference affected the KCC’s revenue collection as well. This most notably 
occurred with the abolition of the graduated tax, the KCC’s largest source of revenue, in 2005. The 
graduated tax, with its colonial roots, had long been unpopular. It was regressive, its assessment 
process was often corrupt and its collection could be both brutal and economically inefficient.14 
When campaigning for the 2001 elections, Besigye promised to abolish the tax. Museveni 
responded by promising to improve assessments and lower its threshold from 10,000 to 3,000 
UGX. The President also suggested that people should not be ‘disturbed’ by tax collectors during 
the election, and his remarks were taken by many to imply that the tax did not need to be paid.15 
Collection declined significantly as a result, with total revenue raised from the graduated tax across 
the country falling from 89 billion UGX in 1997/98 to 44 billion UGX in 2001/2002.16 The decline 
                                                          
10 Ibid, 161. For the distribution of funds within the LC system, see “Local Governments Act,” Fifth Schedule, Part 
V.  
11 Lambright (2012), 10.  
12 Ibid.  
13 Ibid, 14-15.  
14 Makara, 289-290.  
15 Cammack et al., 33.  
16 Williamson, Tim, “Fiscal Decentralisation,” in Kuteesa et al. eds., 321.  
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in Kampala was less severe, with graduated tax revenue only falling from 3.82 billion UGX in 
1998/99 to 3.52 billion UGX in 2004/05,17 the last year in which it was collected, at which point 
it made up 14.5% of local revenues.18 Local revenues for 2005/06 were down 8.4% from the 
previous year.19 To make up for the shortfall, two new taxes, the Local Service Tax (which does 
not apply to many informal activities)20 and the Local Hotel Tax, were introduced in 2007 to take 
effect the following year. These proved to be inadequate, however, bringing in less than 300 
million UGX from a projected 1.5 billion UGX for the KCC in their first year.21 As Cammack 
points out, the abolition of the graduated tax had a debilitating impact on local governments 
throughout Uganda, making many unable to pay salaries, hire new staff, make debt or pension 
payments, supplement donor funding or even hold council meetings.22 
The collection of property taxes, the second most important source of local revenue for the 
KCC, was also significantly undermined by the central government. During the run-up to the 2006 
elections, Museveni criticized the property tax, suggesting that the burden of paying it should fall 
on wealthy landowners with income properties rather than homeowners.23 After the election, 
Parliament passed the Local Governments (Rating) (Amendment) Act, which exempted all owner-
occupied residents in the country from property taxes.24 This change likely cut the KCC’s revenues 
from property taxes by 50-75% from what they otherwise would have been following extensive 
revaluations undertaken in 2005.25 Furthermore, Goodfellow finds evidence that major properties 
in the city had their values—and thus their property tax obligations—significantly reduced after 
the 2005 revaluations, and that many of the owners of these properties were prominent 
businesspeople with ties to the NRM.26 Even when people did not have such political connections, 
they were often able, as Makara notes, to appeal to Movement politicians who would sympathize 
with their pleas for lower taxes based on a political desire to minimize the revenue intake of the 
opposition-led city government.27 
                                                          
17 Goodfellow (2012), 249 
18 Calculated from ibid, 245 and 249.  
19 Calculated from ibid, 245.  
20 Ibid, 241.  
21 Lambright (2011), 30.  
22 Cammack et al., 34.  
23 Lambright (2012), 15.  
24 “Local Governments (Rating) (Amendment) Act,” 2006, Section 3.  
25 Goodfellow (2012), 256. 
26 Ibid, 256-257.  
27 Makara, 294.  
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Museveni also directly intervened to block the KCC from introducing new sources of 
revenue. This most notably took place in relation to the KCC’s efforts to tax the city’s thriving 
boda-boda industry. The KCC attempted to introduce a tax on boda-bodas for the 2002/03 
financial year, levying a 5,000 UGX fee for a number plate and demanding an additional monthly 
payment of 10,000 UGX. The KCC estimated that this would raise 700 million UGX per year.28 
Boda-boda drivers, however, complained that the fees were exorbitant, and appealed to the 
President to have it overturned. On June 2, 2004, the Acting Private Secretary of the President 
wrote to the KCC demanding that the tax be repealed.29 The KCC again tried to tax the boda-boda 
industry by introducing a 9,000 UGX monthly fee (to be divided evenly between the KCC, the city 
divisions and the National Federation for Boda-Boda Operators) in December 2006. This effort 
was similarly unsuccessful, and the President intervened to overturn the tax in June 2007 following 
appeals by boda-boda drivers.30  
The central government’s constant interference in the KCC’s financial affairs stemmed 
from the ruling party’s desire to undermine the opposition’s control of the city. In the competitive 
and deeply divided political landscape that existed in Kampala following decentralization and 
democratization, the NRM sought to demonstrate the opposition’s incompetence and unsuitability 
to hold political power, and starving the KCC of resources was a particularly effective way of 
fostering chronic mismanagement that could be blamed on the opposition. Low revenue intake 
resulted in poor service delivery, which, as argued in Chapter Three, increased informal economic 
activity, further harming revenue collection in a positive feedback loop that undercut the KCC’s 
ability to perform its basic functions and damaged its legitimacy. This dysfunction then provided 
the central government with a justification for the introduction of the KCCA. 
The KCC’s financial problems were not entirely the fault of the central government, 
however. Mismanagement of public assets and finances also plagued the KCC, which was accused 
of allocating contracts to incompetent bidders and selling assets at below market value. Following 
the introduction of its divestiture program in 2001, the KCC sold 475 properties in its possession, 
and according to New Vision, “flouted the rules” when doing so as “many ended up in the hands 
of KCC officials, their cronies and the same people who were selling them.”31 The KCC lost as 
                                                          
28 Ibid, 313.  
29 Ibid, 312-314.  
30 Goodfellow (2012), 225-226.  
31 Quoted from Semakula, John, “KCC Sold Off 500 Properties,” New Vision, 30 July 2011.  
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much as 28 billion UGX between 2000 and 2005, and more than 13 billion UGX due to mishandled 
leases, tenders and contracts in 2006/07.32 It is in this environment of financial mismanagement 




Markets always provided an important source of revenue for the KCC. In keeping with its 
struggles elsewhere, however, the intake of market fees fell significantly below its potential, 
causing the KCC to contract out market revenue collection to private companies in nine of the 
city’s markets in the mid-1990s. These efforts proved to be a success, and increased revenue intake 
while reducing administrative costs.33 In 2002, the KCC went a step further by starting to award 
tenders to manage markets to outside bidders, a process that continued until 2007. Precisely how 
the policy of privatization came to be adopted is unclear, particularly because the issue quickly 
became highly contentious and many sought to apportion blame for their own political purposes. 
The tendering process began when Ssebaana was Mayor, but intensified under his successor 
Sebaggala, who oversaw the granting of leases after coming into office in 2006. The Minister of 
Local Government, Kahinda Otafiire, also played a major role in overseeing the leasing process, 
as did three Town Clerks, James Ssegane, William Tumwine and Ruth Kijjambu; all four figures 
represented the central government rather than the opposition that was elected to run the KCC, but 
it was Sebaggala who came to be more associated with the policy than anyone else.  
The KCC first needed to provide itself with the legal grounds for the privatization of 
Kampala’s markets. The main piece of legislation that provides for the regulation of markets in 
Uganda is the Markets Act of 1942, which establishes that only “the administration of a district”, 
“a municipal council” or “a town council” had the power to “establish or maintain a market”.34 
The Local Governments Act of 1997 similarly describes the power to “[e]stablish, acquire, erect, 
maintain, promote, assist or control” markets “with the participation of citizens”.35 In keeping with 
the act’s overarching theme of decentralization, it also devolves the administration of markets, 
along with the related powers of revenue collection and the administration of licences, to city 
                                                          
32 Musoke, Cyprian, “KCC Loses Over Sh40b in Revenue,” New Vision, 21 October 2007.  
33 Makara, 301-304.  
34 “The Markets Act,” 1942, Article 1, Section 1.  
35 “Local Governments Act,” Second Schedule, Part 3, Section 1. 
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division councils (LC3).36 In Kampala, however, such a devolution seems to have never taken 
place given the extent to which the KCC maintained control over market affairs. In 2006, the KCC 
passed the Local Governments (Kampala City Council) (Markets) Ordinance, which departed from 
previous national legislation by stating that individuals could establish or maintain markets with 
permission from the city council,37 and that the KCC “may enter into a contractual agreement with 
a person, firm, company or organisation which intends to invest money in the establishment and 
maintenance of a market”.38 The KCC thus surrendered its right to exclusive control of the city’s 
markets, allowing it to enter into agreements with private groups or individuals if and when it saw 
fit. Given that the Local Governments Act only invests in urban/district councils (LC5) the power 
to “make laws not inconsistent with the Constitution or any other law made by Parliament”, it is 
not clear whether or not it had the power to do so.39 
Market privatization nevertheless went ahead, but quickly encountered other significant 
problems. Major dissatisfaction amongst vendors and questions surrounding the legitimacy of 
deals made by the KCC with private contractors led to conflicts that not only prevented new 
leaseholders from managing and/or developing markets as they saw fit, but also caused a decline 
in the amount of revenue that the KCC was able to collect from markets.40 Seeing an opportunity 
to position himself as a champion of market vendors in Kampala, a group that is usually seen as 
highly supportive of the opposition,41 Museveni intervened in the city’s market conflicts by using 
his powers to halt and in some cases reverse the privatization process in order to give vendors 
control over the management and development of their markets. In April 2007, the President 
instructed Otafiire to stop selling market leases to private investors,42 and in September 2007 the 
central government adopted the policy that all vendors who own shops or stalls in a given market 
should join their market association, which would then be given priority in the allocation of market 
                                                          
36 Ibid, Second Schedule, Part Five, Section (B).  
37 “Local Governments (Kampala City Council) (Markets) Ordinance,” 2006, Part II, Paragraph 4.  
38 Ibid, Part II, Paragraph 5.  
39 “Local Governments Act,” Part IV, Section 38, Subsection 1. For the legal and policy framework surrounding 
markets in Uganda and the problems and inconsistencies that it contains, see “A Report of the Review of the Markets 
Act, Cap 94 in Uganda,” Uganda Law Reform Commission and Ministry of Local Government, July 2013. Other 
relevant pieces of legislation and policy documents are discussed below.   
40 Kato, Joshua, “Why Kampala City Council May Revert to Direct Collection of Market Dues,” New Vision, 11 
February 2009a.  
41 The President’s electoral motives were often remarked on during fieldwork. They are also referred to in Goodfellow 
and Titeca.  
42 Kato (2009a).  
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tenders (and free, if they so choose, to enter into partnerships with external investors for financial 
support).43 Because of his decisive intervention, this is a policy that Museveni was, and indeed still 
is, personally associated with. 
The KCC’s privatization efforts had major political repercussions. Sebaggala, the son of a 
Nakasero Market vendor who was elected Mayor of Kampala as the populist candidate promising 
to represent the interests of the urban poor, became highly unpopular amongst the market vendors 
who had served as one of his core constituencies in his triumphant return to office. After supporting 
Sebaggala in large numbers in 2006, market vendors soon came to feel that he abandoned his 
promises to serve the ‘common man’ by leasing the markets that are so crucial to a large segment 
of the urban poor to wealthy private investors. The Mayor became so intensely disliked by his 
former supporters that he was even attacked by vendors when visiting Park Yard Market in 
February 2009.44 In 2010, Sebaggala joined the NRM, but was at that point so unpopular that he 
was heavily criticized by many figures within the party (who would deny him a ministerial post 
less than a year later).45 It is likely that the sense of betrayal felt by so many of the city’s market 
vendors contributed greatly to the DP’s poor performance in the 2011 local elections and, at the 
same time, allowed the NRM to capitalize on widespread disaffection with the opposition’s 
management of the city (ironically at a time when the central government, by introducing the 
KCCA, was disempowering local politicians). In the same vein, Lukwago’s victory in the same 
elections was likely aided by the prominent role he played as an MP in combating the privatization 
of the city’s markets, the success of which he regards as one of his greatest achievements as a 
politician.46  
 Privatization did not occur in a uniform way, but rather unfolded differently in markets 
throughout the city as a result of specific market histories and varying alignments of competing 
individuals and interests. In order to understand the privatization process, therefore, it is necessary 
to look at it in the context of specific markets and identify both its common and unique 
                                                          
43 Mwanje, Robert and Stella Nakakande, “The Politics and Money Behind Market Wrangles,” Daily Monitor, 4 
October 2007.  
44 Bagala, Andrew and Robert Mwanje, “Sebaggala at Half-Term; A Litany of Broken Promises,” Daily Monitor, 3 
July 2009; and Mwanje, Robert and Andrew Bagala, “Sebaggala’s Tenure of Broken Promises,” Daily Monitor, 17 
March 2011. 
45 “Sebaggala, the Stranger in His New NRM Home,” The Observer, 10 October 2010; and Nankya, Sylvia, “MPs 
Reject Sebaggala as Minister,” New Vision, 2 June 2011.  
46 Interview, Erias Lukwago, 10 August 2015.  
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characteristics. Three of the city’s largest markets capture a suitably broad range of experience to 
allow for such an undertaking: Owino, Kisekka and Nakawa. Each is explored here.  
 
a) Owino Market 
Management and development issues have featured prominently in the history of Owino 
Market.47 After the market was established in 1971, it consisted of papyrus structures built on a 
dirt ground for the first two-and-a-half decades of its existence, making it particularly susceptible 
to rain damage. In the mid-1990s, a grant was secured from the World Bank in partnership with 
the KCC to redevelop the market by building new shops and stalls and expanding it from three-
and-a-half to eight acres in order to accommodate more vendors in improved structures. The 
construction contract to lead the redevelopment process was awarded to M/S Midland Famusa 
Construction Company. The handling of the process, however, caused controversy, causing the 
Inspector General to launch an investigation in 1997 that found that M/S Midland Famusa 
Construction Company had been established by Godfrey Kayongo Nkajja, the chairperson of the 
United Market Vendors Association (UMVA), Owino’s market association, and Steven Higobero, 
the KCC’s co-ordinator of market development, and that Kayongo’s daughter was registered as 
the company’s chairperson, Higobero’s son was registered as the vice-chairperson and the son of 
another market leader was registered as the secretary despite the fact that all three children were 
minors at the time.48 Vendors also accused the UMVA of various forms of abuse and malpractice 
during the redevelopment process, including keeping the best shop and stall spaces, mistreating 
vendors who expressed dissent, stealing money that vendors paid to contribute to reconstruction 
and underreporting the number of vendors in the market in order to minimize the fees that it owed 
to the KCC.49 Despite these problems, M/S Midland Famusa Construction Company and the 
UMVA continued to lead the market’s redevelopment process. 
When the KCC announced that it would be leasing the market in 2002, Owino Traders and 
Transporters Limited, the group of vendors that was at that time managing the market, submitted 
                                                          
47 Unless otherwise indicated, the account presented here is constructed from information collected during fieldwork. 
Two interviews were particularly important: group interview, St. Balikuddembe Market Stalls, Space and Lock-Up 
Shops Owners Association Limited, Owino Market, 4 August 2015; and group interview, St. Balikuddembe (Owino) 
Market Produce, Traders and Vendors Co-Operative Society, 8 August 2015.  
48 Goodfellow (2012), 168; and Makara, 310-312.  
49 Group interview, St. Balikuddembe (Owino) Market Produce, Traders and Vendors Co-Operative Society, 8 August 
2015. Some of these complaints are also mentioned in Goodfellow (2012), 168.  
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a bid for the tender of 76.05 million UGX per month. They were, however, unsuccessful, and the 
tender was instead awarded to Victoria International Trading Company, which submitted a higher 
bid of 126.8 million UGX per month (or lower rates for six or 12 month periods).50 Victoria 
International Trading Company was owned by Hassan Basajjabalaba, a wealthy businessperson 
and major property owner in Kampala who also has significant political connections with senior 
NRM officials, including Otafiire,51 served as the chairperson of the NRM’s Entrepreneur League 
and was a major fundraiser for the ruling party.52 In addition to Owino, companies owned by 
Basajjabalaba and managed by Haba Group, his holding company, also acquired leases for both 
Nakasero Market and Shauri Yako Market, and had earlier won a contract from the KCC to 
develop and build a shopping mall in Constitution Square.53 Vendors at Owino protested 
Basajjabalaba’s takeover of the market, the Local Government Minister, Jaberi Bidandi Ssali, 
unsuccessfully attempted to have the contract overturned and the Mayor tried but failed to have 
the tender revoked for either Owino or Nakasero, not wanting to have the two markets controlled 
by the same person.54 The controversy deepened when it emerged that both Victoria International 
Trading Company and Sheila Investments Limited, the company that had taken over Nakasero 
Market, had used forged incorporation documents to support their successful bids.55 Still, both had 
their contracts renewed by the Town Clerk, Ssegane, in 2006.  
Vendors at Owino continued to oppose Basajjabalaba’s control of the market. Kayongo, 
still the market chairperson, organized a new group, the St. Balikuddembe Market Stalls and Lock-
Up Shops Owners Association (SLOA), which began collecting money in 2006 to purchase the 
tender back and demonstrate that vendors could lead the market development process themselves. 
SLOA appealed to the President for assistance, which they duly received when the President began 
to actively support the right of vendors to manage and develop their own markets, a position that, 
largely due to the President’s initiative, was adopted as official government policy in 2007. SLOA 
was awarded the tender for Owino Market in 2010, paying 4 billion UGX, with 200 million UGX 
each year in ground rent, for a 49-year lease. 
                                                          
50 Muwanga, David, “Bids for Owino Await KCC,” New Vision, 7 October 2002.  
51 Lambright (2012), 19.  
52 “MPs Want Bassajja, Col Mugyenyi, to Refund Shs156bn,” The Observer, 29 August 2011.  
53 Lambright (2012), 19.  
54 Kato, Joshua, “Kampala’s Controversial Tenders,” New Vision, 25 June 2003.  
55 Ibid.  
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Basajjabalaba had all of his market contracts terminated, which he agreed to under the 
condition that he would be fully compensated by the government. The central government agreed 
to pay Basajjabalaba 142.6 billion UGX, a figure that had grown from 8 billion UGX throughout 
a lengthy negotiation process.56 The money paid to Basajjabalaba was not taxed, and the payment 
itself may have been illegal because it did not have the approval of the Attorney General’s office.57 
Museveni has publicly criticized the payment, but there is speculation that he approved the figure 
or even increased it from a previously lower amount.58 An audit undertaken by KPMG, one of the 
world’s largest auditing firms, at the request of the Auditor General later found that many of 
Basajjabalaba’s compensation claims were based on invalid contracts and accompanied by 
supporting documents that were improper, incomplete or, in some cases, fraudulent. The auditors 
argued in their report that the 2002 contract that first gave Victoria International Trading Company 
the right to manage Owino Market, like other contracts held by Haba Group, was rendered void 
by the fact that it was not approved by the Attorney General and therefore violated both the 
Constitution and official guidelines issued by the Attorney General in 1999 (the same guidelines 
that the compensation payment itself violated), and also argued that the extension of 
Basajjabalaba’s contracts for Owino and Nakasero violated the Local Governments Act because 
Ssegane, by his own admission, acted without the necessary approval from the KCC. The audit 
report concluded that rather than being eligible for financial compensation, Basajjabalaba actually 
owed the government 994 million UGX.59  
The privatization of Owino Market proved to be a costly endeavour. Not only did the KCC 
fail to collect the money that it was owed by Victoria International Trading Company, but the 
central government ended up spending a considerable sum of money to satisfy Basajjabalaba’s 
poorly supported compensation demands. Considering that the logic of privatization was to boost 
revenues while lowering costs, the entire process was, by the most basic criteria, a significant 
failure. In this respect, the experience of Owino Market was not unique.   
 
                                                          
56 “MPs Want Bassajja, Col Mugyenyi, to Refund Shs156bn”. 
57 Ibid.  
58 See, for example: Mugerwa, Yasiin, “Letters Link Museveni to Basajjabalaba’s Cash Claim,” Daily Monitor, 1 
December 2011; and “Museveni: I’ve Not Changed Position on Basajjabalaba,” Daily Monitor, 7 February 2012.  
59 “Basajjabalaba’s Compensation Claims: The Inside Story (Part I),” Daily Monitor, 5 December 2011; and “Audit 
Report Shows Basajjabalaba’s Company Owes KCC: The Inside Story (Part II),” Daily Monitor, 6 December 2011.  
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b) Kisekka Market 
Kisekka Market underwent a similarly contentious privatization process.60 Unlike at 
Owino, however, Kisekka’s privatization was at least partially driven from within the market itself. 
In November 2006, a group of vendors belonging to the New Nakivubo Road Market Vendors 
Association (NNRMVA), led by chairperson Samuel Ssekibenga, applied to the KCC for 
permission to redevelop Kisekka Market. The application was approved by both Stanley Kinyatta, 
the RDC, and Otafiire, and the KCC instructed NNRMVA to identify a partner to help the 
association lead the development process.61 NNRMVA entered into an agreement with a company 
called Rhino Investments Limited that would split the 3.7 acre market into two sections: one, at 
2.2 acres, would be controlled by Rhino Investments, while the other, at 1.5 acres, would be 
controlled by NNRMVA. Rhino Investments paid 1.5 billion UGX for the 49-year lease, and was 
to work with NNRMVA to construct a six-storey shopping centre. The project was approved by 
the KCC.62 The deal is notable because it took place after Museveni had declared his support for 
the policy that vendors should manage and develop their own markets, and concluded in the same 
month, September 2007, that the central government adopted the President’s position as official 
policy, but the fact the NNRMVA claimed to represent the vendors of the market gave it a degree 
of apparent legitimacy. It is also notable because Rhino Investments was owned by retired army 
Colonel John Mugyenyi, a former government official, a National Resistance Army (NRA) veteran 
from the civil war and a personal friend of the President, as well as a major property owner in the 
city.63  
The sale of the lease to Mugyenyi was extremely unpopular with market vendors. Claiming 
that NNRMVA did not represent the vast majority of vendors in Kisekka, a group of vendors led 
by Robert Kisembo formed a new association, Nakivubo Road Old Kampala (Kisekka) Market 
Vendors Limited (NROKKMVL), to rival NNRMVA and attempt to halt the planned 
redevelopment of the market. The popular backlash against the deal between NNRMVA and Rhino 
                                                          
60 This account of Kisekka Market is primarily based on fieldwork, particularly: interview, chairperson, Nakivubo 
Road Old Kampala (Kisekka) Market Vendors Ltd., 20 August 2015; interview, rival ‘chairperson’ within Nakivubo 
Road Old Kampala (Kisekka) Market Vendors Limited, 25 July 2015; group interview, rival group within Nakivubo 
Road Old Kampala (Kisekka) Market Vendors Limited, 20 August 2015; and group interview, rival group within 
Nakivubo Road Old Kampala (Kisekka) Market Vendors Limited, 21 August 2015.   
61 A brief history of NNRMVA’s partnership with Rhino Investments is provided in Kato, Joshua and Florence 
Nakaayi, “Confusion Among Leaders Worsens Market Wrangles,” New Vision, 16 September 2007.  
62 Mwanje and Nakakande.  
63 Ibid.  
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Investments followed from major divisions that existed within the market: whereas NNRMVA 
claimed to represent most of the 680 people in Kisekka who owned market stalls, NROKKMVL 
drew its support from the vast majority of market vendors who were not owners but rather worked 
as employees or labourers.64 The leaders of NROKKMVL first tried to plead their case to 
government officials, but after going to “every relevant office”, were unable to secure any 
support.65 Mugyenyi, they found, had “a lot of influence”, so they would always “find his hand” 
influencing decisions, while anyone who tried to help them “would face threats”.66 The fact that 
NROKKMVL drew most of its support from vendors who were not shop owners also acted as a 
hindrance, raising questions about who has the right to represent the vendors of a market as well 
who has the right to even be represented in decisions concerning management and development; 
Sebaggala, for example, stated publicly that the KCC only recognized NNRMVA since it wanted 
to deal with “land lords and not vendors or hawkers”, and that it had “no time to waste with idle 
characters at Kisekka Market.”67  
Unable to exercise any influence through political appeals, NROKKMVL instead turned 
to “the voice that [politicians] could hear”: protests.68 According to the chairperson of 
NROKKMVL, market vendors began clashing with the police “almost every day”, and would 
cause “chaos” when representatives of NNRMVA or Rhino Investments were at the market, 
“challenging them from morning to sunset.”69 Large protests broke out on a number of occasions, 
including, most notably: in September 2007, leading up to the announcement that the market would 
be leased to NNRMVA and Rhino Investments;70 twice in February 2008, with the second coming 
after Lukwago leaked a Parliamentary report that argued that the President should not have the 
authority to make decisions surrounding market development;71 in June 2009 as the KCC 
continued to refuse to give NROKKMVL the lease to the market;72 and in September 2011 as the 
                                                          
64 “KCC vs. Kisekka Market Vendors: What Caused the Conflict?” New Vision, 3 September 2010.  
65 Interview, chairperson, Nakivubo Road Old Kampala (Kisekka) Market Vendors Ltd., 20 August 2015.  
66 Ibid.  
67 Quoted in Mwanje, Robert, “Market Riots: Kayihura Turns to Gen. Museveni,” Daily Monitor, 28 September 2007.  
68 Interview, chairperson, Nakivubo Road Old Kampala (Kisekka) Market Vendors Ltd., 20 August 2015. 
69 Ibid.  
70 Kato and Nakaayi.  
71 Mwanje, Robert and Andrew Bagala, “Four Shot in Fresh City Market Riots,” Daily Monitor, 13 February 2008; 
and Mwanje, Robert and Risdel Kasasira, “Market Vendors Strike Over Leaked Report,” Daily Monitor, 26 February 
2008.  
72 “Kisekka Market Traders Riot Over Land Title,” Daily Monitor, 17 June 2009.  
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KCCA also refused to surrender the lease.73 These protests regularly drew a harsh response from 
the police, with repression usually taking the form of arrests, the use of teargas or violence. Still, 
NROKKMVL’s efforts, the group’s chairperson believes, succeeded in drawing attention to and 
support for the vendors’ cause, and ultimately inspired “[a]lmost the whole country” to question 
why politicians were ignoring vendors “who are 10,000 in the interests of one person”—that is, 
Colonel Mugyenyi.74  
Not everyone who became aware of NROKKMVL sympathized with its cause, however. 
In fact, the association and its actions attracted a significant amount of negative attention, much of 
which is particularly revealing of broader perceptions of both Kisekka Market and market vendors 
as a whole.75 The poorer vendors that NROKKMVL primarily represented were not only seen as 
unable to participate in market management and development due to their low socioeconomic 
status, but were also often associated with criminality.76 Kisekka Market specializes in used 
vehicle parts and, to a lesser extent, other mechanical goods, and there is a widely held perception 
that much of what is sold at the market has been stolen. The association of criminality with 
informality is common in popular perception and not at all unique to Kampala; indeed, even 
scholarly and policy discussions are often guilty of failing to distinguish between economic 
activity that is illegal and that which is merely informal.77 Such a view greatly contributes to the 
marginalization and repression that informal vendors face, delegitimizing their efforts to 
participate in urban development while legitimizing the coercive use of state power. 
NROKKMVL’s use of protests as a central tactic in the pursuit of its goals only furthered negative 
perceptions of the market and its vendors while also reinforcing the association of informal 
vending with urban chaos and disorder. The desire to eradicate such disorder underlies many of 
the development plans that are imposed on informal vendors in Kampala.  
NROKKMVL eventually succeeded in securing the President’s support. In a letter to Major 
General Kale Kayihura, the Inspector General of Police, in February 2008, Museveni insisted that 
the policy that market vendors have the right to lease their own markets must be implemented in 
                                                          
73 Bwambale, Taddeo, “Kisekka Traders Demand Land Title,” New Vision, 7 September 2011.  
74 Interview, chairperson, Nakivubo Road Old Kampala (Kisekka) Market Vendors Ltd., 20 August 2015. 
75 The views addressed here were commonly expressed during fieldwork and regularly feature in media coverage of 
the market.  
76 See, for example, Wanambwa, Richard and Robert Muwanje, “Otafiire Sets New Conditions for Kisekka Market 
Re-Development,” Daily Monitor, 28 September 2007.  
77 See the definition of informal economic activity provided in Chapter One.  
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Kisekka. While the policy document read by Kayihura referred to “sitting tenants who own stalls”, 
the decision was interpreted as a rejection of NNRMVA’s deal with Rhino Investments.78 The 
President’s order was not immediately implemented, but his intervention ultimately proved to be 
decisive.79 Sebaggala informed Kisembo that NROKKMVL officially had control of Kisekka in 
April 2009,80 and Kijjambu wrote to NROKKMVL to award the association the lease for the 
market in January 2010.81 It was not until December 2011 that NROKKMVL was given the title 
to the market by the KCCA, for which it paid 1.5 billion UGX and promised to pay 500 million 
UGX in annual ground rent. The lease was awarded for five years, and was to be renewed for 49 
years on the condition that NROKKMVL undertake the redevelopment of the market. Like 
Basajjabalaba, Mugyenyi agreed to have his market lease terminated in exchange for 
compensation, and ultimately received 14.9 billion UGX that was also not taxed and paid in 
violation of the Constitution.82  
 
c) Nakawa Market 
Nakawa Market has had a rather different history of privatization.83 Unlike at Owino and 
Kisekka, the lease for Nakawa Market was not sold to a wealthy businessperson during the KCC’s 
market privatization process. Instead, the KCC’s decisions regarding the allocation of the market’s 
tender exacerbated divisions within the market both before and during its privatization efforts. The 
nature of these internal divisions prevented groups of vendors from appealing to the President for 
support, and meant that the presidential directive that markets should be managed by vendors had 
virtually no impact on Nakawa Market.  
Vendors’ organizations first emerged in Nakawa Market in the early 1980s, and grew 
significantly after the end of the civil war. The first of these groups was Nakawa Market Vendors 
Association Limited (NMVAL), which was founded in 1982 and elected a ten-person committee 
and an official chairperson, Francis Mwesigye, in 1988. NMVAL quickly came to serve as the de 
                                                          
78 Bagala, Andrew and Robert Mwanje, “President Museveni Backs Kisekka Market Vendors,” Daily Monitor, 15 
February 2008.  
79 Interviews revealed that vendors widely attribute their success to Museveni’s intervention.  
80 Walaga, Patricia and Robert Mwanje, “Vendors Take Control of Kisekka Market,” Daily Monitor, 16 April 2009. 
81 Kato, Joshua, “What Next After Vendors Gain Control of Kisekka Market?” New Vision, 24 February 2010.  
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83 This account is based on fieldwork, particularly: group interview, Nakawa Market Vendors Association Limited, 
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facto leadership organization in the market, providing essential services and representing the 
market’s vendors in interactions with the KCC. Membership in NMVAL was free to all vendors 
in Nakawa Market. The second group that emerged during this time was a co-operative society 
known as Nakawa Market Co-operative Savings and Credit Society Limited (NMCSCSL). As a 
co-operative society, the main purpose of NMCSCSL was to look after vendors’ savings and 
provide affordable loans. These services, however, were only available to the co-operative 
society’s members, and to join, vendors were required to pay a membership fee of 10,000 UGX 
and purchase five shares in the co-op at a total of 50,000 UGX.84 
The leaders of NMVAL applied to the KCC for the market tender to officially run the 
market in 1995. They were informed, however, that since the association was not officially 
registered, the co-operative society was in a much better position to win the tender. A meeting was 
then held in the market, at which vendors decided to apply for the tender through the co-operative 
society. NMCSCSL won the tender to manage Nakawa Market in 1999. As a result, it took over 
the provision of services in the market from NMVAL, as well as the association’s role in 
representing the market’s vendors in relations with the KCC. Since NMCSCSL was a co-operative 
society rather than, like NMVAL, a vendors’ association, it was mainly tasked with serving the 
interests of its members, and since joining the co-op entailed costs that not all vendors could afford, 
many people in the market were excluded from the benefits that came with NMCSCSL’s 
management. Vendors also complained that the fees charged by NMCSCSL for stalls in the market 
were too high, and that the channels for influencing decision-making could be improved.85  
Before the tender for Nakawa Market was awarded to NMCSCSL, NMVAL had attempted 
carry out a project to redevelop the market. To lead the redevelopment process, the association set 
up a new group, Nakawa Market Development Steering Committee (NMDSC), led by Mwesigye 
and made up of 21 representatives from all of the zones in the market. The committee accepted a 
proposal from a firm called Alcon International, and in doing so rejected one from a company 
owned by Steven Higobero, the co-ordinator of market development at the KCC who had partnered 
with Godfrey Kayongo to carry out the redevelopment of Owino. According to the leaders of 
NMVAL, Higobero then began supporting NMCSCSL’s right to lead the redevelopment of the 
market, a position that came to be accepted by the KCC. NMDSC was disbanded, and a new 
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development committee comprised of co-op members was appointed by the Town Clerk.86 Now 
in charge of the market’s redevelopment, NMCSCSL hired a new construction company, Arab 
Contractors, to begin work in February 1998. The project was to last two years and cost 4 billion 
UGX.87 Problems soon mounted, however, as development stalled and over 400 vendors did not 
receive the shops and stalls that they paid for.88 Arab Contractors claimed that it had not been fully 
paid by NMCSCSL, and later filed a lawsuit against the co-op seeking 1.5 billion UGX in damages; 
in response, NMCSCSL claimed that the construction contract was invalid because it had been 
signed by the development committee, which lacked the legal authority to enter into such 
agreements.89 Vendors complained to the KCC of NMCSCSL’s mishandling of the market’s 
redevelopment, and the co-op’s tender was eventually terminated in 2007.90 
After NMCSCSL lost its right to manage Nakawa Market, the leaders of NMVAL claim 
that the association entered into an agreement to acquire the tender for the market in April 2008. 
The KCC, however, apparently reneged on this deal, and instead brought its “own people to 
manage and control the market” under the name Nakawa Market Vendors Association (NMVA).91 
NMVA, the leaders of NMVAL claim, did not truly represent the market’s vendors, but consisted 
of people who had been installed “for political reasons”.92 In the words of a later leader of the 
market (and opponent of NMVAL), Sebaggala “threw away these people who were managing the 
market” without thinking of “how the market started” or “where it came from”, and instead “gave 
it to his supporters” who were “only after collecting the money, only interested in themselves.”93 
“That’s when the problems started arriving in the market.”94  
The respective leaders of NMVAL and NMVA each claimed that their association was the 
sole legitimate authority in Nakawa Market. The uncertainty surrounding the validity of these 
claims prevented either side from attracting the support of the President. In both Owino in Kisekka, 
it was obvious what group had the support of and therefore ‘spoke’ for the vast majority of market 
vendors; in Nakawa, this was not the case, giving Museveni, who intervened in market conflicts 
                                                          
86 Group interview, Nakawa Market Vendors Association Limited, 14 August 2015. 
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to support popular positions as a means of presenting himself as a champion of the interests of 
market vendors, no clear incentive to involve himself in the market’s affairs. The fact that both 
NMVAL and NMVA claimed to represent the vendors of Nakawa Market also meant that 
Museveni’s ruling that markets should be run by vendors had no impact on the ongoing conflicts 
at the market. While privatization was being overturned in Owino and Kisekka, therefore, Nakawa 
was at an impasse with two groups locked in continuous conflict and neither willing to surrender 
its claims. It was an impasse that the KCC, given the impact that its decisions surrounding the 
allocation of the market’s tender had on the internal politics of Nakawa, played a major role in 
bringing about, and the President had little reason to resolve.  
 
iii. The Agency of Market Vendors During Privatization  
Questions of political power defined Kampala’s market privatization process. Privatization 
itself was the result of continuous efforts by the central government to undermine the opposition-
led KCC by starving it of the resources it needed to properly function, and privatization was 
successfully contested by vendors who were able to take advantage of the divisions that existed 
between the central government and the KCC to appeal to the President for support. Museveni, 
seeking to increase his own personal popularity at the expense of the opposition, acceded to these 
appeals in order to portray himself as the champion of market vendors in the city, a position that 
was formerly held by Sebaggala, the once popular opposition mayor.95 The entire market 
privatization process can therefore be seen to have unfolded in a way that strengthened the power 
of the President. Vendors were able to exercise agency by taking advantage of the President’s 
efforts to expand his power, but this was only necessary because Museveni’s previous efforts to 
expand his power created the conditions that led to privatization in the first place.  
Vendors’ agency became manifest in different ways in different markets throughout the 
privatization process. In Owino, the previous leaders of the market formed a new group, SLOA, 
that was able to gain the support of the President and acquire the market’s lease from 
Basajjabalaba. In Kisekka, a group of vendors who were unhappy with NNRMVA’s deal with 
Rhino Investments and felt that they were being excluded from a redevelopment project that was 
being implemented by and for stall owners formed NROKKMVL, and after extensive protests, 
was able to gain control of the market. With the backing of Museveni, both SLOA and 
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NROKKMVL were able to challenge privatization and demand inclusion in urban development 
on their own terms. The experiences of Nakawa Market, in contrast, demonstrate that not all 
vendors could count on Presidential support for their claims. Even after the unpopular NMCSCSL 
lost its tender to manage Nakawa, the lack of clarity surrounding who could legitimately claim to 
represent the market’s vendors precluded presidential intervention. This is due to the fact that 
Nakawa is distinct from Owino and Kisekka in one obvious respect: the market was never sold to 
an outside investor, therefore meaning that there was no obvious cause that vendors could rally 
behind in order to gain the support of the President. Instead, Nakawa remained divided. The agency 
that vendors at Owino and Kisekka enjoyed came from the very fact that their markets were 
privatized and acquired by wealthy businesspeople with ties to the NRM; this, of course, was the 
result of the central government’s attempts to undermine the KCC, meaning agency existed for 
vendors to gain the support of the President to resolve an issue that the President, in effect, caused.  
The ability of market vendors to oppose privatization was therefore dependent on the 
particular political environment in which privatization occurred. When these political 
circumstances changed due to efforts by the Museveni and the NRM to further expand their power, 
the agency of market vendors duly contracted. The remainder of this chapter explores how this has 
taken place.  
 
Part II: Conflicts Surrounding Market Ownership and Development  
 The end of privatization did not signal an end to conflicts surrounding market ownership 
and development. While the intervention of the President has empowered vendors by allowing 
them to manage and develop their own markets, it has also promoted conflicts about who has the 
authority to represent vendors and what forms development should take. The privatization of 
markets in Kampala allowed vendors to rally behind a common cause that had, within markets, 
almost universal support; when vendors succeeded in overturning privatization, they lost their 
primary source of unity and rapidly became divided due to disagreements about what, precisely, 
management and development conducted by and in the interests of vendors entails. These conflicts 
have surrounded, and tend to exacerbate, the significant divisions that exist within markets. 
The transformation of markets into ‘modern’ shopping centres has become a major feature 
of urban development in Kampala. The central government has adopted ambitious plans to lead 
market development in the city and indeed across the country, and has received international 
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support for its efforts. The KCCA has been similarly active since its introduction in March 2011, 
but breaking from the policy that vendors should manage and develop their own markets, it has 
sought to assume direct control of Kampala’s markets as a means of improving revenue collection 
and realizing its developmental ambitions for the city. The political divisions that have emerged 
between the President and the KCCA have exacerbated the conflicts that are taking place within 
markets by allowing some groups of vendors to seek political support to advance their claims. The 
President and the KCCA, in turn, use the political support that vendors provide to solidify their 
own positions in the city’s markets.   
 The conflicts that have taken place in Kampala’s markets since the end of privatization 
have been defined by the expansion of political control by the President and the ruling party and 
the contraction of the agency of market vendors. The introduction of the policy that vendors should 
own and develop their own markets has reawakened and worsened divisions between market 
vendors, and both the President and the KCCA have been able to take advantage of these divisions 
and conflicts for their own purposes; for Museveni, they provide the opportunity to increase his 
own popularity amongst market vendors, and for the KCCA, they provide the opportunity to 
improve revenue collection while pursuing urban development goals. More generally, vendors’ 
associations commonly face co-option, neglect and repression, reflect ingrained market 
hierarchies, fail to represent the interests of their members and struggle to implement market 
management and development plans, significantly limiting their utility as vehicles for vendors’ 
agency. Market vendors have therefore seen their agency contract, but not disappear entirely, since 
some groups of vendors have been able to pursue their own management and development claims 
with the support of either the President or the KCCA, and elections offer periods political 
competition that vendors can take advantage of to make small gains. Still, the conflicts that have 
come to characterize markets in Kampala have, for most vendors, led to further marginalization. 
 
i. Market Development in Kampala 
Issues of development have long been central to the politics of markets in Kampala. 
Vendors’ groups such as UMVA at Owino and both NMVAL and NMCSCSL at Nakawa began 
to implement their own market redevelopment projects in the mid- to late-1990s, but these 
experienced mixed success, often due to poor, sometimes duplicitous management or problems 
with affordability. In 2004, the KCC affirmed its desire to transform markets into modern shopping 
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centres in its Kampala City Strategic Plan.96 These developmental ambitions played a role in the 
KCC’s privatization of the city’s markets, with major contractors such as Victoria International 
and Rhino Investments tasked with leading the redevelopment of the markets that they acquired. 
The vendors who successfully resisted the privatization of the city’s markets sought to not only 
manage their own markets, but also oversee their own development projects. Museveni’s 
intervention on their behalf gave them the opportunity to do so.  
The President’s support for the right of vendors to manage and develop their own markets 
was not the only step taken by the central government to play a more active role in market 
development. In 2007, the World Bank approved a 33.6 million USD loan to the government of 
Uganda to fund the Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure Development Project (KIIDP), a 
project aimed at improving aspects of infrastructure and service delivery in the city that have “not 
kept pace with its economic and demographic growth and have deteriorated over time.”97 KIIDP 
initially included plans to redevelop Kibuli and Kawempe markets, but these were abandoned due 
to growing construction costs, a lack of land availability and the initiation of a new market 
development project led by the African Development Bank (AfDB).98 In 2009, the central 
government agreed to a loan of 57 million USD from the African Development Fund (ADF), part 
of the AfDB Group, for a project known as Uganda Markets and Agricultural Trade Improvement 
Programme – 1 (MATIP-1) that was to address Uganda’s “poorly managed, dilapidated, 
overcrowded and overwhelmed market infrastructure” by assisting in the redevelopment of seven 
markets in urban areas around the country.99 More ambitious plans for MATIP-1 to cover 21 
markets, including six in Kampala—Busega, Kansanga, Kasubi, Nakulabye, Ntinda and 
Wandegeya—as part of long-term ambitions to redevelop 85 markets across the country were 
announced by the government in June 2010,100 and a loan of 10 million USD was obtained from 
the Arab Bank for Economic Development in Africa (BADEA) to support the redevelopment of 
                                                          
96 Ssenkabirwa, Al-Mahdi, “Lukwago Cries as Traders Get Market Title,” Daily Monitor, 5 December 2011.  
97 Quoted from “Implementation Completion and Results Report (IDA-43670) on a Credit in the Amount of SDR 22.0 
Million (US$ 33.6 Million Equivalent) to the Republic of Uganda for a Kampala Institutional and Infrastructure 
Development Adaptable Program Loan (APL) Project,” The World Bank, June 2014, 1.  
98 Ibid, 8. 
99 Quoted from “The Environmental and Social Development Plan: Summary: Markets and Agriculture Trade 
Improvement Project (MATIP-2),” African Development Bank Group, March 2014, 1-2. MATIP-1 is explored in 
detail in “Markets and Agricultural Trade Improvement Project I (MATIP-I) ADB Loan No.2100150019294: 
Financial Statements for the Year Ended 30th June 2014 Together with the Report and Opinion Thereon by the Auditor 
General,” Office of the Auditor General, Ministry of Local Government, 2014. 
100 Businge, Conan and Polly Kamukama, “Govt to Construct 85 Markets,” New Vision, 25 June 2010.  
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Busega, Kansanga, Kasubi and two other markets outside of the city (Kimaka in Jinja District and 
Nyendo in Masaka District).101 Uncertainties surrounding land ownership prevented 
redevelopment at Kansanga, Kasubi and Kimaka, while Busega and Nyendo experienced years of 
delays.102 MATIP-1 was eventually scaled back to again cover seven markets. Wandegeya Market 
was the only market redeveloped in Kampala under MATIP-1, with a new four-storey concrete 
shopping centre opening in January 2014.  
The central government secured a loan from AfDB to redevelop another 14 markets across 
the country under a second project, MATIP-2, in December 2014. The plan originally involved 
redeveloping Nakulabye and Ntinda in Kampala, but both were absent from the final list of 11 
markets when the 84.2 million USD loan was announced in April 2016.103 The ADF estimated that 
the 14-market plan would have directly benefited about 20,000 vendors and had indirect benefits 
for 4.5 million people.104 The potential benefits outlined by the ADF illustrate the breadth of 
reasons that are commonly used to justify market development. They can be divided into four 
categories:105   
 
1. Aesthetic and Functional Benefits: including a reduction in overcrowding; an 
“[i]mproved trading environment” due to “well and nicely constructed trading 
structures”;106 better market and community aesthetics due to environmental gains; 
improved security due to lighting and the enclosed nature of new structures; a reduced 
risk of fires due to better cooking facilities; a reduced risk of “contamination” due to 
the separation of goods;107 improved water supply and a reduced risk of water 
contamination; and improved sanitary systems. 
2. Socioeconomic Benefits: including increased employment opportunities in surrounding 
communities; higher incomes; improved “national cohesion and integration” due to the 
interactions involved in the functioning of a market;108 improved regional trade and 
                                                          
101 “Markets and Agricultural Trade Improvement Project I”, 3-4.  
102 Ibid.  
103 Odeng, Michael, “Gov’t to Spend sh316b on 11 Markets,” New Vision, 2 April 2016.  
104 “The Environmental and Social Development Plan”, 2. 
105 This list is based on ibid, 4.  
106 Quoted in ibid.  
107 Quoted in ibid. 
108 Quoted in ibid.  
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integration; and, in rural communities, reduced poverty due to improved access to 
markets for agricultural goods.   
3. Environmental Benefits: including improved drainage and waste management; reduced 
greenhouse gas emissions due to better waste management; and reduced pollution due 
to improved cooking systems.  
4. Health Benefits: including reduced disease transmission due to better ventilation and 
reduced congestion.  
 
The report also outlines negative effects of redevelopment, most notably the potential 
disruptions and loss of business that will result from the relocation of vendors during 
reconstruction.109 Other potential negative consequences, however, are not mentioned. The 
experiences of Wandegeya Market since its redevelopment under MATIP-1 provide a glimpse into 
what some of these might be. When Wandegeya was reopened in 2014, many vendors refused to 
return to the market, where the cost of rent had risen to 40,000-250,000 UGX per month.110 Even 
vendors who did return to the market have struggled to attract customers due to the higher prices 
that they are forced to charge in order to afford their rental fees. As of October 2015, less than two 
years after the opening of its new structure that is able to accommodate 1,100 vendors, Wandegeya 
was only 70% full.111 The national co-ordinator of MATIP has argued that in the markets 
redeveloped under MATIP-1, vendors’ incomes have grown by 14%, trading of agricultural goods 
has increased by 21% and, in urban areas, revenue collection has risen by 33%.112 In Wandegeya, 
at least, at least some of any rise in average income can be contributed to the absence of poorer 
vendors who cannot afford space in the new market. In the words of one respondent, the 
redevelopment of Wandegeya Market embodies a form of “governance without government” in 
which decisions are made by officials who neither represent the interests of nor respond to input 
from the vendors who are primarily affected by development.113 Wandegeya, according to another 
respondent, “was built like they were building a hotel” rather than a space for poor vendors to 
conduct trade in, reflecting the notion that practical functionality was sacrificed in favour of 
                                                          
109 Ibid, 3-4.  
110 Bwambale, Taddeo, “Wandegeya Market Opens on Jan 24,” New Vision, 16 January 2014.  
111 Mulondo, Lawrence, “Anxiety as Traders Abandons Wandegeya Market [sic],” New Vision, 29 October 2015. This 
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idealized understandings of how a ‘modern’ market should look and how it should operate.114 At 
the time of writing, the implementation of MATIP-2 is set to begin in the immediate future. 
The support that the central government has received for its market development ambitions 
highlights the crucial role that international donors play in the country’s political economy. 
Throughout its time in power, a key pillar of the NRM’s legitimacy both domestically and 
internationally has been its apparent ability to lead economic development. For foreign donors, the 
ruling party’s implementation of extensive economic liberalization reforms inspired a desire to 
cast the country as ‘success story’ of structural adjustment in Africa, a fact that, along with its 
support for American and European foreign policy objectives, has caused donors to neglect 
concerns about governance.115 Donors have since played a major role in solidifying the position 
of the NRM, providing it with significant financial backing.116 By funding the central 
government’s market development plans, they further strengthen its legitimacy.  
Market vendors and associations are always conscious of and forced to respond to the 
pressures of development. Like street vendors, market vendors struggle to insert themselves into 
urban development in a rapidly growing city that is transforming in a way that threatens to exclude 
the urban poor for their apparent failure to meet the aesthetic, organizational and economic 
standards of modernity. In the words of one leader at Owino Market: “The city is changing so fast, 
at some point we were told ‘you are not supposed to be in the city centre’.”117 The transformation 
of the city’s markets into well ordered, well designed shopping centres presents an opportunity for 
vendors to participate in urban development, but as the redevelopment of Wandegeya Market 
suggests, this opportunity potentially comes at a cost. The constant negotiation of the opportunities 
and costs that development entails has led to major conflicts within markets in Kampala.  
 
ii. The Introduction of the KCCA 
 The introduction of the KCCA in 2011 transformed the political landscape of Kampala. 
Intent on avoiding the revenue problems that affected the KCC, the KCCA has made improved 
local revenue performance a top priority. The KCCA’s current Strategic Plan, which covers the 
                                                          
114 Interview, chairperson, Nakawa Market Traders’ Development Association, 29 July 2015.  
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117 Group interview, St. Balikuddembe Market Stalls, Space and Lock-Up Shops Owners Association Limited, Owino 
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period of 2014/2015 to 2018/2019, lists “[enhancing] the growth in local revenue mobilized” as a 
primary objective in achieving “Operational Excellence” while acknowledging that the local 
government’s developmental ambitions “will not be achieved without significant investment” in 
“revenue enhancement measures” and the “introduction of new alternative financing measures”.118 
The KCCA’s efforts to improve revenue collection have been extremely successful, as illustrated 
by the dramatic growth of local revenue in Kampala since the 2010/2011 fiscal year (the final year 
of the KCC): 
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118 Quoted from “Strategic Plan 2014/15-2018/19”, 14 and 87. 
119 Adapted from email interview, KCCA spokesperson, 12 February 2016.  












A 164.57% increase in revenue collection between 2010/2011 and 2014/2015 represents a 
major departure from the years of low growth and chronic underperformance under the KCC. 
While the importance of the KCCA’s concerted efforts to improve revenue collection should not 
be diminished, it is also worth noting that revenue growth has been aided by the fact that the clear 
political incentive that the central government had to undermine the opposition-led KCC no longer 
exists with the centrally controlled KCCA; in fact, the central government now has an obvious 
incentive to ensure that the local government in Kampala is both well funded and effectively run 
in order to contrast the performance of the ruling party with that of the opposition. This does not 
mean, however, that the relationship between the KCCA and the central government has been free 
from political conflict.   
Markets have played an important role in the KCCA’s improved revenue performance. 
Money from Kampala’s markets mainly comes to the KCCA in three forms: market dues, ground 
rent and the trading licenses that vendors are supposed to purchase. Market dues brought in 1.88 
billion UGX for the KCCA in 2014/2015, a 150.66% increase from the final year of the KCC. As 
major leaseholders in the city, market vendors also contribute to a significant share of the ground 
rent that the KCCA collects; for example, the combined 700 million UGX that vendors at Owino 
and Kisekka pay each year alone makes up 11.29% of the value of the total ground rent collected 
in 2014/15. Similarly, the market vendors who purchase trading licenses contribute to what is the 
third largest source of revenue for the KCCA. Markets, of course, are primary sites of informal 
economic activity in the city, and many vendors do not purchase trading licenses, therefore 
meaning that there is a significant gap between the actual and potential amount of revenue that the 
KCCA collects from markets. The KCCA is committed to closing this gap by bringing markets 
and their vendors within the city’s regulatory and tax structure. The focus on markets as an 
important revenue source, however, has drawn criticism. Lukwago, for example, argues that the 
KCCA is wrongly prioritizing revenue collection over markets’ other important functions: “They 
put on lenses of revenue. That is the problem we’re facing. With every problem it is about how to 
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generate revenue. It is not about service delivery, it is not about helping people. It is about revenue. 
It is very unfortunate.”120 
The KCCA not only wishes to improve revenue collection in markets, however, but also 
wishes to take over the city’s markets and manage them directly. It has a strong legal basis for its 
claims. Echoing the Local Governments Act, the KCCA Act reaffirms that the city government 
has the power to “[e]stablish, acquire, erect, maintain, promote, assist or control” markets “with 
the participation of the citizens”,121 and devolves the administration of markets to the city division 
level (LC3).122 According to the KCCA’s spokesperson, the KCCA Act “mandates us to develop 
and manage all the markets in the city”, even if “some markets like Kisekka and Owino were 
leased to private individuals and associations” due to “political inconveniences that were left by 
our predecessors – Kampala City Council”.123 The KCCA is currently seeking to resolve the 
“impasse” surrounding market ownership “using legal means.”124  
The KCCA’s desire to manage and develop markets is in keeping with its broader urban 
development plans for the city. Markets, in their current form, do not meet the standards of 
aesthetic and economic modernity that the KCCA has set for Kampala, so the reconstruction of 
markets as concrete shopping centres is seen as part of a broader “bid to transform the City”.125 A 
Physical Development Plan commissioned by the KCCA describes how the presence of markets 
in the city centre “physically degrades the CBD [Central Business District], disrupts its functioning 
and compounds its traffic problems, all detracting from the amenity of the resident client.”126 It 
also claims that markets “constitute serious health and fire hazards” and are “totally inefficient, 
resulting in unnecessarily high cumulative mark-ups, despite the fierce competition, inflating food 
costs, whilst still only providing the individual worker, trader and agricultural producer with 
subsistence level income.”127 Developing the city’s markets will not only address some of these 
problems, but will also contribute to the ‘trade order’ that the KCCA aspires to achieve in the city 
by creating space for evicted street vendors. Part of the KCCA’s current Strategic Plan involves 
the redevelopment of 11 markets in the city, including both Nakawa and Usafi, into “modern and 
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multi-purpose business centre facilities”128 with the purpose of “[creating] organized work places, 
setting minimum market standards in the City, [and promoting] trade order and formality of 
business in the City.”129 Wandegeya Market is held as a model of what the KCCA aspires to 
achieve. The project is estimated to cost 38.5 million USD between 2014 and 2018.130 At the time 
of writing, only one of these markets, Busega, has undergone any reconstruction.  
The KCCA does not aim to develop all markets in Kampala, however, but only those that 
have been gazetted and thus officially designated as trading areas. It plans to remove all ungazetted 
markets from the city centre.131 This policy also follows from the KCCA’s urban management and 
development ambitions, reflecting a desire to control how and by whom particular city spaces can 
be used and to limit where informal vending can take place. Park Yard, as the only major 
ungazetted market in the city centre, has become the focal point of this policy. The KCCA has 
declared Park Yard to be illegal,132 and Musisi has asked Parliament to support plans to relocate 
the market in order to “restore trade order and development control” in the city centre.133 Museveni 
has ordered the KCCA to gazette the market, an instruction that the KCCA has failed to heed.134 
On February 7, 2017, Kamya issued a directive ordering vendors at Park Yard to leave the market 
within 30 days in order to allow for the redevelopment of Nakivubo Stadium, and early in the 
morning of February 27, KCCA and police officers demolished the market, displacing its vendors 
and destroying their stalls and merchandise.135 Kamya apparently ordered the demolition after 
learning that later that day a group of vendors would secure a court order against their relocation.136 
Efforts led by Lukwago to prevent the demolition failed.137 
Like its efforts to eradicate street vending, the KCCA’s market development plans have 
major class dimensions. Informal vending represents a key livelihood strategy for a significant 
portion of the urban poor who otherwise have few opportunities to participate in economic life in 
                                                          
128 Quoted from email interview, KCCA spokesperson, 12 February 2016. 
129 Quoted from Kampala Capital City Authority, 34.  
130 Ibid, xvi.  
131 Walusimbi, Deo, “Musisi to Move Markets, Repair Old Taxi Park,” The Observer, 11 April 2014.  
132 Mukisa, Farahani and Al-Mahdi Ssenkabirwa, “Park Yard Market is Illegal, Says KCCA,” Daily Monitor, 9 
January 2014.  
133 Quoted in Walusimbi.  
134 Mukisa and Ssenkabirwa. 
135 Atim, Judith and Ali Mivule, “Lukwago Calls Crisis Meeting As Police Demolish Park Yard Market,” Daily 
Monitor, 27 February 2017; and Imaka, Isaac, “Minister Kamya Asks for Parliament “Handshake” for Park Yard 
Eviction,” Daily Monitor, 2 March 2017.  
136 Imaka (2017).  
137 Atim and Mivule.  
Young  181 
 
the city. What informal vendors desire is to be able to engage in their activities under favourable 
conditions and free from state repression, a desire that fundamentally surrounds access to space—
whether on the streets or in markets—in the city centre. Members of Kampala’s expanding middle 
and upper classes, in contrast, desire a city that is aesthetically pleasing, decongested and well 
ordered, and where economic activity is regulated by a state that creates the necessary conditions 
for formal businesses to thrive. For them, informal vendors threaten such aspirations. This is the 
vision of Kampala that the KCCA aggressively pursues. Driving street vendors into markets and 
developing markets into ‘modern’ shopping centres are important components of broader efforts 
by both the central and local government to transform Kampala into a ‘modern’, developed city. 
For the NRM, urban management and development in Kampala have both economic and political 
dimensions: the ruling party’s apparent success in leading economic development has been key to 
its legitimacy throughout its time in power, and now that it has taken over the city with the 
introduction of the KCCA, it is intent on contrasting its performance with that of the opposition-
led KCC. In the pursuit of its urban management and development ambitions, the government, in 
the words of one street vendor, is “chasing the people out of the city.”138 
 One of the most notable features of the KCCA’s market policy is the extent to which it is 
so clearly at odds with the ideal of vendor ownership that the President has long advocated and the 
central government has adopted as official policy. This is particularly curious considering the 
extent to which the KCCA is controlled by the central government. Museveni almost certainly 
could influence the KCCA to change its position at any time, or even replace Musisi with a more 
amenable Executive Director since he alone has the power to appoint the head of the KCCA’s 
technocratic wing. The fact that he has let this conflict continue reveals much about his primary 
political interests. In the words of one interview respondent: “The President is a politician. He lets 
Jennifer Musisi do something extreme, but when the people rise up he can come in and pretend to 
care. So [market ownership] is not a policy question, it is a political question.”139 If the KCCA 
were run by leaders who respected and supported the right of vendors to manage and develop their 
own markets, then Museveni would not be able to position himself as the champion of market 
vendors in the city. In such a scenario, conflicts surrounding market ownership and development 
would possibly decrease due to the fact that vendors could no longer seek political support for 
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diverging claims, but these are conflicts that the President actually benefits from, giving him little 
reason to use his considerable powers to influence the KCCA. Policy coherence or effectiveness 
are not Museveni’s primary goals; what he values most in the city’s market conflicts is to appeal 
to a major group of poor urban voters in order to allow him to attract support at the expense of the 
opposition. The KCCA, in contrast, is unaffected by electoral concerns, so is instead mainly 
focused on implementing its development plans and boosting revenue collection to ensure that it 
is adequately funded. Neither side therefore has any incentive to change its position.  
The KCCA has encountered significant obstacles in its efforts to claim control of the 
markets in Kampala. While it can point to the KCCA Act, the Local Governments Act and the 
Markets Act to support its position, its claims are not supported by the President’s directive on 
market management or the Local Governments (Kampala City Council) (Markets) Ordinance. In 
addition, the KDLB has actively opposed the KCCA’s claims under its leader and prominent FDC 
supporter Yusuf Nsibambi, who claims that the Constitution and the 1998 Land Act invest control 
of the country’s land in the people of Uganda rather than any government authority, and that the 
KDLB has the right to manage land in the city on the people’s behalf.140 The inconsistent and 
contradictory legislation that is relevant to the city’s markets provides an opportunity for interested 
parties both within the government or markets themselves to bolster competing claims.  
 
iii. Conflicts in Three Markets 
Markets are complex institutions with their own internal hierarchies, socioeconomic 
divisions, political allegiances and competing interests. The policy of allowing vendors to manage 
and develop their own markets has led to major conflicts between groups of vendors that are shaped 
by many of these pre-existing points of difference, while the political divisions that have emerged 
between the President and the KCCA have furthered internal conflicts by allowing competing 
parties to seek support to advance their management and development claims. These dynamics 
have played out differently in markets throughout the city, as illustrated by the recent conflicts that 
have unfolded in Owino, Kisekka and Nakawa. Examining these conflicts reveals three different 
ways in which the state has impacted the agency of market vendors: in Owino, the President and 
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the KCCA have supported competing management and development claims; in Kisekka, the 
President and the KCCA have refrained from offering similar support due to the market’s ties to 
the opposition; and in Nakawa, the KCCA has used conflicts between vendors as a pretense to take 
over the market. Groups of vendors have, in some instances, been able to exercise agency by taking 
advantage of political support offered by the President or the KCCA, but in general, the efforts by 
Museveni and the NRM to expand their power has resulted in further marginalization. 
 
a) Owino Market 
Although the policy of leasing markets to vendors was adopted in 2007, SLOA did not 
secure the lease for Owino Market until March 2010.141 SLOA had the support of the President 
and, eventually, even Sebaggala after the Mayor again changed his position on market privatization 
by reverting to the opposition that he expressed during his campaign, but some within the KCC, 
including Kijjambu, the Town Clerk, argued that the official tendering process still had to be 
followed.142 Museveni, of course, ultimately prevailed, but it took time for his orders to be 
implemented.  
SLOA has also faced significant opposition from within Owino Market itself. 
Significantly, SLOA is a company rather than a market association, meaning that it has 
shareholders in whose interests it acts and is not necessarily open and inclusive. The company 
claims that anyone who owns a shop or stall in the market can become a shareholder for 10,000 
UGX a share, but based on its own estimates, about 80% of the vendors in Owino market are 
renters rather than owners, meaning the list of potential shareholders is limited to only about 
10,000 vendors.143 It is unclear, however, if this is true; since SLOA is a limited company, critics 
say that it has no more than 155 shareholders, and that SLOA misled vendors when collecting 
money for redevelopment by suggesting that contributions to redevelopment were actually share 
purchases.144 Regardless of which of these claims is accurate, the vast majority of vendors in a 
market with approximately 50,000 people are not and cannot become shareholders in SLOA, a fact 
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that raises significant doubts about the company’s ability to represent Owino’s vendors as well as 
its right to manage and develop the market on their behalf.  
Dissatisfied with SLOA’s exclusionary structure, a group of vendors led by John Bosco 
Kivumbi formed a rival co-operative known as the St. Balikuddembe (Owino) Market Produce, 
Traders and Vendors Co-Operative Society (SOPTVC) “to fight for vendors’ rights” and demand 
inclusive management and development processes.145 In December 2009, SOPTVC obtained a 
court order blocking SLOA from taking over the lease to the market, and in February 2010, SLOA 
and SOPTVC arrived at a consent agreement under which the two groups would merge and jointly 
manage the market. Both of these, however, were violated when SLOA was awarded the lease to 
Owino Market in March 2010. The directors of SOPTVC then asked to be given control of a two-
acre section of the market to develop independently of SLOA, but their request was not granted.146 
Disagreements between SLOA and SOPTVC continued, and in March 2011, SLOA obtained a 
loan from DFCU Bank for which the bank requested the title for the market as collateral. SOPTVC 
again accused SLOA of violating both the December 2009 court order and the February 2010 
consent agreement in obtaining the lease, for which the directors of SLOA added the word ‘Space’ 
to the company’s name, changing it to St. Balikuddembe Market Stalls, Space and Lock-Up Shops 
Owners Association Limited (SSLOA).147 The bank ultimately accepted a different land title as 
collateral due to delays in acquiring the lease from the KCC.148 
Once it gained control of Owino, SLOA began to implement its plans for developing the 
market, which is a condition that it must meet to extend its lease to 99 years. Its original plan was 
to build a six-storey structure on the site of the current market at a cost of 120 million USD, with 
its approximately 10,000 members each contributing 1 million UGX.149 At the time the lease was 
awarded, Kayongo claimed that SLOA had already collected 7 billion UGX, or 1 million UGX 
from 7,000 vendors, and there were reports that the market would be demolished for reconstruction 
as early as October 2010;150 accounts, however, were contradictory, and according to another, 
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SLOA had just 1.6 billion UGX saved and was aiming to begin reconstruction in 2011.151 
Uncertainty over how much money SLOA had collected led to demands by SOPTVC that the 
company account for its finances,152 and the leaders of SOPTVC still maintain that the money 
collected for reconstruction was never used for its intended purposes.153 SSLOA later revised its 
initial plans, which at the time of fieldwork involved building a ten-storey shopping centre, with 
the first three stories reserved for current vendors and the next seven open to new tenants that the 
updated facilities will attract. Construction was supposed to start in 2014, but was again pushed 
back due to inadequate finances, so SSLOA was still looking for financial support in the form of 
loans on favourable terms that would not compromise its ownership position. According to the 
company’s plan, construction was to take place in stages over three years so vendors were not 
displaced, and was to cost 200 million USD.154 In 2015, however, SSLOA announced that it had 
found an investor who would provide 400 million USD toward a new 10-year reconstruction plan 
that is to be undertaken in two stages: in the first, lasting three years, a market where vendors can 
relocate to during reconstruction is to be built; and in the second, lasting seven years, Owino is to 
be rebuilt as a 13-storey structure that will accommodate over 40,000 vendors in 14,000 shops and 
lock-ups as well as an open space floor. The financer of the project has been granted a 20-year 
lease. SSLOA has reached an agreement with Ketza International, a Canadian construction 
company, to carry out the first phase of the project.155 At the time of writing, no work has yet 
begun on the redevelopment of Owino Market. 
SSLOA’s directors claim that the company’s “vision” is for all current vendors “to own a 
stall” in the redeveloped market, and state that “[t]he idea is good and the vendors like it.”156 In 
order for this to happen, however, vendors either have to make their 1 million UGX contribution 
to redevelopment or, after the new market is built, purchase a stall at a price that is not yet 
determined and will depend on the ultimate cost of construction.157 SOPTVC accuses SSLOA of 
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hiding the true costs of a stall in the redeveloped market, which it estimates will be close to 100 
million UGX for a ten-by-ten foot space.158 Again, regardless of which of these claims is accurate, 
even 1 million UGX is a significant amount of money for many market vendors, making securing 
a stall in the redeveloped market a remote prospect. SSLOA’s directors admit that not all vendors 
will immediately be able to afford space in the newly developed market, but suggest that while 
“they can’t come on board at once”, they will eventually be able to raise enough money for a 
stall.159 This ‘vision’, however, seems unrealistic, and many vendors who currently earn their 
living at Owino Market are at risk of being left behind by SSLOA’s ambitious plans.  
SOPTVC continues to oppose SSLOA’s development plans, which it views as too costly 
and contrary to the interests of the majority of vendors in the market. Given SSLOA’s conduct 
(and similar experiences at other markets), SOPTVC’s leaders have come to believe that the policy 
of awarding market leases to vendors was implemented improperly and with little accountability, 
and that as a result it has been hijacked by individuals who seek to manage and develop markets 
in a way that is self-interested rather than to the benefit of market vendors as a whole. Markets, 
the leaders of SOPTVC insist, primarily exist “for poor people who can’t afford to go and rent in 
arcades”, so if they are transformed into nearly identical structures that are similarly unaffordable, 
they will end up losing the very quality that sustains them and allows them to provide crucial 
livelihood support for a large segment of the city’s urban poor.160 With no affordable market space 
available, vendors would be forced to find alternative sites to trade their goods or, if none were 
available, adopt a new form of economic activity or leave the city altogether. The position of 
SOPTVC is clear: “Markets should be owned and governed by the government”, and “[i]f there is 
any redevelopment, it should be done by the government, because vendors can’t afford it.”161 
Markets, SOPTVC holds, are public assets and should be managed as such in a way that prioritizes 
all of the vendors who occupy them rather than small groups of owners, and the government is 
best positioned to undertake such a task. The leaders of SSLOA reject the idea that the government 
should control markets, and argue that rent is significantly higher in markets that are owned by the 
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KCCA.162 Kayongo has also accused SOPTVC of “being used by politicians and other rich people 
in town who are plotting to grab the market land and build arcades”.163 The leaders of SOPTVC, 
in contrast, point to the experience of Shauri Yako Market, where an attempt by vendors to develop 
the market “failed” and the market is now owned by a wealthy “tycoon”, and claim that SSLOA 
has brought in outside investors (mainly “foreigners”) for financial backing.164 Each therefore 
accuses the other of failing to act in the interests of the market’s vendors.  
Both SSLOA and SOPTVC have sought political support for their respective causes. 
Kayongo continues to be the chairperson of SSLOA, and since the company officially holds the 
lease to Owino, can claim to be the de jure chairperson of the market itself. He is also the head of 
Kampala Joint Market Vendors Association (KJMVA), a group that unites many of the market 
associations in the city. Most significantly, Kayongo is now the official Presidential Advisor on 
Markets, making him Museveni’s chief source of information on matters concerning informal 
markets in Uganda. It is a position that, in January 2014, came with a monthly salary of over 2.79 
million UGX.165 The leaders of SOPTVC believe that Kayongo used his position to exert improper 
influence in order to secure the lease to the market, compromising the fairness of the tendering 
process.166 They also believe that Kayongo regularly portrays events in the market “to his own 
advantage”, making it difficult for the President to get an accurate picture of what is actually 
happening in Owino;167 this is not merely a partisan sentiment, but one that is shared by ‘ordinary’ 
vendors as well.168 In fact, interview respondents both within and outside of Owino Market 
frequently expressed the idea that by appointing him as a Presidential Advisor, Museveni has 
effectively co-opted Kayongo, who no longer represents the interests of market vendors (if indeed 
he ever did). Kayongo himself has abandoned all pretense of political impartiality and has become 
an outspoken advocate of the NRM, campaigning for the ruling party during elections as a part of 
Museveni’s efforts to stir up support amongst market vendors.  
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While SSLOA enjoys the support of the President, SOPTVC, in contrast, has sought the 
backing of the KCCA. The association’s position that markets should be owned and managed by 
the government rather than vendors has made the KCCA a natural ally, and the two have been on 
the same side in conflicts surrounding the management and development of Owino Market. In 
December 2011, SOPTVC led a boycott against paying market dues to SSLOA, claiming that only 
the KCCA had the right to collect money from vendors.169 The KCCA, SSLOA and SOPTVC 
attempted to resolve their disputes in a meeting in January 2012 where, according to the leaders of 
SOPTVC, the parties reached an agreement to form a new group to manage the market that would 
be led by a chairperson from the KCCA and three representatives each from SSLOA and SOPTVC. 
SSLOA, however, reneged on the agreement, claiming that it had sole ownership of the market, 
causing the KCCA to take over Owino, with the support of SOPTVC, in March 2012.170 The 
KCCA’s control of the market, however, quickly met with major opposition from within the 
government. In May 2012, the KDLB overturned its offer to lease Owino to the KCCA and ordered 
that the market be returned to its vendors.171 Museveni backed the KDLB’s decision, with his Press 
Secretary commenting that “whoever does not realize that Museveni always sides with the ordinary 
people, makes a big mistake.”172 In July 2012, the Solicitor General informed the KCCA of the 
vendors’ right to manage Owino,173 and the following month, the Inspector General of Government 
(IGG) repeated the order that the market be returned to SSLOA, which, the IGG claimed, held a 
valid lease for the market.174 SSLOA obtained a court order to be given the market lease from the 
KCCA in February 2014.175  
Owino’s internal conflicts therefore became a proxy struggle between the President, with 
his position that markets should be owned by vendors, and the KCCA, with its ambitions to 
improve revenue collection and oversee urban development. Both SSLOA and SOPTVC were able 
to seek political support to further their own causes surrounding the ownership and development 
of the market, and able to provoke major interventions by their political allies for their own ends. 
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Led by Kayongo, SSLOA has secured the continuing support of the President, who both ordered 
the lease to be given to SSLOA after the KCC’s attempt to privatize the market and backed the 
KDLB’s decision to overturn the KCCA’s lease offer after the local government tried to take over 
Owino. SOPTVC has been similarly successful in encouraging intervention by the KCCA, even if 
these interventions have ultimately failed to overturn SSLOA’s management claims and 
development plans. According to the leaders of SOPTVC, conflicts over ownership, the payment 
of fees and the treatment of vendors by SSLOA—with claims that those who opposed the company 
faced harassment, violence and the confiscation of goods—led to protests that served as “a call for 
the government to come in and save the vendors from the suffering.”176 These actions caused the 
KCCA to pursue mediation in January 2012 and to take over the market in March 2012. After the 
KCCA’s authority over the market was undermined, however, attempts to provoke intervention 
were less successful. In February 2013, another group, Owino Twegatte Development Association, 
presented a petition to Parliament requesting that the KCCA take control of the market and hold 
elections for a new market leadership,177 proposals that Parliament ultimately rejected due to an 
apparent concern that the government could be forced to make a compensation payment to SSLOA 
similar to the one that it had made to Basajjabalaba.178 In October 2014, SOPTVC, under its new 
leader Joseph Lwanga, led a group of market vendors to the KCCA headquarters in central 
Kampala and demanded that the KCCA use its powers to stop SSLOA from collecting market 
dues. Musisi declared that SSLOA was collecting dues illegally, a claim that Kayongo rejected.179 
According to the leaders of SOPTVC, however, they were at least able to convince the KCCA to 
replace the police officers at the market, who were, they argued, supportive of SSLOA and 
mistreating vendors.180 
Owino Market remains divided between SSLOA and SOPTVC. At present, however, it 
appears that SSLOA may have effectively seen off all major challenges to its leadership; the 
KCCA lost its struggle with SSLOA over control of the market, which is perhaps not surprising 
considering that the company enjoys the support of the President, and SSLOA is apparently ready 
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to begin its long-awaited development project, the cost and scale of which has steadily increased 
since it first acquired the lease to Owino Market in 2010. The leaders of SOPTVC have long 
warned that a large majority of the market’s vendors are being excluded from an expensive and 
unrepresentative development process; they may soon learn if such concerns were warranted.  
 
b) Kisekka Market 
After acquiring the lease for Kisekka Market, NROKKMVL wasted little time in beginning 
to implement its major development project.181 The association devised plans to construct a four-
storey shopping centre with 2,500 shops that will later be expanded to seven stories. A shop in the 
redeveloped market will have an average price of 1,400 USD per square metre on the ground floor 
and basement, meaning a standard shop of ten square metres will cost 14,000 USD (which was, at 
the time of research, equal to marginally less than 50 million UGX). Shops on higher floors will 
be slightly less expensive. The chairperson claims that there will not be significant changes to the 
composition of Kisekka, but did acknowledge that the new market would likely have fewer 
“minor” traders.182 NROKKMVL contracted Roko Construction Company to carry out the 
redevelopment process, which the association estimates will take 14-16 months to complete once 
construction begins.  
NROKKMVL quickly came to face significant time and money pressures in its efforts to 
develop Kisekka.183 By August 2015, the association had raised about 12 billion UGX, and after 
paying for the lease to the market, gave the remainder of its savings (equal to about 3 million USD) 
to Roko Construction Company. It still, however, needed to raise another 20 million USD (equal 
to 71.36 billion UGX at the time). Realizing that it was unable to rely on contributions from the 
market’s vendors alone, the association began to seek out external sources of funding. It found 
interest rates on bank loans too high, however, so it instead began looking for a private investor to 
provide a loan at an affordable rate of 3-5%, but has so far only found “pretenders”.184 The 
association also became willing to sell shops to non-vendors who are able to pay 50% of the cost 
of the stall upfront (vendors are asked to pay 25%). At the time of research, five hundred units in 
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the redeveloped market remained unsold. NROKKMVL, the association’s chairperson admits, is 
“running out of time” due to that fact that its lease for the market expires in 2016 and will not be 
renewed by the KCCA if it has not done a satisfactory job in leading the market’s 
redevelopment.185 The chairperson laments that “people have the money, but they fear the politics” 
due to the concern that the government could reclaim the land and “sabotage” the project.186 He is 
confident, however, that these fears will diminish once construction begins.  
NROKKMVL has also come under pressure from internal challenges. A group has 
emerged within NROKKMVL that opposes the association’s development plans, and by claiming 
to represent the majority of the market’s vendors who were being excluded from a development 
process that is being run by and in the interests of a small group of wealthy individuals, its position 
is highly reminiscent of that of NROKKMVL in the association’s previous conflicts with 
NNRMVA and Rhino Investments.187 The leaders of this rival group believe that NROKKMVL’s 
redevelopment project is “going to fail” because it is “too expensive for the vendors”, and claim 
that “[m]ost people” would prefer for the market to be run by the KCCA.188 The leaders of 
NROKKMVL “thought they could do it,” the chairperson of the rival group claims, but vendors 
have since “realized they can’t afford it” and now need the government to “give a helping hand”.189 
Members of the group apparently supported a different redevelopment plan, but claim that Roko’s 
bid was accepted because the company paid a bribe that the preferred bidder would not.190 The 
chairperson of NROKKMVL rejects the rival group’s assertion that the plans to redevelop Kisekka 
will fail, arguing that “they oppose [redevelopment] because they don’t have the money” to 
contribute to it.191 The difference, he argues, is that while opponents think that the association 
should have investors before it begins work on the new market, the leaders of NROKKMVL 
instead believe that its financial position will improve as redevelopment progresses and investors 
gain confidence in the project.192 
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Whether or not NORKKMVL will be able to afford its redevelopment plan is not the only 
point of contention within the association, however. There is also a significant amount of 
dissatisfaction surrounding the decision to sell space in the new market to non-vendors. Critics of 
the policy argue that it is “robbing the poor vendor and enriching the land-grabber”, and suggest 
that NROKKMVL has been taken over by a small group “with the help of land-grabbers” and “rich 
people” who are “dispossessing thousands and thousands of people” in the market.193 It is also, 
they claim, driving up the price of stalls in the new market. In the words of the chairperson of the 
rival group: “The rich men can come in and buy twenty lock-ups. Those could be rented out at a 
lower fee. He comes in and pays for twenty or thirty lock-ups, but then he rents them out at a 
higher rate.”194 It is generally seen as unfair, according to a member of the rival group, that an 
‘ordinary’ vendor “can’t even afford one shop, but then someone comes in and buys fifty shops.”195 
Critics claim that many outside investors have purchased multiple shops in the new market, 
“driving out” the vendors who should be benefitting from the redevelopment process; “if the 
project goes on like that,” one suggests, “we will end up becoming tenants on our own land.”196 
Given that vendors at Kisekka strongly resisted an attempt to privatize the market only a few years 
ago—the very process, coincidentally, that brought NROKKMVL to power—the widespread 
unwillingness to see a large portion of the redeveloped market owned by outside investors is 
unsurprising. Even supporters of NROKKMVL’s development plans are aware that selling shops 
to outside investors is an unpopular idea, but maintain that it is necessary since vendors have 
proven to be unable to pay for the new market on their own.197 
The conflicts taking place within NROKKMVL raise important questions about what 
constitutes development, who has the authority to design and implement development projects and 
whom exactly development is for. Answers to these questions within the market are largely split 
along socioeconomic lines: the leaders of NROKKMVL hold that Kisekka should be redeveloped 
into a ‘modern’ shopping centre with the aid of external financial support, while the rival group 
that has emerged within the association holds the view that most of the market’s vendors are being 
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excluded from a development process that is being carried out in a way that benefits wealthy 
outside investors. The rival group, its chairperson claims, is “very strong on the ground” with the 
market’s vendors, but the leaders of NROKKMVL are supported by “the rich”, whose interests 
the association’s policies primarily serve, and therefore have access to more resources.198 In the 
words of one member of the rival group within NROKKMVL: “No one is against development, 
but the question is who benefits from that development?”199 This is a sentiment that is widely 
shared amongst vendors who are not opposed to the concept of development itself, but are 
dissatisfied that the current development project being implemented by NROKKMVL does not 
respect their interests or the role that they should play in market development, and instead 
surrounds the construction of a new market (possibly for self-interested financial reasons) that 
many will be unable to afford space in.200 Many vendors would agree with the view that the “policy 
of enabling vendors to run their markets was a great idea,” but it has been unfortunately been 
“hijacked” by “corrupt vendor associations” like NROKKMVL.201 The leaders of NROKKMVL, 
the chairperson of the rival group claims, “should leave because they are failing development.”202 
It is an opinion that attracts a lot of support.  
Conflicts surrounding the redevelopment of Kisekka escalated significantly when, in 
December 2014, NROKKMVL demolished Kisekka Market to begin construction on its planned 
shopping centre. The rival group within the association had obtained a court order to prevent the 
demolition in September of the same year, but the ruling was ignored by the leaders of the 
association. The rival group also accuses the leaders of NROKKMVL of violating an agreement 
that the market would be redeveloped in stages so that vendors would not be displaced while 
construction was taking place.203 The association initially planned to temporarily relocate vendors 
to the nearby Namayiba Bus Terminal, but it was later revealed that the site was far too small to 
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accommodate all of the vendors who would be displaced from Kisekka.204 With their old market 
spaces gone and without any readily available affordable alternatives, most vendors moved to the 
arcades located across the street from where Kisekka Market formerly stood, which is now an 
empty lot awaiting construction. Space in the arcades, however, is extremely expensive, averaging 
between 500,000 and 1.5 million UGX per month, causing many vendors to be “pushed out of the 
city” due to “excessive rent”.205 Compounding the problem, the owners of the arcades actually 
raised rental rates following the arrival of vendors from Kisekka due to increased demand for 
space.206 Delays in construction are only prolonging the amount of time that vendors have to spend 
in the arcades, causing them an even greater financial strain. It is also difficult for vendors to pay 
for both rent in the arcades as well as space in the new market, and money that could otherwise be 
saved in a more favourable location is instead spent on rent, further diminishing vendors’ prospects 
of participating in redevelopment. The demolition of Kisekka Market and the high cost of rent 
remain major sources of grievance for vendors, and contribute to dissatisfaction with the market 
development project in general.207 
Disputes within NROKKMVL eventually resulted in leadership struggles within the 
association.208 The leaders of NROKKMVL were elected in 2007 to serve for a period of three 
years, but according to leaders of the rival group, never called an Annual General Meeting to stand 
for re-election. In January 2015, members of the rival group wrote to the Registrar General, 
Bemanya Twebaze, requesting permission to call an extraordinary meeting to hold new elections. 
Their request was granted, and at the meeting, held the following month, attendees passed a motion 
of no confidence against the leaders of NROKKMVL and elected a new board to lead the 
association. The Registrar General then ordered that a new meeting be called because some 
attendees were not properly registered as members of the association. Members of the rival group 
called a second meeting in May 2015, apparently under the impression that the leaders of 
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NROKKMVL refused to do so themselves, at which attendees again elected a new board with 21 
members, including both of the representatives of the association’s management that were present, 
as well as a new chairperson, Geoffrey Kayita. The leaders of the association did hold their own 
meeting, however, which members of the rival group say they were not informed of and did not 
have a quorum. As a result, two different groups exist in the market with both claiming to be the 
legitimate representatives of the market’s vendors and the current leaders of NROKKMVL. At the 
time of research the original leaders of NROKKMVL were still working to implement the 
association’s development plan.  
What is particularly notable about Kisekka is that, in contrast to Owino, divisions within 
the market have not resulted in the emergence of extensive political linkages between groups of 
vendors and either the central and local government. This is due to the fact that the market is seen 
as a major centre—quite possibly the major centre—of opposition support in the city. The market’s 
political image prevents vendors in the market from being able to attract support from either 
Museveni or the KCCA, neither of which has any interest in aiding supporters of the opposition. 
The political connections that do exist in the market are with opposition politicians, particularly 
Besigye and Lukwago, who use the market to rally support (as discussed below), but given the 
limited political power of the opposition both in Uganda and, since 2011, in Kampala, these bring 
few benefits. In fact, one respondent interviewed for this thesis expressed the view that vendors in 
Kisekka are being “punished” for their political sympathies, suggesting that the demolition of the 
market would never have happened if vendors instead supported the NRM.209 Conflicts at Kisekka 
have certainly succeeded in driving many of the market’s vendors out of the city, which has aided 
the ruling party in its efforts to regain control of Kampala by harming a crucial segment of the 
opposition’s support.  
Tied to its image as a centre of opposition politics is the widely held perception that 
Kisekka is, in the words of the Daily Monitor, “the hotbed of rioters and demonstrations” in the 
city.210 This view has persisted since NROKKMVL led protests against NNRMVA and Rhino 
Investments as the rival group within NROKKMVL led protests of its own, most notably against 
the demolition of Kisekka and the forced relocations that this involved. The group has since given 
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up the use of protests as a tactic, however, because the police would just “throw [them] in jail” 
while even vendors who were not involved would have their property destroyed or stolen.211 
Lamenting the fact that the market had gained “a bad name” and not wanting to be seen as ‘rebels’, 
the group resolved to pursue their goals through legal channels instead.212 The market has also 
featured prominently in larger demonstrations and periods of unrest in the city, most notably 
serving as the “epicentre” of the 2009 Buganda riots—events that led to a police crackdown in 
which over 40 people were killed—and, as discussed below, played an important role in the Walk 
to Work Protests.213 Such events have only increased the amount of repression that Kisekka 
vendors face, with the market eventually becoming a place where “any petty skirmish attracts 
heavy police deployments”.214 Again, the market’s history of protest only furthers the image of 
urban chaos and disorder that has long been tied to the market and informal vending more 
generally, and makes Kisekka appear to be an even greater obstacle to the government’s efforts to 
transform Kampala into a modern, developed city that is controlled by the ruling party.  
With NROKKMVL’s lease on the market up for renewal in 2016, and given both the 
KCCA’s commitment to regaining control of the city’s markets as well as the extent to which 
redevelopment has stalled, it is quite possible that Kisekka will soon come under the control of the 
city government. If this happens, the market would still be stuck between demolition and 
reconstruction, and any further development would be decided upon and led by the KCCA. At the 
time of writing, its future remains uncertain. 
 
c) Nakawa Market 
Nakawa Market, unlike both Owino and Kisekka, actually has been taken over by the 
KCCA, and therefore provides an interesting glimpse into an arrangement that some vendors in 
the city see as preferable to the management of markets by small, unrepresentative groups of 
wealthy traders. Vendors at Nakawa Market are largely united in their desire to regain control of 
the market from the KCCA. They are, however, still divided on the issue of what group of vendors 
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should manage the market. One group of vendors has co-operated with the KCCA even while 
trying to get the KCCA removed from the market, giving it an advantage over its rival that receives 
no political backing. Efforts by both groups to dislodge the KCCA, however, have proven 
unsuccessful.   
Since NMVAL and NMVA both claimed the right to manage Nakawa Market, each also 
claimed the right to collect market dues. Conflict between the two, however, meant that dues often 
went uncollected or were not properly remitted to the KCC. Unhappy with its low revenue intake 
from the market, the KCC briefly took over Nakawa in July 2009.215 The dispute between the two 
groups was still unresolved by the time the KCCA was introduced in 2011, and by July of that 
year, vendors at Nakawa owed the KCCA a total of 420 million UGX in unpaid market dues.216 In 
the same month, the KCCA cancelled all contracts pertaining to Nakawa Market and assumed the 
management of the market itself.217 Police deployed heavily in the market following the takeover 
to prevent any unrest caused by popular discontent with the KCCA’s actions.218  
The KCCA organized elections in the market in March 2013. The elections were “hotly 
contested” and had to be run twice due to irregularities in the first ballot, but both contests were 
won by a group of vendors who represented neither NMVAL nor NMVA, but a new third group, 
Nakawa Market Traders’ Development Association (NMTDA).219 After five years of conflict 
between NMVA and NMVAL, the main outcome of which was for the market to be taken over by 
the KCCA, vendors evidently wanted new leadership in the market. The same year, the leaders of 
NMVAL initiated a lawsuit against the KCCA claiming that they had the right to manage Nakawa 
Market based on their April 2008 agreement with the KCC. In May 2015, a judge ruled in favour 
of the KCCA, arguing that although NMVAL made an effort to acquire the tender for the market 
from the KCC, the association “failed to prove” that it had a contract with the KCC “for the 
management, control and maintenance of Nakawa Market”.220 The leaders of NMVAL reject the 
judgement of the court, claiming that the findings of the case showed that they were the rightful 
holders of the market’s tender and that the judge must have been influenced to rule in favour of 
                                                          
215 Waiswa, Juliet, “Nakawa Loses Sh120m in Taxes,” New Vision, 14 July 2009.  
216 Kostov, Nicolas and Andrew Bagala, “Nakawa Market Contractors on the Run,” Daily Monitor, 21 July 2011.  
217 Ibid.  
218 “Police Deploy at Nakawa Market,” New Vision, 20 July 2011.  
219 Interview, chairperson, Nakawa Market Traders’ Development Association, 29 July 2015. 
220 Nakawa Market Vendors Association Ltd. v. Kampala Capital City Authority, High Court Civil Suit No. 135 of 
2010, May 2015.  
198  Young 
 
the KCCA.221 The group refuses to surrender its claim to Nakawa Market, and promises to continue 
to challenge the KCCA’s management. In the words of one member of NMVAL: “We are going 
to cause a war with the KCCA. You will hear us.”222 
NMTDA continues to manage Nakawa Market, and owes its position to the backing that it 
receives from the city government. NMTDA handles most of the duties involved in running the 
market, particularly the resolution of conflicts between vendors or other internal problems. The 
only service provided by the KCCA is garbage collection.223 Despite the KCCA’s stated intention 
to develop Nakawa Market, it had not even devised firm plans to do so at the time of research. One 
task that the KCCA has accepted responsibility for, however, is the collection of market dues. The 
leaders of NMTDA are unhappy with the fact that although they are the ones who are “keeping 
law and order” and “helping people in the market”, they “don’t get a penny” from the 
government.224 Despite the KCCA’s presence, the chairperson of NMTDA complains, “everything 
we do here we do with our own money.”225 In his view, the KCCA “has turned markets” in 
Kampala into “revenue generating institutions”, ignoring the fact that they “are supposed to be 
service providers.”226 NMTDA may co-operate with the KCCA to manage Nakawa Market, but it 
does so reluctantly.  
Both the leaders of NMVAL and NMTDA therefore want the same thing: to be able to run 
Nakawa Market without the interference of the KCCA. The leaders of NMTDA strategically ally 
with the KCCA in order to maintain the group’s position in the market, but they still aim to remove 
the KCCA and manage the market themselves. Notably, they plan to appeal to the President 
“telling him of our plight, telling him of what we are going through and what we demand from 
him as the head of our country.”227 Museveni, the chairperson of NMTDA notes, tends to come to 
the aid of vendors “when things are not well” and “there is chaos in the markets”, and unlike other 
politicians, “realizes there is value in the informal sector”.228 NMTDA has also joined the Central 
Organisation of Free Trade Unions (COFTU), one of the country’s two main labour organizations, 
which is currently lobbying Parliament to amend the 1942 Markets Act in line with the President’s 
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policy that markets should be owned and run by vendors. Significantly, the leaders of NMTDA 
have rejected the use of protest in the pursuit of their goals due to the belief that such a tactic would 
ultimately be counterproductive. In the words of the chairperson of NMTDA: “If people here 
believed in violence we would have driven KCCA away. We would have gone on strike. But 
KCCA wants you to go on strike so they can come in and say what? ‘You can’t manage.’... KCCA 
wants markets in chaos so they can use force to take over the market.”229 The leaders of the 
association understand the power of discourses that associate market vending with disorder, as 
well as the significant role that these play in justifying the KCCA’s efforts to assume control of 
the city’s markets. By consciously avoiding protest (in notable contrast to vendors in Kisekka), 
they are seeking to deny the KCCA the ability to claim that controlling Nakawa is necessary to 
impose order on the market. Instead, they are relying on either the President or Parliament to come 
to their aid. At the time of writing, neither has yet done so.    
NMVAL, in contrast, receives no political support, and is left with no power in Nakawa 
Market. The association has also appealed to the President, who they believe is “here for [them]” 
and needs their assistance to develop the market “[b]ecause the land is not his.”230 Still, the group 
has been unable to gain his support due to the fact that, just as in its previous struggles with NMVA, 
it is not clear that NMVAL can validly claim to represent most, let alone all, of the vendors in the 
market. The fact that NMTDA was elected to lead the market gives NMVAL’s claims even less 
legitimacy, as does the fact that it has had its claims to control the market rejected by the courts, 
and it is difficult to see why Museveni would intervene to support a group that is apparently less 
popular than its rivals. Unlike SSLOA in Owino, the President lacks political ties with NMVAL 
and the association lacks the support and the resources necessary to control the market, so co-
opting the group would not necessarily increase the President’s power or popularity in the market. 
Without the support of either the President or the KCCA, and with their claims rejected in court, 
NMVAL’s options are limited. Like NMTDA, NMVAL has always avoided the use of protest in 
the pursuit of its goals, and its leaders claim that they have always been able to dissuade supporters 
from demonstrating by arguing that they were “handling the situation” through legal means.231 
This, however, may now change. According to one member of NMVAL: “After failing, our 
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dissatisfaction will be open. We will tell the vendors to decide for themselves.”232 If the leaders of 
NMTDA are correct, any protest that occurs could primarily serve to undermine the vendors’ cause 
by strengthening the KCCA’s arguments about the need to impose order on a chaotic market. At 
the time of research, these protests had not yet taken place (if, indeed, they will take place at all). 
The KCCA’s control over Nakawa Market remains undiminished. 
 
iv. The Agency of Market Vendors in Conflicts Over Ownership and Development 
The conflicts surrounding ownership and development that came to consume Kampala’s 
markets after the KCC’s failed privatization efforts provide crucial insights into how the state 
impacts the agency of informal vendors. The policy that vendors should have the right to manage 
and develop their own markets has exacerbated the divisions that exist between vendors, and the 
President and the KCCA have been able to manipulate these divisions for their own advantage. 
The markets discussed here reveal three different ways in which the state has impacted the agency 
of vendors in conflicts surrounding management and development. In Owino Market, the President 
and the KCCA have provided support for two groups with competing management and 
development claims. With the support of the President, SSLOA has been able to secure its control 
of Owino and proceed with a market development plan that faces significant opposition. SOPTVC 
has used the support provided by the KCCA to oppose SSLOA’s control of the market and plan 
for market development, but its efforts have proven unsuccessful. In Kisekka Market, in contrast, 
groups of vendors engaged in similar conflicts surrounding market management and development 
have been unable to secure any political support. Neither Museveni nor the KCCA has any interest 
in coming to the aid of vendors at a market that is viewed as a centre of opposition support and 
protest in the city, and as a result, an increasingly unpopular market development project has 
stalled, the market has been demolished with few signs of reconstruction, vendors have been 
displaced and it is quite possible that the KCCA will acquire the lease for the market from 
NROKKMVL in the immediate future. In Nakawa Market, the KCCA has taken the opportunity 
presented by conflicts over market management to take over the market itself. It has provided its 
support for NMTDA to manage the market on its behalf, which the group does despite its own 
opposition to the KCCA, while NMVAL has seen its market management claims repeatedly 
denied.  
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The divisions that have re-emerged and deepened due to the policy that vendors should 
manage and develop their own markets have fundamental socioeconomic roots. These roots can 
be obvious, particularly when they surround patterns of ownership; in Owino, for example, 
SSLOA is exclusively controlled by and represents the interests of the (at most) 20% of vendors 
who own shops and stalls in the market. They can also simply be related to varying levels of capital 
accumulation. Owners are likely to have higher incomes than renters, and indeed may derive some 
of their income by renting out their market space(s) to tenants. There is also a notable 
socioeconomic hierarchy in which the occupants of lock-up shops are above the occupants of stalls 
and both, in turn, are above the occupants of open spaces. These socioeconomic roots are important 
because the resources at a vendor’s disposal determine his or her ability to participate in and benefit 
from specific market development projects. Major market redevelopment projects, such as those 
that are planned in Owino and Kisekka, are viewed by some vendors as an opportunity to improve 
working conditions and incomes, but are seen by others as a threat to already precarious livelihoods 
due to the various costs they involve, particularly mandatory contributions to reconstruction, 
displacement during the rebuilding process and higher rent once the new structure is complete. 
Such projects are likely to be led and supported by wealthier vendors, particularly those who own 
shops and stalls, who can afford to pay for and who will benefit from market development, and 
more likely to be opposed by poorer vendors, particularly renters who operate in less expensive 
market space(s). The fact that vendors may oppose a particular development project, however, 
does not mean that they are opposed to the concept of market development itself; indeed, interview 
and survey respondents regularly indicated a desire for market development regardless of their 
background. Conflicts instead surround disagreements between vendors about what form(s) 
development should take and whom it should benefit. What constitutes development for wealthier 
vendors does not necessarily constitute development for poorer vendors who are excluded due to 
what are for them prohibitive costs, so what opponents of specific projects usually want is for 
market redevelopment to be designed and implemented in a way that is more inclusive. In 
Kampala’s markets, ‘development’ is itself an open and contested concept that all parties interpret 
and seek to influence in accordance with their socioeconomic position.  
Compounding these issues is the fact that development also serves as a useful pretext to 
serve self-interested goals. Ownership and management claims are strengthened and given a 
degree of apparent legitimacy if they are justified by claims of serving development, allowing 
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individuals and groups to gain control of valuable pieces of land “under the guise of developing 
the city.”233 It is not only private investors who, in the words of Lukwago, “hide behind the notion 
of development”, since groups of vendors also make developmental claims to advance their 
positions within a market and to impose their own visions of market transformation.234 Conversely, 
arguments about development can also serve to delegitimize internal dissent; vendors in Owino, 
for example, complain that when they try to alert the government to the market’s problems, the 
leaders of SSLOA deny that these problems exist and convince the government that the group is 
leading the development of the market.235 Many vendors would agree with the argument, expressed 
by a KCCA official, that “no adequate guidelines were put in place” for the policy of allowing 
vendors to manage and develop their own markets, and as a result, “[i]t is the few at leadership 
level that are likely to benefit from this arrangement.”236  
The possibility of gaining the support of either the President or the KCCA to advance 
market management and development claims provides an important opportunity for some groups 
of vendors to exercise agency. Groups such as SSLOA, SOPTVC and NMTDA have all, in various 
ways, taken advantage of political support. SSLOA has particularly benefited from the support 
that it receives from Museveni, which has secured its control of the market despite opposition from 
both SOPTVC and the KCCA and allowed it to work towards implementing its market 
development plans. SOPTVC and NMTDA, on the other hand, have continued to face major 
obstacles despite receiving political support, since the backing of the KCCA has ultimately not 
allowed SOPTVC to effectively challenge SSLOA while NMTDA, despite co-operating with the 
KCCA, desires to free Nakawa from the control of the local government. Still, political support 
has allowed SOPTVC to advance its claims and NMTDA to manage Nakawa, facilitating the 
agency of both groups.  
It is equally true, however, that the President and the KCCA are able to use the support that 
they can provide for groups of vendors to pursue their own interests in controlling markets, which 
are, for Museveni, minimizing opposition support while improving his personal popularity 
amongst vendors, and for the KCCA, managing markets to improve revenue collection and 
fulfilling developmental ambitions. Thus the leaders of SSLOA have secured the support of the 
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President while the President can use the company to control the market and mobilize support for 
himself, particularly during elections. The leaders of SOPTVC, in contrast, have attracted the 
support of the KCCA, which has aided the KCCA in its efforts to gain control of the market. The 
support provided by either the President of the KCCA can further exacerbate divisions by altering 
the power balance between different groups. In Nakawa, for example, the support that the KCCA 
provides to NMTDA allows the association to play a role in the management of the market, while 
the leaders of NMVAL blame the KCCA for dividing vendors: “We are all vendors, but they make 
sure you hit one another.”237 Divisions between, on the one hand, the central government and the 
KCCA, and on the other, different groups of vendors, therefore feed into each other: competing 
vendors’ groups seeking support for their ownership and development claims strengthen the 
positions of both the President and the KCCA, while competition between the President and the 
KCCA allows some groups of vendors to further pursue their claims.  
It is important not to confuse agency for some vendors’ groups with agency for market 
vendors more generally. The ability of one group to exercise agency can directly infringe upon the 
ability of another group to do so as well; the ability of SSLOA to lead market management and 
development, for example, is directly detrimental to SOPTVC. Furthermore, political support is 
not available to all vendors’ groups, as the experience of vendors at Kisekka Market and NMVAL 
demonstrate. Also of particular significance is the fact that market vendors are not only divided by 
competing ownership and management claims, but also between those who actively support claims 
and those who do not. Crucially, the majority of vendors who responded to interviews and surveys 
were not involved in any market associations and did not participate (or would not admit to 
participating) in demonstrations. There are many reasons for this lack of involvement. Vendors in 
Owino, for example, provided some of the most important: the view that neither SSLOA nor 
SOPTVC has done anything to benefit vendors, so many just avoid both;238 the belief that “the 
heads of the associations are not trustworthy, transparent or reliable”;239 and the failure to 
“understand the agenda” of either group.240 The “state machinery” that exists in markets in the 
form of the political ties of vendors’ groups, such as those between SSLOA and the President, also 
acts as a major deterrent because it means that vendors who openly oppose a politically powerful 
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group can face exclusion from access to certain financial opportunities in the market or even from 
the market itself.241 Similarly, participation in demonstrations carries the obvious threat of police 
repression. Such risks threaten the already precarious livelihoods of many poor market vendors, 
making the costs of involvement in market conflicts unappealingly high. Still, the fact that such a 
large share of vendors fail to support any organizations again raises the question of who has the 
legitimate authority to represent vendors in issues of management and development. It also 
suggests that vendors’ organizations are not necessarily vehicles for agency, but can reinforce 
existing hierarchies and advance certain interests that in fact limit the agency of a large share of 
vendors in a market. A group such as SSLOA that is run by and consists of a small share of market 
vendors who own shops and stalls and is imposing a development plan that many vendors find 
unaffordable can be viewed in such a way. These groups can be oppressive, exclusionary and 
threaten vendors’ livelihoods, significantly limiting rather than promoting agency.  
Divisions exist not only within markets, but between markets as well. Vendors and their 
associations are commonly focused on the immediate problems that affect their own markets, and 
even though vendors in different markets share many common interests and often face similar 
obstacles, co-operation is rare. One respondent blamed the leaders of associations for being 
“myopic” in their failure to understand that vendors have common interests,242 but it is also true 
that associations often only practice “management by crisis” rather than proactive long-term 
planning due to the challenges that they constantly face.243 There are still some options for groups 
of vendors who do want to join larger organizations outside of individual markets. NMTDA, for 
example, has joined COFTU, which the association’s leaders believe will increase its bargaining 
power and give it more influence over government decision-making. According to the chairperson 
of NMTDA, “it is very difficult for a market like Nakawa to influence KCCA” on its own, but “the 
government will be able to tackle issues of all markets” if vendors from different markets make 
their appeals together through COFTU “with one voice”.244 The fact that NMTDA is the only 
vendors’ association in all of the markets under study to have joined COFTU, however, 
undermines the goal of unified collective bargaining. Other organizations are less receptive or 
appealing to vendors. The National Organization of Trade Unions (NOTU), the second of 
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Uganda’s two main trade union organizations, does not allow groups that represent informal actors 
to join, reflecting a common divide that exists between formal and informal economic activity due 
to divergent interests and different social relations of production.245 This exclusion is one of the 
major reasons why COFTU was founded in the first place.246 Even groups that specifically exist 
to aid the collective organization of informal vendors are not necessarily ideal vehicles for 
representation, since both NUIEWO (as discussed in Chapter Four) and KJMVA, under Kayongo, 
are widely seen as having been co-opted by the central government. The possibility for co-
operation between markets therefore remains largely unrealized.  
The divisions that exist within informal markets point to significant class fragmentation 
amongst vendors. Following the work of Barbara Harriss-White and Nandini Gooptu, and, latterly, 
Rizzo, the groups formed by informal vendors often engage in a ‘struggle over class’ rather than a 
‘struggle between classes’ since they embody and seek to advance competing interests that are 
fundamentally shaped by socioeconomic and political roots.247 Indeed, the competing interests of 
vendors and the extent to which these are tied to both ownership patterns and capital accumulation 
demonstrate the difficulty of understanding informal market vendors as belonging to a single class 
at all; if they do, it is one that has lacked unity since the common threat of privatization has 
disappeared. The groups that vendors form often increase fragmentation by representing narrow 
sets of interests,248 and divisions between the President and the KCCA allow competing groups to 
attract political support. Both the President and the KCCA exploit these political ties for their own 
purposes, solidifying fragmentation and further ensuring that issues surrounding market ownership 
and development remain perpetually unresolved. As long as these divisions exist, the agency of 
market vendors will be significantly constrained.  
  
v. The Electoral Politics of Markets 
Market vendors’ ability to take advantage of divisions within the state becomes particularly 
acute during elections. While the KCCA is not affected by electoral concerns, the desire to attract 
the support of market vendors is the President’s primary motivation for intervening in market 
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conflicts. Kampala is a particularly contested electoral battleground given the popularity of the 
opposition in the city and the desire of the ruling party to establish its dominance over the country’s 
economic and political capital. Market vendors constitute a large segment of the urban poor in 
Kampala, numbering around 150,000 people in a city with a population of 1,936,000, making them 
a significant voting demographic.249 As argued above, the KCC’s failed market privatization 
program almost certainly contributed to the opposition’s poor performance in the 2011 local 
elections, allowing the NRM to capture the majority of council seats at both the city (LC5) and 
city division (LC3) level for the first time since the introduction of decentralization and 
democratization. Market privatization was undertaken on the local rather than national level, 
however, and the opposition party that controlled the KCC, the DP, was not the same as the 
opposition party that was prominent in national elections, the FDC, meaning that a similar boost 
for the President was not a guarantee. Still, Museveni made every effort to ensure that he got one. 
This provided vendors with the opportunity to exercise a certain degree of agency. 
The most obvious way in which the President appeals to market vendors before and during 
elections is by supporting their right to manage and develop markets. This is an issue that is of 
central importance to vendors, and survey respondents often cited issues of market management 
and development as key to determining how they will vote. As explored above, however, 
supporting management and development claims is not merely a neutral policy of vendor 
empowerment, but involves favouring the claims of particular individuals or groups while rejecting 
others. This means supporting a particular claim will not be universally popular, and will likely 
further deepen market divisions. Since the groups that the President does back often provide 
political support in return, the NRM also uses its ties to market leaders and associations to mobilize 
support amongst vendors. For example, Kayongo, the head of both SSLOA and KJMVA as well 
as Museveni’s Presidential Advisor for markets, campaigns for the NRM during elections, 
attempting to mobilize vendors to provide support for the ruling party; similarly, the leaders of 
NMVA campaigned for the NRM in the run-up to the 2011 elections, using some of their own 
funds to do so with the apparent promise of future financial benefits.250 The problem with these 
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efforts, however, is that SSLOA faces and NMVA faced significant opposition in their respective 
markets, making both imperfect vehicles for vendor mobilization. The significant divisions that 
exist within markets present a major obstacle to any effort to attract the support of market vendors.  
The NRM also seeks to attract the support of vendors during election campaigns through 
the distribution of material goods. The monetization of elections has become a major feature of 
the democratic process in Uganda, and the NRM is particularly guilty of using state resources for 
its own partisan purposes, a practice that blurs the distinction between the NRM and the state and 
provides the ruling party with a notable financial advantage over the opposition.251 Attempts by 
the NRM to use public money to secure popular support were widespread in the run-up to the 2011 
elections. The central government’s 2010/11 budget contained a 16% increase in spending from 
the previous year, and in January 2011, the month before the elections were held, a supplementary 
budget of 602 billion UGX was passed, with 85 billion UGX given specifically to the President.252 
In a 2012 Afrobarometer survey, 41% of respondents reported being offered money or other gifts 
as a means of securing their votes during the 2011 elections.253 The NRM was responsible for 67% 
of vote buying offers.254 A large share of vendors surveyed for this thesis reported that politicians 
offer goods, particularly money and t-shirts, as a means of encouraging vendors to vote for them, 
while vendors interviewed at Kisekka also described how the NRM would distribute items such 
as salt and sugar in the market in an effort to attract support.255 Since market vending is usually a 
low income activity, even small handouts can lead to noticeable livelihood gains. As a result, 
elections serve as significant periods of economic opportunity for vendors.   
Some forms of attempted vote buying are less explicit than others. While it is common for 
politicians to simply hand out money to potential supporters, the NRM also uses SACCOs, the 
government sponsored co-operative savings and credit organizations that provide their members 
with affordable loans, as a vehicle for distributing money to low-income voters. SACCOs were 
introduced after the 2006 elections and expanded significantly in the run-up to 2011. A specific 
                                                          
251 See, for example: “Report on Money in Politics: Pervasive Vote Buying in Uganda Elections,” Democracy 
Monitoring Group, January 2011; and “Uganda: Final Report: General Elections 18 February 2011,” European Union 
Election Observation Mission, 10 March 2011, 24-26.  
252 Conroy-Krutz, Jeffrey and Carolyn Logan, “Museveni and the 2011 Ugandan Election: Did the Money Matter?” 
Journal of Modern African Studies 50 (4) 2012: 632. 
253 Kewaza, John Martin, “Fighting Corruption in Uganda: Despite Small Gains, Citizens Pessimistic about their 
Role,” Afrobarometer Dispatch No. 77, 28 March 2016.  
254 Conroy-Krutz and Logan, 636.  
255 Group interview, Kisekka Market vendors, 19 August 2015. 
208  Young 
 
budget was set aside in 2010/11 to fund SACCOs in markets with the apparent goal of providing 
all vendors in urban areas with loans of 30,000 UGX and all vendors in rural areas with loans of 
20,000 UGX. Kayongo, as the Presidential Advisor for markets, was appointed to lead the 
program. The money that the central government provides to SACCOs is often seen and presented 
as specifically associated with the NRM, making its distribution a political rather than merely 
technocratic exercise.256 The government often gives money to certain SACCOs and not others, 
and whether or not a SACCO receives money from the government can depend on its political 
connections.257 In Owino, for example, the central government apparently gives money to a 
SACCO run by SSLOA but not to other SACCOs in the market.258 It is not guaranteed that money 
given by the central government will reach market vendors, however: one vendor in Owino 
claimed that the leaders of SSLOA simply keep the money that is given to them by the NRM,259 
while other vendors reported joining SSLOA just to receive some of the money that was given to 
the company by the central government, but complained that it only went to “known” people in 
the market.260  
Museveni’s electoral performance in Kampala improved significantly in 2011, when the 
first elections after his intervention into market conflicts were held. In 2006, the President received 
170,688 votes in the city (39.5%) while Besigye won 245,004 (56.69%); this margin narrowed 
significantly in 2011, with Museveni winning 225,698 votes (46.08%) and Besigye claiming 
229,527 (46.86%). Still, while Museveni’s share of the vote increased in Kampala, it improved 
even more significantly across the country, growing from 4,109,449 (59.26%) to 5,428,369 
(68.38%).261 It is therefore difficult to attribute the President’s improved performance in the city 
to any increased support from market vendors. The divisions that exist within markets were likely 
too significant to overcome with the President’s support for ownership and development claims; 
in fact, Museveni’s intervention contributed to deepening these divisions even further. Even 
                                                          
256 Titeca, Kristof, “The Commercialisation of Uganda’s 2011 Election in the Urban Informal Economy: Money, 
Boda-Bodas and Market Vendors,” in Perrot et al. eds., 185-193.  
257 Interview, lawyer, 30 July 2015. 
258 Group interview, St. Balikuddembe Market Stalls, Space and Lock-Up Shops Owners Association Limited, Owino 
Market, 4 August 2015. 
259 Interview, Owino Market vendor, 19 August 2015.  
260 Group interview, Owino Market vendors, 9 July 2015. 
261 Breakdowns of Uganda’s election results can be found at “Election Results,” Electoral Commission of Uganda, 
accessed 1 August 2016, http://www.ec.or.ug/?q=content/election-results. District results for the 2006 elections can 
be found at “Ugandan General Election, 2006,” Wikipedia, accessed 1 August 2016, 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ugandan_general_election,_2006. 
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appeals to the President are often instrumental rather than indicative of actual support. According 
to one civil society leader, there is a widespread perception even amongst opposition supporters 
that “[i]f you want something, you just demonstrate” or “lead a delegation to the State House” and 
“the President will give it to you for political reasons.”262 Market vendors know that the President 
has the power to intervene in policy formation and implementation and that he has a long history 
of doing so, and therefore view appealing to his authority as an effective way of pursuing their 
interests. Some appeals, of course, do indicate genuine political support; SSLOA, for example, has 
close ties to the President and actively seeks to mobilize support for the NRM. The vendors at 
Kisekka who appealed to Museveni to overturn NNRMVA’s deal with Rhino Investments, in 
contrast, did not abandon their overwhelming allegiance to the opposition. Museveni’s electoral 
interests present an opportunity that vendors take advantage of regardless of their true political 
sympathies.   
Market vendors also take advantage of the NRM’s vote buying efforts for their own 
financial gain. They are not alone in this regard. According to one observer, since voters know that 
politicians are not actually responsive to their concerns and that elections will not result in any 
meaningful change, they treat elections as an opportunity to “milk” leaders, believing that “they 
have not done anything for us, so when they come I will try to get something from them.”263 
Democracy Monitoring Group (DEMGroup), a local civil society organization, similarly argues 
that “[v]oters seek to extract resources from candidates because they feel that it is the only way 
they can gain from their vote.”264 Accepting the material goods offered by the NRM, however, 
does not necessarily imply support or indicate voting intention; indeed, an Afrobarometer survey 
found that 76% of respondents claimed that they would not support a candidate even after 
accepting money, while only 4% said that they would, and only 1% of respondents who supported 
the opposition stated that they would support the NRM if the ruling party tried to buy their vote.265 
In their study of the 2011 elections, Jeffrey Conroy-Krutz and Carolyn Logan find that 
“beneficiaries of vote-buying attempts and recently distributed public goods were not significantly 
more likely to have supported Museveni than their counterparts”.266 This applies to market vendors 
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264 Quoted from “Report on Money in Politics”, 3.  
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as well. Vendors interviewed at Kisekka, for example, noted that while traders in the market would 
accept the ruling party’s gifts, they would still not vote for the NRM because the party ignores 
vendors once elections are over.267 Accepting the goods that are offered by the NRM but reneging 
on their implicit agreement to support the ruling party in return allows vendors to financially 
benefit from the electoral interests of politicians—even if some benefits, such as money given to 
certain SACCOs, are not universally available—without compromising their own political 
interests. This represents a significant form of political agency, and it is made possible due to the 
electoral competition that exists between the NRM and the opposition.   
While the end of elections usually diminishes the agency of vendors by reducing the 
political divisions that they are so dependent on, the Walk to Work Protests that broke out across 
the country in April 2011 provided another brief opportunity for market vendors to become 
politically active. The protests had their roots in the outcome of the elections that had taken place 
less than two months earlier, and were initiated when the defeated opposition leaders, led by 
Besigye, launched a campaign that encouraged Ugandans to walk to work in order to demonstrate 
solidarity with the growing number of people who could not afford to pay for transportation. The 
nature of the campaign effectively tied the opposition’s complaints about the unfair electoral 
process to the grievances of the urban poor who were being affected by rising inflation, particularly 
rapidly increasing food and fuel costs, that was at least partly caused by the NRM’s excessive 
campaign expenditures. The campaign’s broad appeal attracted widespread support in the city, 
particularly amongst the urban poor, and a situation quickly emerged in which increasingly large 
protests would provoke increasingly violent state repression, in turn leading to more protest.268 
Market vendors, whose already precarious livelihoods were being put under even greater stress as 
a result of inflation, came to play a major role in the protests. Their involvement, like that of so 
many other groups, was not necessarily motivated by support for the opposition, but by their pre-
existing social and economic marginalization and the political conditions that fostered it. 
Lukwago, the newly elected Lord Mayor and one of the leaders of the protests, admits that it was 
“just a coincidence” that while opposition leaders had their own “plan of civil action”, vendors 
“had their own grievances” around which they were so quick to mobilize.269 For market vendors, 
                                                          
267 Group interview, Kisekka Market vendors, 19 August 2015.  
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the Walk to Work Protests presented an opportunity to take advantage of a temporary political 
opening created by the opposition to overcome the divisions that normally separate the urban poor 
from both each other and other segments of society, allowing them to mobilize around long-held 
grievances. When the protests ended following severe state repression less than a month after they 
began, this opportunity again vanished.  
Whatever popularity gains Museveni made in Kampala in 2011 disappeared in 2016. Not 
only did his share of the vote in the city decline from 2011, it also fell to its lowest point, 30.92%, 
of any of the five elections that he has participated in since coming to power.270 Issues surrounding 
markets, of course, are not the only determinant of Museveni’s electoral performance in the city, 
but his efforts to improve his own popular support at the expense of the opposition have clearly 
not had their intended impact. Market vendors, however, have been able to take advantage of these 
efforts, first by (sometimes) using his support to strengthen their own management and 
development claims, and subsequently by seeking financial benefits during political campaigns. 
They were also able to take advantage of the opportunity presented by the Walk to Work Protests 
to unite around and act on shared grievances along with a much broader share of the city’s, and 
indeed the country’s, population. Each of these opportunities emerged due to the political divisions 
that exist between the ruling party and the opposition that elections render particularly acute.  
While elections provide brief periods of political competition that market vendors are able 
to take advantage of, however, they do not fundamentally alter the increasing marginalization that 
vendors are forced to contend with. As this chapter has detailed, the deeply ingrained conflicts that 
exist within Kampala’s markets, and the various forms of manipulation, co-option, repression and 
exclusion that these entail, have continued, and even worsened, since the 2011 elections and Walk 
to Work Protests. Elections allow vendors to realize small gains, but they are still part of a broader 
process by which the President and the NRM seek to expand their political control, a process that 
continues in other forms as elections end and competition that they create quickly disappears. It is 
this expansion of power that so profoundly impacts the agency of informal vendors and precipitates 
their exclusion from urban development and economic life in the city.  
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Part III: Conclusions 
Efforts by the President and the NRM to monopolize control over the state have had a 
significant impact on the agency of market vendors in Kampala. When the KCC attempted to 
privatize the city’s markets due to financial problems largely caused by political interference from 
the central government, vendors were able to appeal to the President for support given his desire 
to undermine the opposition-led local government while increasing his own personal popularity. 
The President intervened to overturn the KCC’s privatization program, and instead introduced a 
policy that gave vendors the right to manage and develop their own markets. While market vendors 
were able to unite around widespread opposition to privatization, this new policy exacerbated 
internal divisions within markets and led to major conflicts between groups of vendors surrounding 
issues of representation and the design and implementation of development projects. These 
divisions have significant socioeconomic roots, reflecting patterns of ownership and capital 
accumulation that exist amongst vendors. The President and the KCCA have been able to take 
advantage of conflicts within markets to advance their own competing interests, and provide 
support to groups of vendors that allow them to solidify their own popularity in or control over 
markets. This political support worsens divisions between vendors and further circumscribes their 
agency.  
The ability of market vendors to exercise agency has not completely vanished due to 
closing political space, however. The opportunity to attract the support of either Museveni or the 
KCCA represents an important form of agency for some groups of vendors even as it limits the 
agency of others and allows the President and the ruling party to pursue their interests in Kampala’s 
markets. Elections also provide periods of particularly open political space for market vendors due 
to heightened competition between the ruling party and the opposition. The ability to take 
advantage of temporary electoral openings, even just to secure material goods, represents an 
important form of agency for market vendors. The fact that vendors have been able to exercise this 
agency while largely ignoring the President’s efforts to attract their support highlights their ability 
to resist political domination, even though they are largely unable to alter their position of 
marginalization when doing so.  
The President’s and ruling party’s efforts to expand their power have placed significant 
constraints on the agency of market vendors. In doing so, they have excluded vendors from market 
management and development, threatened vendors’ livelihoods and made internal conflicts 
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particularly intractable. While Museveni and the NRM have been able to further tighten their grip 
on political power, market vendors have experienced further marginalization. Barring any 
significant changes to the city’s political landscape, it is difficult to see how this marginalization 
will be overcome.  
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Chapter Six: Conclusions 
 
 Since the end of the civil war in 1986, the President and the NRM have consistently sought 
to expand their power in an environment of ostensible political liberalization. The early 
decentralization and democratization programs introduced by the NRM were designed and 
implemented in a way that aimed to solidify its position and that of the President, and were halted 
or even reversed when they did not. While these reforms succeeded in providing both Museveni 
and the NRM with a considerable degree of legitimacy, popular support and political hegemony 
across the country, they also had the unintended consequence of allowing the opposition to 
dominate Kampala given its popularity in the city. This was a state of affairs that deeply 
dissatisfied the central government, which constantly undermined the KCC’s authority and ability 
to carry out core functions in an attempt to demonstrate that the opposition was unfit to hold office 
and could not be trusted to lead urban management and development. These efforts, however, were 
unsuccessful, and the opposition maintained its political dominance in the city throughout the 
KCC’s existence. Unable to gain control of the city through electoral means, the central 
government instead replaced the KCC with the KCCA, shifting political power in Kampala from 
democratically elected local officials to centrally appointed technocrats, and thus from the popular 
opposition to the ruling party and, ultimately, Museveni. Since the introduction of the KCCA, 
these technocrats, with the backing of the NRM, have sought to marginalize elected officials in 
the city even further. These events represent a dramatic expansion of power by the President and 
the ruling party in Kampala, and a fundamental reversal of the principles of decentralization and 
democratization that are apparently a central feature of Ugandan politics under the NRM.   
 The agency of informal vendors in Kampala has been profoundly impacted by the 
expansion of power by the President and the NRM. Street and market vendors have experienced 
this power in significantly different ways. The intense political competition between the ruling 
party and the opposition that came to define the KCC following the NRM’s decentralization and 
democratization reforms gave street vendors the opportunity to remain on the city’s streets. In a 
highly divided political environment, street vendors were able to support politicians who valued 
political advantage over the formation and implementation of policy and were willing to offer them 
protection in exchange for electoral support. The opportunity to take advantage of political 
divisions came to an end with the introduction of the KCCA, as the new city government is 
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structured and operates in a way that disempowers elected officials in favour of centrally appointed 
technocrats who do not rely on popular support for their positions. In order to justify its existence, 
the KCCA has sought to implement ambitious urban management and development plans, a central 
feature of which is a ban on street vending, an activity that is seen to have no place in a ‘modern’ 
urban landscape and economy. Unable to exercise the influence that they previously enjoyed, street 
vendors have faced significant repression by the KCCA. Market vendors were similarly able to 
take advantage of the competition that existed between the ruling party and the opposition in order 
to overturn the city’s market privatization program, which was itself initiated due to financial 
struggles caused by the central government. Sensing an opportunity to further undermine the KCC 
and gain popular support at the expense of the opposition, Museveni ended market privatization 
and introduced the policy that vendors should manage and develop their own markets. This policy 
has reawakened and exacerbated divisions between market vendors that have deep socioeconomic 
roots, initiating conflicts surrounding who has the right to represent market vendors and what 
form(s) development should take. The President and the KCCA have been able to take advantage 
of these conflicts to further their interests in the city’s markets, which are, for the President, 
increasing his personal popularity, and for the KCCA, improving revenue collection and 
implementing its urban development goals. 
 The expansion of political power by the President and the NRM has not completely 
eliminated vendors’ ability to exercise agency, however. While both street and market vendors 
have seen their space for agency retract significantly, they have still been able to adopt certain 
strategies that allow them adapt to their changing circumstances. Precisely what these strategies 
are depends on the type(s) of state power that they face. Street vendors have responded to the 
criminalization of their activities in three ways: through compliance and co-operation, particularly 
by helping to create and relocating to Usafi Market; through small-scale forms of resistance that 
allow them to remain on the streets; and through forming or participating in organizations that aim 
to defend their interests and/or give them a degree of political representation and influence. Some 
groups of market vendors, in contrast, have been able to respond to conflicts by attracting the 
support of either the President or the KCCA to advance their own market management and 
development claims. Furthermore, both street and market vendors have been able to take advantage 
of the political competition offered during elections to make certain gains, particularly, for the 
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former, returning to the streets, and for the latter, acquiring material goods from politicians, 
primarily in the ruling party, who are seeking electoral support.  
 Despite the strategies that they employ to respond to their changing political circumstances, 
informal vendors still face significant obstacles in their efforts to exercise agency. Street vendors 
who have relocated to Usafi Market have had to contend with few customers and excessive rent, 
both of which threaten their livelihoods and have caused many to return to the streets to sell their 
goods. Those who have returned to the streets or never left in the first place face the constant threat 
of being fined, having their goods confiscated or being arrested and imprisoned. Attempts to form 
or join organizations are often derailed by practical issues such as a lack of money or difficulties 
holding meetings, while reduced political space makes organizations less able to exercise political 
influence, the ban on street vending makes them subject to repression and co-option remains a 
constant threat. Many groups of market vendors have been unable to attract any political support, 
while those that have been successful have also played their part in furthering the influence of the 
President or the KCCA within markets. Even when vendors’ groups do manage to advance their 
own management and development claims, they are not necessarily vehicles for agency since they 
often represent narrow sets of interests, solidify internal market hierarchies and pursue 
development plans that many market vendors are unable to afford. Finally, gains made during 
elections often disappear with the return of the status quo surrounding informality once elections 
are over, such as when street vendors were evicted from the city streets immediately after the 2016 
elections, or do not fundamentally alter the balance of power between the state and the informal 
sphere, as when market vendors extract material goods from politicians.  
The President’s and the NRM’s efforts to monopolize their control over the state at both 
the local and the national level have ultimately limited the ability of informal vendors to participate 
in urban development and economic life in Kampala. While both street and market vendors have 
been able to adopt strategies that allow them to exercise limited forms of agency in the context of 
closing political space, they have seen their livelihoods become increasingly precarious and their 
presence in the city increasingly under threat. The political influence that they previously enjoyed 
has largely disappeared, and this political exclusion has precipitated a broader social and economic 
exclusion that the state uses its co-optive and coercive powers to enforce. For informal vendors, 
the ultimate effect of the monopolization of political power is further marginalization and 
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increased vulnerability. Despite their best efforts, it is a situation that they are largely unable to 
improve.   
 
Part I: Key Insights  
The experiences of informal vendors in Kampala offer important insights into informal 
economic activity more generally. This thesis offers a critique of the neoliberal view that 
informality represents a widespread disengagement by the urban poor from an exclusionary and 
unjust political and economic system, using the relationship between agency and the state as a lens 
through which to challenge neoliberal interpretations of informal economic activity and the core 
assumptions on which they are based. For neoliberal theorists like de Soto, informal economic 
activity is itself an expression of the agency of the urban poor in response to the high costs of 
formalization imposed by the state.1 In this narrative, agency is understood in terms of the 
creativity of the poor and their determination to overcome their exclusion and participate in 
development on their own terms, while the state is viewed as relevant for its economic dysfunction, 
its burdensome regulatory and legal constraints and its poor incentives for formalization. 
Neoliberal interpretations of informal economic activity have come to dominate academic and 
policy literature and inform common best practice, particularly due to their influence over the 
World Bank.2 This thesis offers a dramatically different analysis of the relationship between 
agency and the state in the informal sphere. Agency, it contends, is fundamentally shaped by the 
state and takes places within the structural limitations that the state imposes. The informal sphere 
is not a space for popular agency, but of constant and pervasive state power that the poor must 
navigate in their efforts to participate in urban development and economic life. State repression, 
manipulation and co-option rather than liberation and empowerment are the defining features of 
life in the informal sphere, while the state’s political processes and institutions, modes of operation, 
vertical linkages, treatment of independent and oppositional groups, forms of representation and 
electoral competition and urban development ambitions have a greater impact on agency than its 
regulatory and legal frameworks or its formalization incentives. 
This thesis also casts doubt on the degree to which informal actors are able to ‘change the 
rules’ of state-society relations. The notion, advanced by Tripp, that informal economic activity 
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that can precipitate political transformation by challenging the state’s definition of social justice 
and economic fairness overstates both the extent to which informality reflects a popular sense of 
morality and the malleability and responsiveness of state power.3 Presented with the challenge of 
widespread informality, there is no reason to believe that the state will become more 
accommodating as it adjusts to the livelihood strategies of the urban poor. As the modern history 
of street and market vendors in Kampala suggests, the response of the state is likely to be increased 
political control resulting in further exclusion. The agency of informal vendors in Kampala has not 
driven political change. Instead, political change has dramatically limited their agency and 
worsened their vulnerability.   
The idea that informality can be ‘solved’ through formalization, and that formalization can 
be promoted by reducing the costs imposed by taxation and regulation while reforming the legal 
system to protect the property and contract rights of the poor, ignores the realities of state power 
in the informal sphere. Liberalization does not help reduce informality, but in fact helps to create 
and sustain it. The state is also not relevant for informal actors merely as an obstacle to 
formalization, but also as the body that leads urban management and development and regulates 
access to urban space, and is, at times, repressive, manipulative or even co-operative for its own 
purposes. It also shapes the ability of informal actors to exercise agency through its structures, 
institutions and internal distribution of power, forcing them to navigate their ever-evolving 
political circumstances in ways that can precipitate further marginalization. None of these aspects 
of the relationship between the informal sphere and the state can be addressed through further 
economic liberalization. Indeed, one of the primary drivers of efforts to eradicate informal vending 
is the rise of a form of neoliberal urbanism that views the practice as antithetical to exclusionary 
notions of ‘modernity’ and ‘development’. Vendors do not require assistance as entrepreneurs 
through microfinance, formalization campaigns and private sector development initiatives, but 
relief from the ever-present forms of state power that define their daily lives and limit their ability 
to participate in exclusionary urban development processes.  
The significant restrictions that informal vendors face due to their political circumstances 
do not mean that they are unable to exercise agency. This thesis explores many of the ways in 
which they are able to do so, highlighting how each is fundamentally tied to the state. In doing so, 
it builds on the growing body of literature that considers specific manifestations of agency in the 
                                                          
3 Tripp (1997).  
Young  219 
 
informal sphere by placing the agency of informal vendors in its proper political context, 
emphasizing that questions about the structural limitations imposed by the state and the role of 
political power in driving structural change are central to understanding agency in the informal 
sphere. Its description of the ability of informal vendors to exercise political influence by taking 
advantage of competition and the self-interest of elected officials following decentralization and 
democratization follows most directly from Cross’ work on how street vendors can take advantage 
of poor state integration and the disconnect between the design and implementation of policy to 
remain on city streets.4 It departs from Cross not only in its emphasis on competition between the 
ruling party and the opposition and between the central and local government in a period of 
significant political transformation, but also by detailing how such an equilibrium can end. Just as 
questions of power can lead to the creation of a system in which vendors can exercise political 
influence, the same questions of power can spur institutional transformation in the pursuit of 
political hegemony, resulting in a new status quo in which vendors face state repression, 
manipulation, co-option and developmental pressures while lacking viable avenues for political 
engagement. Informal actors’ ability to exercise political influence is dependent on a specific set 
of state structures and power dynamics that facilitate inclusion and tie the interests of officials to 
those of otherwise marginalized groups. As these state structures and power dynamics change, the 
agency of informal actors necessarily changes as well.  
Placing the agency of informal actors in its proper political context is also essential for 
understanding organization in the informal sphere. The ability of informal actors to organize and 
collectively assert their rights has become a major focus of the ILO, civil society activists and 
scholars, creating a large body of work detailing the successes and failures of organizational efforts 
in a broad range of contexts.5 This thesis demonstrates the extent to which organization is 
dependent on the political conditions in which it takes place. Street vendors in Kampala were 
able—and even encouraged—to organize under the KCC; under the KCCA, street vendor 
organizations have faced co-option and repression while further organization efforts have been 
limited by doubts about political influence and the fear of coercive state power. Market vendor 
organizations in the city were able to successfully oppose privatization by gaining the support of 
the President, winning the right of vendors to manage and develop their own markets, but their 
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5 See Chapter Two, Notes 82-87.  
220  Young 
 
ability to realize their management and development plans have since been dependent on their 
ability to attract political support, while both the President and the KCCA have furthered their 
influence in markets and exacerbated internal divisions. The potential of organization in the 
informal sphere is fundamentally determined by the state, and cannot be reduced to de-
contextualized, de-politicized generalizations about agency that ignore the dynamics of the 
political environment in which organization occurs. Understanding this environment, and how and 
why it changes, is crucial for understanding the fortunes of organizational efforts by informal 
actors.    
Finally, recognizing the structural limitations on agency imposed by the state sheds light 
on the small-scale resistance strategies that informal actors employ in the face of state repression. 
It is the state, of course, that makes these strategies necessary; when channels for influence close 
and states seek to use their coercive power to eradicate street vending, vendors who wish to remain 
on city streets must act in ways that allow them undermine the state’s efforts. In doing so, they 
engage in certain forms of ‘everyday resistance’ that, following Scott,6 contest the application of 
state power while avoiding outright confrontation.7 During election periods, the brief return of 
political competition allows street vendors, following Bayat’s critique of Scott,8 to more actively 
and progressively make claims on the state, even if their gains are temporary and largely disappear 
once elections are over. The repression of informal vending is primarily driven by the state’s 
developmental ambitions and definitions of who and what urban space is for,9 both of which are 
rooted in state power and political control. These dynamics of power and the interests that they 
serve are the defining features of the context in which small-scale resistance takes place.  
The agency of informal actors is fundamentally contingent on the political circumstances 
in which they are forced to act. The relationship between agency and the state in the informal 
sphere is not defined by disengagement, liberation and the transformative potential of grassroots 
entrepreneurial activity, but by constant and ubiquitous state power that permeates all aspects of 
the lives of the urban poor and circumscribes their possibilities for action. The fortunes of informal 
actors are largely at the mercy of political changes that are driven by the interests of power and 
over which they exercise limited influence. Their efforts to participate in urban development and 
                                                          
6 Scott (1985); and Scott (1990).  
7 See, for example, Musoni.  
8 Bayat (1997); Bayat (2000); and Bayat (2010).  
9 Also see Setšabi and Leduka. 
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economic life subject them to various forms of state interference, co-option, repression and 
clientelism and force them to navigate political institutions and processes that are characterized by 
increasing levels of political control. For the urban poor, the informal sphere is not a space for 
agency, but of further socioeconomic and political exclusion. In the face of ever-present state 
power, their ability to improve their condition of marginalization and vulnerability is limited.  
 
Part II: Avenues for Future Research  
 The arguments presented in this thesis point to a number of potentially fruitful avenues for 
future research. Three of these seem particularly valuable: examining how actors other than 
informal vendors are impacted by the evolution of state in Kampala; exploring the effects of the 
state on the agency of informal actors in other political contexts; and considering how the agency 
of informal actors is impacted by conditions and circumstances that are not related to the state. 
 
i. Different Actors 
While this thesis focuses on informal street and market vendors, it would be equally 
insightful to examine how other groups of actors in Kampala have their agency impacted by the 
state. The most obvious new direction in this regard would be to explore how different sectors of 
the informal sphere engage with the state. Many of the features of informal vending that define its 
relationship with the state are specific to the activity itself, particularly the degree to which it is 
seen as a manifestation of urban disorder and underdevelopment as well as a threat to formal 
businesses. Similarly visible forms of informal economic activity that take place in the city, 
particularly work in the boda-boda and matatu industries, offer obvious points of comparison, as 
do other activities that are less prominent but still important features of Kampala’s economic and 
physical landscape, including waste picking, domestic work, construction work and informal 
employment in businesses of various sizes. These activities not only have different social, 
economic and political statuses, but also involve a variety of forms of capital accumulation and 
livelihood support, patterns of ownership, employment relationships and internal hierarchies. 
Exploring how each of these activities is impacted by the monopolization of political power by the 
President and the NRM would be a significant step toward understanding the relationship between 
the state and the informal sphere more generally.  
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It would be similarly worthwhile to examine how groups outside of the informal sphere are 
impacted by Kampala’ changing political environment. Opposition parties and supporters, unions, 
local NGOs, different types of formal businesses or even business associations such as KACITA 
and PSFU all must contend with the state in different ways, and examining how they have 
experienced and navigated changing political circumstances would offer similar ‘bottom-up’ 
views of the state to the one that is presented in this thesis. All of these perspectives promise 
valuable empirical insights that would aid in the construction of a comprehensive understanding 
of the nature of the Ugandan state.  
 
ii. Different Political Contexts 
The accounts presented in this thesis are firmly rooted in the politics of informality and the 
state in Kampala and Uganda more generally. Because the agency of informal vendors in Kampala 
is shaped by their particular experiences of political power in the city, it would be valuable to 
analyze the relationship between informal vendors and the state in different contexts. This could 
be done in two ways. The first would be to examine different political contexts in Uganda itself. 
Kampala, due to its size and political and economic significance, is not necessarily representative 
of all urban settings in Uganda, so it would be valuable, for example, to consider how the themes 
highlighted in this thesis can be observed in cities as geographically, economically and politically 
diverse as Entebbe, Jinja, Mbarara, Mbale and Gulu. It would also be worthwhile to compare urban 
and rural settings, particularly given how much the state’s treatment of informal vending is rooted 
in particular understandings of urban management and development. Finally, regional differences 
in levels of development and experiences of state power are particularly pronounced in Uganda, 
and studying the politics of informal vending in, for example, the north and southwest would offer 
valuable insights into how the state interacts with the informal sphere in markedly different 
political circumstances.  
The second way in which the relationship between informal vendors and the state should 
be considered in different contexts is by analyzing the themes explored in this thesis outside of 
Uganda.10 Similar cases can most likely be found within Sub-Saharan Africa, and considering the 
extent to which the politics of informal vending in the region are commonly dominated by the 
                                                          
10 Relevant literature on the relationship between informal vendors (and informal actors more generally) and the state 
outside of Uganda is explored in Part II of Chapter Two.  
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forms of personal rule, politicized decision-making, informal bargaining, institutional interference 
and manipulation of democratic processes that are highlighted in this thesis would contribute 
greatly to understandings of the ‘African state’. Comparisons should not be confined to similar 
cases, however, but should also include states with notably different political systems and 
economic and social realities as a means of determining the significance that these have in shaping 
the politics of informal vending. Several axes of difference are particularly relevant: levels of 
democracy and authoritarianism; degrees of the concentration of power; structural and 
constitutional arrangements; levels of state repression; levels of development; levels of economic 
liberalization; developmental ambitions; levels of conflict and/or regime stability; and levels of 
social fragmentation along political, ethnic or socioeconomic lines. Such comparisons would 
provide significant insight into the generalizability of the arguments presented in this thesis.  
 
iii. Beyond the State 
This thesis argues that the state plays a crucial role in shaping the agency of informal 
vendors in Kampala. This does not mean, however, that all analysis of informality must take the 
state as its central point of reference. Indeed, informal economic activity should be studied from 
as many perspectives as possible in order to fully understand it in all of its complexity. For 
example, detailed ethnographic accounts and longitudinal studies of how particular organizations 
emerge, evolve, solve problems surrounding mobilization and, in many cases, decline as a result 
of repression, co-option, ineffectiveness or internal problems would contribute greatly to 
understandings of the agency of informal actors. While the extent to which informal actors can 
benefit from external assistance, particularly from unions, NGOs or international organizations 
has already been explored in considerable detail in existing literature,11 more work can still be 
done on the social networks that these organizations are connected to12 and the potential for 
transnational activism in the context of constantly evolving and increasingly globalized media 
environments. More generally, the discourses that informal actors employ and the significance of 
                                                          
11 See Chapter Two, Notes 82-87.  
12 See, for example, Meagher (2010).  
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ethnicity,13 gender14 and culture15 in shaping their agency merit further attention. All of these 
avenues promise to complement the arguments presented in this thesis.   
 
Part III: The Future of Informal Vending in Kampala   
  Informal vending in Kampala is inseparably tied to the state. Its future is therefore largely 
dependent on the continued political evolution of the city. The KCCA is now firmly established 
as the city’s local government body, and the central government is unlikely to voluntarily 
relinquish power in the city and reintroduce the political competition that existed under the KCC. 
The impetus for change therefore must come from elsewhere; given the closed and unresponsive 
nature of the KCCA, however, it remains unclear how effective any internal or external pressure 
will be. The success of the opposition in the city’s 2016 local elections suggests that popular 
opinion is still very much against the ruling party and its dominance of local politics—even if 
some, particularly those in the upper and middle classes, believe that the KCCA is doing a better 
job at leading urban management and development than the politically divided KCC—but the 
structure and operation of the KCCA means that popular opinion counts for little. Led by 
Lukwago—who remains an overwhelmingly popular figure in Kampala—elected officials will 
continue to resist their marginalization and challenge the dominance of unelected technocrats in 
decision-making processes, ensuring that the political struggles between the opposition and the 
ruling party that have occurred within the KCCA since its creation will continue. Unfortunately 
for local politicians, challenging the technocrats that control the KCCA effectively involves taking 
on the power of the central government. This is a difficult task.   
 The prospect of the KCCA lifting its ban on street vending seems remote. Efforts to remove 
vendors from Kampala’s streets are a key feature of the urban management and development 
ambitions that underpin the KCCA’s legitimacy, and they will not likely be abandoned, 
particularly given street vendors’ lack of political influence. The combination of the KCCA’s 
obstinacy and a lack of economically viable alternatives to street vending makes the constant state 
                                                          
13 See, for example: Novo, Carmen Martínez, “The ‘Culture’ of Exclusion: Representations of Indigenous Women 
Street Vendors in Tijuana, Mexico,” Bulletin of Latin American Research 22 (3) 2003: 249-268; and Swanson, Kate, 
“Revanchist Urbanism Heads South: The Regulation of Indigenous Beggars and Street Vendors in Ecuador,” Antipode 
39 (4) 2007: 708-728. 
14 See, for example: Kabeer, Naila, Kirsty Milward and Ratna Sudarshan, “Organising Women Workers in the 
Informal Economy,” Gender & Development 21 (2) 2013: 249-263; and Kabeer, Sudarshan and Milward eds.  
15 See, for example, Seligmann, Linda J., “Market Places, Social Spaces in Cuzco, Peru,” Urban Anthropology and 
Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development 29 (1) 2000: 1-68. 
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repression and vendor resistance described in this thesis particularly intractable. Assuming that the 
KCCA’s ban will not be lifted, breaking this pattern would involve creating alternatives to selling 
on the streets that appeal to vendors. This is precisely the purpose of Usafi Market, but the 
problems surrounding the market have limited its success. Now that the KCCA has assumed 
control of Usafi, it has an opportunity to take steps to ensure that the market becomes both 
economically sustainable and attractive for vendors who would otherwise trade on the city’s 
streets. Whether or not it will—or even can—do so is unknown, but early signs from its market 
management are not particularly promising. Indeed, there are few signs that street vendors in 
Kampala can look forward to any relief.  
 Market vendors face a similarly uncertain future in the city. Whereas the primary threat to 
street vendors in Kampala is repression by the KCCA, market vendors instead face considerable 
challenges that stem from efforts to redevelop markets into ‘modern’ shopping centres. These 
efforts are being led by the central government, the KCCA and groups of vendors themselves. 
Extensive market development plans will soon be implemented by the KCCA in 11 markets 
throughout the city, while the central government will redevelop a further 11 across the country 
under MATIP-2. The experiences of Wandegeya Market suggest that these plans may have a 
negative impact on many vendors’ livelihoods. Further problems can be observed in the three 
markets that this thesis examines. In Owino Market, SSLOA will soon implement its ambitious 
market development plan despite the opposition of a large share of the market’s vendors who are 
concerned about the costs of the project and the narrow interests it represents. Similar conflicts at 
Kisekka Market have hindered redevelopment efforts, and as a result, it is highly possible that the 
KCCA will take over the lease for Kisekka in the immediate future. Now just an empty lot in 
Nakasero, Kisekka Market may never be reconstructed, in which case its vendors would likely 
disperse to other markets throughout Kampala or even leave the city altogether when they are no 
longer able to afford the excessive cost of rent in the arcades that most of them currently inhabit. 
In Nakawa Market, the KCCA seems to have little intention of returning the market to vendors, 
and will likely introduce its own market development plan at some point in the future. In all three 
markets under study here, vendors have little reason to be optimistic about what the future holds.  
Perhaps the greatest hope for informal vendors in Kampala is a fundamental change in the 
central government. While this may seem a remote prospect at present given the degree of 
hegemony enjoyed by both the President and the ruling party, there will come a time when each is 
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inevitably replaced. It is unknown when either of these changes will occur, or indeed what the 
country’s post-Museveni, post-NRM political landscape will look like given the extent to which 
both the President and the ruling party have been virtually synonymous with the state throughout 
their time in power. If, however, either brings about an end to the continuous monopolization of 
political power that has been a defining feature of politics in Uganda under the NRM, then perhaps 
it will also bring about an end to the trend of increasing marginalization and vulnerability that 
informal vendors currently face. Under the right political conditions, informal vendors can 
participate in the processes of urban management and development from which they are so often 
excluded. While these do not currently exist in Kampala, they may yet emerge from seismic shifts 
in local and national politics. For informal vendors, such transformation—whatever its source—
cannot come soon enough.  
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Section I: Background Information 
Gender/Obutonde Bwoomuntu: Male/Musajja __  Female/Mukazi__  Age/Emyaka: ____________ 
 
Market/Akataleko:  Kisekka __  Owino __  Nakawa __  
 
Employment situation/Wekozesaobanedda: Employer/Olinabokozesa __        Employee/Olimukozi__
 Self-employed, no employees/Wekozesatolinabakozi __  
 
Business location/Okolelawa: Open space/Mukifo Kyomubbanga __ Stall/Mudaala __     Lock-up/Obalokaapu __ 
 
Do you own or rent your market space? Olinnannyini oba opangisa ekyifo ekyo kyolimu?   Own/Olinnnanyini __
 Rent/Opangisa __ 
 
What are your average weekly profits? Magobakkigofuna mu week____________ 
 
Section II: Short Answers  










Are you involved in a market association? If so, which one? Why? Olina ekyiwayi kyekyibiina kweebyo ebibiina ebili 





Do politicians ever try to get you to vote for them? If so, how? Bannabyabufuzi bakusikiliza obbalonda? Bwekiba 











Have you ever participated in a protest or demonstration at your market? If so, why? Waliwetabyeeko mu kwekalakasa 




                                                          
1 This survey has been slightly reformatted here for space and clarity. 


















































































































                                                          
1 This survey was designed to be illustrative rather than representative, so this macro data does not necessarily provide 
accurate information on market demographics. 
2 A mismatch between the sum of the figures in a particular column with total number of vendors surveyed in the 
corresponding market indicates that some respondents declined to answer the relevant question. 
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